Department of Economics - University of Innsbruck
Dividing the Dollar Fairly when Agents have Subjective  Evaluations of Claims
 

Rudolf Kerschbamer


Zeit: Montags von 14:30-16:30 Uhr (bzw. geblockt)
 
Ort: Besprechungsraum des Institutes für FIWI,
4. Stock, SoWi

 


 



10.03.08 Vorbesprechung 
  
   
   
   

The Problem

  

GANTNER, A. and KERSCHBAMER, R. (2008) Fair Division of a Dollar among Partners, Research Proposal

 Research Proposal
   
  

Impartial Division



   

DE CLIPPEL, G., MOULIN, H. and TIDEMAN, N. (2008), Impartial Division of a Dollar, Journal of Economy Theory 139, 176-191.


Paper

 

  

TIDEMAN, N. and PLASSMANN, F. (2008), Paying the Partners, Public Choice, forthcoming.

 

Paper

  
   

Partial Division

  
   

MUMY, G.E. (1981), A Superior Solution to Captain MacWhirr's Problem: An Illustration of Information Problems and Entitlement Structures, The Journal of Political Economy 89, 5, 1039-1043.


Paper

   

BRAMS, S.J. and TAYLOR A. (1994), Divide the Dollar: Three Solutions and Extensions, Theory and Decision 37, 211-231.

 Paper

 
   

Majority Bargaining

  
   

BARON, D.P. and FEREJOHN, J.A. (1987), Bargaining and Agenda Formation in Legislatures, The American Economic Review 77, Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, pp. 303-309.


Paper

   

BARON, D.P. and FEREJOHN, J.A. (1989), Bargaining in Legislatures, The American Political Science Review 83, 4, 1181-1206.

 

Paper

   

MORELLI, M. (1999), Demand competition and policy compromise in legislative bargaining, American Political Science Review 93, 809– 820.

 

Paper

  
   

Unanimity Bargaining

  
   

SUTTON, J. (1986), Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction, The Review of Economic Studies 53, 5, 709-724.


Paper

  
HALLER, H. (1986), Non-cooperative bargaining of N  3 players, Economic Letters 22, 11-13  Paper 
   

KRISHNA, V. and SERRANO, R. (1996). Multilateral Bargaining, The Review of Economic Studies 63, 1, 61-80.


Paper

   

TORSTENSSON, P. (2008), An n-Person Rubinstein Bargaining Game, International Game Theory Review, forthcoming.

 

Paper

   
  

Related: Conflicting Objective Claims ('Bankruptcy') Problem



  

O' NEILL, B. (1982), A Problem of Rights Arbitration from the Talmud, Mathematical Social Science 2, 345-371.

 Paper 
   

AUMANN, R. J. and MASCHLER, M. (1985), Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud, Journal of Economic Theory 36, 195-213.


Paper

   
CHUN, Y and THOMSON, W. (1992), Bargaining Problems with Claims, Mathematical Social Sciences 24, 19-33. Paper
   
MOULIN, H. (2000), Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods, Econometrica 68, 643-684. 

Paper

  
HERRERO, C. and VILLAR, A. (2001), The Three Musketeers: Four Classical Solutions to Bankruptcy Problems, Mathematical Social Sciences 42, 307-328. 

Paper

   
THOMSON, W. (2003), Axiomatic and Game Theoretic Analysis of Bankruptcy
And Taxation Problems: A Survey, Mathematical Social Sciences 45, 249-297.
 

Paper

   
   

Experiments



   

Majority Bargaining

  
   

FRECHETTE, G.R., KAGEL, J.H. and LEHRER, S.F. (2003), Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open Versus Closed Amendment Rules, American Political Science Review 97, 2, 221–232.


Paper

  
FRECHETTE, G.R., KAGEL, J.H. and MORELLI, M. (2005), Gamson's Law Versus Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory, Games and Economic Behavior 51, 2, 365-390.


Paper

  
FRECHETTE, G.R., KAGEL, J.H. and MORELLI, M. (2005), Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers, Econometrica 73, 6, 1893–1937. 

Paper

   
DIERMEIER, D. and GAILMARD, S. (2006), Self ­Interest, Inequality, and Entitlement in Majoritarian Decision­Making, Quarterly Journal of Political Science 1, 327–350. 

Paper

   
DIERMEIER, D., MORTON, R. (2004), Proportionality Versus Perfectness: Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining, in: Social Choice and Strategic Behavior: Essays in the Honor of Jeffrey S. Banks, David Austen-Smith and John Duggan (eds.). Berlin: Springer. 

Paper

   

Conflicting Objective Claims ('Bankruptcy') Problem

  
   
GÄCHTER, S. and RIEDL, A. (2006), Dividing Justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims, Social Choice and Welfare, 27, 3, 571-594. 

Paper

   
GÄCHTER, S. and RIEDL, A. (2005), Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims, Management Science 51, 2, 249-263. 

Paper

   
HERRERO, C., MORENO-TERNERO, J. D., and PONTI, G. (2004), On the Adjudication of Conflicting Claims: An Experimental Study, Working paper, University of Alicante. 

Paper

   

 

Rudolf Kerschbamer

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