What is Faith?

An Exploration of Metaphysical and Religious Trust in God

Contemporary philosophy of religion faces a persistent explanatory gap. Standard theories treat “faith in God” as a unified phenomenon requiring consistent evidential or experiential foundations. Yet empirical observation reveals striking diversity: self-identified atheists who trust cosmic benevolence; devout practitioners who cannot articulate doctrinal beliefs; sophisticated theologians whose faith persists despite acknowledging weak evidence for specific religious claims; and “spiritual but not religious” individuals exhibiting stable dispositional trust without communal affiliation.

Existing theories struggle to explain this diversity. Richard Swinburne’s evidentialist framework (2005) treats faith as trust based on probability calculations from total evidence, but this predicts faith should correlate with doctrinal knowledge and evidential awareness -- contrary to observation. Alvin Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology (2000, 2015) distinguishes the sensus divinitatis (producing belief in God) from the Internal Instigation of the Holy Spirit (producing Christian beliefs), implicitly recognizing two mechanisms, but doesn’t develop this as a theory of two distinct faith-types. Theological traditions distinguish “general” from “special” revelation but rarely analyze corresponding faith-forms systematically.

This dissertation explores whether faith in God might manifest in two distinct but often co-present forms with each grounded in different evidential bases and exhibiting different epistemic and phenomenological characteristics. This is dubbed the Dual Faith Hypothesis (DFH).  Metaphysical or “Secular” Faith (MF) may be a habitual trust in God based primarily on impartialist evidence (that is, experiences, intuitions, and reasoning accessible to persons across diverse religious commitments), while Religious Faith (RF) may be habitual trust in God based primarily on partialist evidence (beliefs, practices, and testimonies specific to particular religious traditions). This hypothesis explains several puzzling phenomena in the sociology and phenomenology of religious belief: why “cultural” believers with minimal doctrinal knowledge can exhibit robust faith, why religious skeptics often retain trust in God, why serious doctrinal doubts need not undermine basic faith, and why adherents of incompatible religions can share similar dispositional trust despite irreconcilable beliefs.

What is Novel in This Research

This dissertation’s originality manifests in several dimensions:

Systematic Development of Dual Structure: While distinctions between “natural” and “revealed” theology or “general” and “special” revelation exist historically, no systematic philosophical account (that I know of) treats faith itself as bifurcated into two types with distinct evidential bases and phenomenological characteristics. This dissertation hopes to provide the first rigorous analytical framework for the MF/RF distinction.

Evidential Typology as Foundation: The DFH grounds its distinction in Katherine Dormandy’s impartialist/partialist evidence framework (2018), extending her epistemological categories to analyze faith-types systematically. This represents a novel application of recent work in social epistemology to philosophy of religion.

Explanatory Integration: The DFH synthesizes insights typically kept separate: Plantinga’s sensus divinitatis/IIHS distinction, theological general/special revelation, Kant’s “religion within reason alone” versus “ecclesiastical faith,” Karl Rahner’s “anonymous Christianity,” and sociological observations about “spiritual but not religious” populations. It shows these apparently disparate discussions illuminate a common underlying phenomenon.

Ordinary Language Grounding: Unlike theories developed primarily from theological or epistemological commitments, the DFH begins with ordinary faith-language and seeks to explain actual faith-phenomena. It treats philosophical theism, Somethingism, and institutional religiosity as points on a continuum rather than categorically distinct.

Psychological Realism: The DFH explains faith’s phenomenology better than unified accounts. It predicts: (a) believers can have strong faith with weak theological knowledge; (b) doctrinal doubts create different experiences than existential doubts; (c) interfaith dialogue can recognize shared “metaphysical” trust despite doctrinal disagreement; (d) “spiritual but not religious” represents genuine faith, not deficient religiosity.

Normative Implications: The DFH clarifies debates about faith’s cultivation. Should religious education emphasize impartialist evidence (natural theology, apologetics) or partialist evidence (scriptural study, liturgical formation)? The DFH suggests both are legitimate but address different faith-forms. It also illuminates the “faith crisis” phenomenon: when religious education emphasizes only RF, encounters with defeaters can unnecessarily destabilize MF.

Significance for Philosophy of Religion

If successfully defended, the DFH would, the author hopes, constitute an advance in religious epistemology by:

• Resolving apparent tensions between philosophical theism and religious faith (they’re different faith-types)
• Explaining why evidentialist and Reformed epistemology both capture genuine aspects of faith (they describe different types)
• Clarifying religious disagreement dynamics (shared MF, divergent RF)
• Providing framework for understanding “spiritual but not religious” as legitimate faith-expression
• Showing how faith can be simultaneously stable and vulnerable, certain and uncertain, universal and particular
• Offering resources for ecumenical theology recognizing commonality amid diversity

The research also demonstrates philosophy of religion’s continued relevance by showing how careful conceptual work illuminates both theoretical puzzles and practical religious life.

Critical Questions and Objections to Address

The research will systematically develop and defend the DFH by addressing major objections:

Objection 1: Artificial Distinction: Critics might argue MF and RF are not genuinely distinct but represent a continuum. Evidence exists on a spectrum from more to less tradition-neutral; creating a binary distinction artificially divides unified faith.

Possible Response Strategy: Defend that while evidence exists on a continuum, paradigm cases cluster at poles (cosmological intuitions and arguments vs. scriptural authority), justifying categorical distinction for theoretical purposes. Show the DFH predicts and explains phenomena unified accounts cannot (faith persistence through doctrinal doubt, interfaith commonality despite incompatible beliefs, etc.). Demonstrate that even if evidence is continuous, faith-phenomenology exhibits discrete characteristics suggesting two types.

