Gastvortrag | Matteo Baggio (Università degli Studi di Torino)

Recent debates in epistemology have increasingly centered on the contentious Counter-Closure principle, which asserts that if an agent S believes proposition q solely based on a competent inference from proposition p and possesses knowledge of q, then S must also possess knowledge of p. This principle has garnered considerable attention due to various challenges, particularly concerning the issue of inferential knowledge derived from false premises. In this talk, I pursue two objectives: one negative and one positive. Firstly, I will argue that the Counter-Closure principle is untenable, but for reasons that diverge from traditional critiques. Specifically, I will present a novel argument against the internalist perspective that endorses instances of knowledge derived from falsehoods. Secondly, I will argue that the shortcomings of the Counter-Closure principle can be more effectively addressed within an externalist framework by examining new theories of defeaters and the intricate relationship between doxastic and propositional warrant.