Student Paper Series #1/2026
This article is part of the Student Paper Series.
Anna Guerri
Trade policy in the European Union is increasingly being used to address security concerns, not only economic ones. Over the past decade, global crises and political pressure have exposed Europe’s dependence on external actors and have prompted a shift in rhetoric and action. My master thesis has examined recent EU trade instruments to explain how the European Commission has taken on a central role in managing these risks, and why this matters beyond trade policy.
From open markets to strategic rivalry
In 2023, the EU’s Single Market celebrated its thirtieth anniversary. For decades, it has supported the European project, strengthening the EU’s global influence. The guiding idea was simple: fewer internal barriers and open trade with the rest of the world would lead to growth and stability. Economic cooperation and security policy were considered distinct areas, and interdependence with partners was generally viewed as beneficial rather than risky.
However, this picture started to change drastically in the 2020s. The COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine exposed how fragile cross-border links can be. At the same time, the EU has become more aware of the hard reality that openness can be exploited. Large actors, including China and the USA, can use Europe’s dependence on foreign supply chains or market access to pursue strategic aims that undermine international rules.
This shift is often described by researchers as securitization or weaponization of trade. The core concept is that economic ties can be weaponised: when one party controls a vital resource, route, technology, or market, they can leverage that control to exert political pressure. In this context, economic policy begins to incorporate security concerns.
The EU’s debate is increasingly focused on reducing risky dependencies and protecting the Single Market against economic coercion. Nevertheless, although academic interest in this “geoeconomic turn” has grown quickly, much of the literature still concentrates on US–China rivalry, and many studies only offer policy advice rather than systematic analysis of EU instruments. A key question therefore remains: to what extent is the EU, through the European Commission, using trade tools to manage security risks?
Crisis change what the EU can do
For a long time, trade and security were considered entirely separate areas. Trade policy focused on exchange and mutual benefit. Security policy, on the other hand, was about protection from threats. The EU’s institutions reflected this division. While the European Commission has always had strong powers in trade, security and foreign policy largely remained in the hands of national governments.
However, the boundary between the two has become increasingly blurred. When economic ties can be used to exert political pressure, trade starts to become a security issue. The energy shock following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is a clear example of this. Dependence on a key supplier suddenly became a vulnerability. While Europe responded with unusual unity, the crisis also exposed gaps in the EU´s ability to act quickly and coherently in the face of economic security risks.
My thesis uses the “failing forward” approach to explain this pattern. The idea is simple. When a crisis hits, EU governments often only agree on the smallest possible solution. This keeps the system running, but it rarely solves the underlying problem. The next crisis then reveals the limits of the earlier compromise, and the EU moves forward, step by step, albeit reluctantly, in a direction that expands its future capabilities.
This perspective also helps to explain the crucial role played by the European Commission. According to the failing forward theory, the Commission does not replace national governments all at once. Instead, it gains influence gradually. It achieves more power by using existing EU competences, particularly those anchored in trade policy, to address new issues that increasingly resemble security challenges. Over time, these practical solutions can transfer authority to the EU, even in areas that were once considered strictly national.
To test this argument, my thesis analysed the period from 2019 to 2024, using a qualitative, document-based approach. Put simply, I compared what the EU says in its key strategy texts with what it does in concrete trade laws. This makes it possible to trace how security language enters trade policy and how new rules can strengthen the Commission´s role in managing economic risks with geopolitical consequences.
The EU’s “trade tools” are increasingly used for security problems
The empirical part of the thesis poses the following question: how can the EU respond when economic ties are used as a means of exerting pressure, even though security policy still depends on national vetoes? The starting point is the EU’s institutional imbalance. Trade policy is highly centralised at the EU level. However, foreign and security policy is not. This matters in a world where power is often exercised through markets, supply chains, and access to technology.
The shift begins with a change in the way that EU leaders talk about trade. Even before the pandemic, Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker indicated a change in approach when he said that the EU should not be “naïve” about free trade and must defend its strategic interests. After 2020, this language became clearer and more frequent. Terms such as “coercion,” “deterrence,” and “resilience” entered trade debates. The idea behind this language is simple: while openness remains valuable, it can also create vulnerabilities.
What followed was a change in practice. Rather than attempting to centralise security policy directly, the EU started to use trade policy as an alternative. This was no accident as trade is one of the few areas in which the EU can act quickly and collectively.