Objection 2: Evidential Basis Confusion: The DFH claims MF is based on impartialist evidence while RF is based on partialist evidence. But believers typically can’t articulate what evidence grounds their faith. Moreover, believers often cite both types of evidence simultaneously. Doesn’t this undermine the distinction?

Possible Response Strategy: Acknowledge believers typically don’t consciously distinguish evidential types. The DFH is analytical, not phenomenological reportage. Compare: linguists distinguish syntax from semantics though speakers don’t consciously separate them (Strawson). Show that when faith is challenged, believers naturally appeal to different types of evidence depending on what’s questioned (defending God’s existence vs. defending specific doctrines). Argue “based primarily on” allows both evidence types to contribute while one predominates.

Objection 3: Plantinga Already Explains This: Plantinga distinguishes the sensus divinitatis (producing belief in God) from the IIHS (producing Christian beliefs). Doesn’t this capture the MF/RF distinction without additional theoretical apparatus?

Possible Response Strategy: Show important differences: (a) Plantinga’s distinction concerns belief-formation mechanisms, not faith-types; (b) Plantinga doesn’t develop the phenomenological and explanatory implications; (c) Plantinga’s account is internalist to Reformed theology, while DFH is ecumenical; (d) DFH explicitly grounds distinction in evidential types, providing clearer explanatory framework; (e) DFH makes predictions Plantinga’s account doesn’t (about faith persistence, interfaith commonality, etc.).

Objection 4: Religious Diversity Problem: If MF is based on impartialist evidence accessible to all, why do some people lack faith entirely? If evidence is genuinely impartial and accessible, shouldn’t most people share MF?

Possible Response Strategy: Argue impartialist evidence doesn’t compel trust in reality’s goodness and in some ultimate destiny, only makes it reasonable (following Aquinas: motives of credibility, not demonstrations). Individual differences in background beliefs, inductive criteria (Swinburne), cognitive dispositions, and cultural conditioning affect whether impartialist evidence generates Metaphysical Faith. Some evidence being accessible doesn’t entail everyone recognizes or responds to it similarly. Compare: aesthetic beauty is publicly accessible, yet aesthetic responses vary widely.

Objection 5: Theological Inadequacy: From theological perspectives (especially Reformed or Catholic), isn’t all faith ultimately a supernatural gift? The DFH treats faith as natural phenomenon arising from evidence evaluation, ignoring grace’s necessity.

Possible Response Strategy: Distinguish philosophical analysis from theological explanation. The DFH describes faith’s structure and evidential bases without denying theological claims about grace. Grace might operate in both MF and RF (Catholic view) or primarily in RF (some Protestant views). The DFH is compatible with various grace-theologies. Compare: analyzing perception’s structure doesn’t deny God sustains perceptual capacities. Show how DFH actually illuminates theological debates (about implicit faith, anonymous Christianity, natural knowledge of God).

Objection 6: Normative Implications Unclear: If the DFH is correct, should religious education emphasize cultivating MF or RF? Which is “better” or more authentic faith?

Possible Response Strategy: Argue both are legitimate and complementary. MF provides stability and breadth; RF provides depth and specificity. Ideal religious formation cultivates both. However, current practice often emphasizes only RF, creating vulnerability when tradition-specific beliefs are challenged by defeaters. Suggest balanced approach: ground a broad, more general faith in impartialist evidence while enriching through partialist tradition. Acknowledge different religious traditions might legitimately prioritize differently.

Objection 7: Metaphysical Faith Without Content: Can MF genuinely be faith if it lacks specific content? Generic trust in “cosmic benevolence” or “transcendent purpose” seems too thin to count as faith in God.

Possible Response Strategy: Defend that MF involves more than generic optimism -- it includes trust in personal transcendent agency, moral accountability, purposive cosmos. This constitutes genuine faith even if less specific than RF. Compare: trusting a person one knows only vaguely is still genuine trust, though less specific than trusting an intimate friend. Show MF can motivate religious seeking, ethical commitment, and existential confidence -- marks of genuine faith. Acknowledge MF alone may be insufficient for full religious life but deny it’s therefore not “real” faith.

Sample of Literature

Alston, William P. Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991.

Bishop, John. Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Clifford, William K. “The Ethics of Belief.” In The Ethics of Belief and Other Essays, edited by Timothy J. Madigan, 70-96. Amherst, MA: Prometheus Books, 1999 [1877].

Dormandy, Katherine. “Rational Faith: How Faith Construed as Trust Does, and Does Not, Go Beyond Our Evidence.” The Monist 106 (2023): 368-384.

Dormandy, Katherine. “Resolving Religious Disagreements: Evidence and Bias.” Faith and Philosophy 35 (2018): 56-83.

James, William. The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. New York: Dover, 1956 [1897].

Palmqvist, Carl-Johan and Francis Jonbäck. Semi-Secular Worldviews and the Belief in Something Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2025.

Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Rahner, Karl. Foundations of Christian Faith. New York: Seabury Press, 1978.

Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. Faith and Belief. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.

Swinburne, Richard. Faith and Reason, 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Swinburne, Richard. “Philosophical Theism.” In Philosophy of Religion in the 21st Century, edited by D.Z. Phillips and Mario von der Ruhr, 3-19. New York: Palgrave, 2002.

Sullivan, Francis A. Salvation Outside the Church. New York: Paulist Press, 1992.

Supervisors

Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Christoph Jäger, Head of Department, Department of Christian Philosophy

Ao. Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Dr. Winfried Löffler, Department of Christian Philosophy

Doctoral Candidate

Robert Joseph Hutchinson, MA, MPhil

robert.hutchinson@student.uibk.ac.at