Meta-Ontology and Pluralism; after Quine and Carnap
This doctoral research explores the evolving status of ontological inquiry within contemporary analytic philosophy, focusing on the lasting impact of Willard Van Orman Quine and Rudolf Carnap. Their critiques fundamentally reshaped how philosophers approach questions about what exists. Quine challenged traditional metaphysics by proposing that ontological commitments arise from the quantificational structure of our best scientific theories, while Carnap reframed ontological debates by distinguishing between internal questions within linguistic frameworks and external, pragmatic decisions about adopting those frameworks.
Building on these pivotal contributions, the thesis examines how current meta-ontological debates respond to their challenges. It investigates whether ontology can still function as a meaningful and substantive philosophical discipline or whether it is better understood as a reflection of linguistic, conceptual or practical choices. Special attention is given to the development of meta-ontology as a field that critically analyzes the nature, methods and legitimacy of ontological claims themselves.
A central focus of the project is ontological pluralism, the view that there may be multiple, equally valid ways of describing reality depending on the conceptual or linguistic framework employed. The thesis evaluates whether pluralism offers a coherent and defensible alternative to traditional, monistic metaphysics. It considers whether pluralism successfully avoids the pitfalls identified by Quine and Carnap while preserving the philosophical significance of ontological inquiry.
Ultimately, this research aims to clarify the role of ontology in contemporary philosophy and to assess whether a pluralistic approach can reconcile competing perspectives. By situating current debates within their historical context, the thesis contributes to a deeper understanding of how we can meaningfully ask and answer questions about what exists.
Research Concerns
- The status and legitimacy of ontological inquiry in analytic philosophy in light of the critiques of metaphysics by Quine and Carnap.
- The implications of Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment and Carnap’s distinction between internal and external questions for the nature of ontology.
- The viability of systematic metaphysics after the linguistic turn and the naturalisation of philosophical method.
- The extent to which ontological pluralism offers a coherent and defensible framework for contemporary meta-ontological discourse.
Research Questions
1. What conception of ontological commitment emerges from Quine’s naturalized approach to ontology?
2. How does Carnap’s internal and external distinction reshape the nature of ontological questions?
3. In what sense can systematic metaphysics remain viable after the linguistic turn?
4. Does ontological pluralism offer a satisfactory account of ontological discourse in contemporary philosophy?
Methodology
This study employs a philosophical analytical approach involving conceptual clarification, critical examination of key arguments in meta-ontology and comparative evaluation of Quinean, Carnapian and contemporary positions. It focuses on assessing the coherence and plausibility of competing accounts with particular attention to ontological commitment, linguistic frameworks and ontological pluralism.
literature
- Carnap, Rudolf. “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology.” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (1950): 20–40.
- Quine, Willard Van Orman. Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960.
- Armstrong, D. M. Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder: Westview Press, 1989.
- Thomasson, Amie L. Ontology Made Easy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Blatti, Stephan, and Sandra Lapointe (eds.). Ontology after Carnap. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
Supervisor
Prof. Dr. Christian Kanzian
Institute of Christian Philosophy
PhD student
Sifil Joseph
Sifil.Joseph@student.uibk.ac.at