When foreign actors applied economic pressure in the form of restricting market access or exploiting dependencies, the EU responded with trade-based measures that were presented as technical solutions to specific problems. In reality, however, they addressed broader concerns about security, resilience, and strategic autonomy.
The empirical analysis shows this sequence repeating over time and across instruments. External pressure exposes weaknesses in existing rules. Member States agree on limited solutions, often to avoid deeper political conflict. While these solutions improve coordination, they do not fully solve the problem. As a result, new vulnerabilities emerge, generating the need for stronger EU action. With each step, the role of the Commission expands. Initially, it gathered information and coordinated national authorities. Over time, it gained the ability to launch investigations, propose responses, and oversee implementation. This shift occurred gradually, not through grand decisions, but through practical necessity.
The key finding is that security entered EU trade policy through the back door. Rather than being openly debated as a question of defense or sovereignty, it was absorbed into trade rules. This enabled the EU to respond to geopolitical pressure without amending its formal division of powers, but by reinterpreting how existing powers could be used. In this way, trade policy has become an effective, albeit indirect, way of managing security risks.
What this shift means for Europe’s future
Thirty years after the launch of the Single Market, the very interdependence that once symbolised Europe’s success has changed. While economic openness helped generate prosperity and influence, it also created new vulnerabilities. In a world shaped by geopolitical rivalry, supply chain disruptions, and technological competition, interdependence has become a source of conflict.
This reality has forced the EU to reconsider how it acts beyond its borders. For a long time, Europe was a strong economic power, but exercised caution in its foreign policy. Trade often took priority over strategy. This balance is now shifting, as EU institutions and Member States are increasingly accepting that economic and security policies can no longer be neatly separated. When markets are used as leverage, defending openness requires more than trust in international rules alone.
My thesis suggests that the EU is responding in a very specific way. Rather than rewriting treaties or openly centralising security policy, it uses the tools already at its disposal. Trade policy has become the instrument through which the EU can react more quickly, act collectively, and bypass national vetoes, which often prevent foreign policy decisions from being made. This approach is pragmatic rather than grand, as it involves taking gradual steps, shaped by crises, rather than making a single strategic leap.
This shift also has institutional consequences. As trade becomes increasingly linked to security concerns, the European Commission is assuming a more central role. What began as economic management now encompasses tasks such as risk assessment, deterrence, and crisis response. Over time, this changes the distribution of power within the EU, even without formal transfers of sovereignty.
Ultimately, it is not only important that the EU acts differently, but also how it does so. When trade rules are used in response to political pressure, decisions that previously mainly affected companies now increasingly influence security, jobs, prices, and access to essential goods. Decisions regarding investment, public contracts, or market access begin to influence Europe´s exposure to external shocks, and its control over critical sectors. The approach chosen can make Europe more resilient, as acting together through the Single Market can reduce dependence on a single supplier and render economic pressure less effective. At the same time, however, it creates difficult trade-offs. While limiting openness can protect against risks, it can also raise costs, slow growth, and affect relations with partners.
There is also a political side to this shift. When security-related decisions are made through trade policy, they often go through legal and administrative processes that were designed to manage markets, rather than debate high-stakes political choices. While this can speed up action, it can also make decision-making feel unaccountable. As trade policy takes on a security role, questions of accountability and democratic trust become harder to ignore.
Therefore, the broader implication of this research is not that Europe is abandoning openness, nor that it is becoming a traditional geopolitical power. Rather, the EU is learning to operate in a world where rules alone no longer shield it from conflict. The challenge ahead is to ensure that using economic tools for security does not undermine the cohesion and trust necessary for collective action. In the end, the way in which Europe balances openness and protection, legitimacy and accountability, national diversity and collective action will not only shape its trade policy, but also its role in the world.
About the author
Anna Guerri is a Master’s graduate with practical experience in governance at both regional and European Union level. Her research focuses on EU politics, particularly internal policy-making processes and how they reshape competences and shape the trajectory of European integration. Her interests lie in how incremental institutional adjustments—often technical and administrative in appearance—can generate long-term transformations in the EU’s political system and influence its future development.
How to cite
Guerri, Anna (2026): Why trade policy is no longer just about markets, Powi Blog, Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Universität Innsbruck, https://www.uibk.ac.at/de/politikwissenschaft/kommunikation/powi-blog/trade-policy-no-longer-just-markets/.
This article gives the views of the author(s), and not necessarily the position of the Department of Political Science.
The text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).