8. & 9. 10. 2025 | Epis­te­mic Hori­z­ons

Abstracts (in alpabetical order): 

Elke Brendel (Bonn): Epistemic Contextualism and (Dis-)Agreement in Logic

Abstract: Twenty years ago, Christoph Jäger and I edited a volume on epistemic contextualism (E. Brendel and Chr. Jäger: Contextualisms in Epistemology. Springer, 2005; also published as a special issue of Erkenntnis, Vol. 61, Nos. 2–3, 2004). Since then, numerous contextualist and relativist positions in epistemology have emerged, particularly with regard to knowledge attributions. Despite their apparent plausibility, however, these positions have been criticised, partly due to their supposed inability to account for the intuition of genuine disagreement in certain knowledge disputes. In this talk, I will apply the idea of epistemic contextualism and the concept of epistemic disagreement to the realm of logic. While in epistemic contextualism disagreement about whether S knows that p can arise due to knowledge ascribers having different epistemic standards, logical disagreement about whether p is logically valid can arise because logicians subscribe to different logical systems such as classical, paraconsistent, or paracomplete logic. I will characterise disagreement in logic as a form of doxastic non-cotenability. I will also examine the often neglected concept of agreement, specifying it as a form of doxastic cotenability whereby logicians accept each other's justifications for their beliefs about the logical validity of a given proposition. Finally, I will argue that disagreement about the validity of certain logical principles can be considered genuine, insofar as it constitutes disagreement about which logic is best abductively justified.

Michel Croce (Genoa): Socratic authority, epistemic empathy, and the aims of education

Abstract: In this talk, I examine the implications of Christoph Jäger's account of epistemic authority for the epistemology of education. In recent work, Jäger argues that if the primary aim of education is the cultivation of intellectual character, then Socratic authority is (uniquely) well-suited to help pupils attain this goal. In the first part of the talk, I suggest that although this view initially appears highly compelling, it becomes problematic upon closer scrutiny. In the second part of the talk, I explore whether epistemic authorities should possess and actively exercise epistemic empathy in their interactions with novices.

Katherine Dormandy (Innsbruck): Christoph Jäger on Authority and Predatory Authority

Abstract: In his paper “False Authorities” (Acta Analytica 2024), Christoph Jäger develops a taxonomy of epistemic authority and of false authority. These ideas are crucial for understanding what epistemic authority is, and – just as importantly in a world full of fraudulent influencers – what it is not. An important concept that Christoph’s taxonomy sheds light on is predatory authority. In the interest of furthering this socially relevant conceptual project, I suggest an expansion of his taxonomy of epistemic authority, and pose two constructive challenges to his account of predatory authority.

Thomas Grundmann (Köln): Christoph Jäger on False Authorities

Abstract: In his 2024 paper on false authorities, Christoph defends a hybrid conception of epistemic authority that combines both objective and subjective elements. On his view, epistemic authorities must genuinely be capable of helping their subjects achieve epistemic goals by virtue of their superior capacities, rather than merely being perceived as capable. In addition, such authorities must reliably exercise these capacities. Building on this account, Christoph develops a taxonomy of false authorities, including predatory experts. In my talk, I raise several concerns about this account, particularly regarding its objective components. I then propose an alternative approach grounded solely in the normative force of epistemic authority. On this view, the cases Christoph classifies as false authorities are better understood as instances of genuine, though misleading, authority. I conclude by outlining how we should address such cases.

Geert Keil (Berlin): What is Wrong with the Boethius-Pike-Fischer Argument? 

Abstract: A consistent theme in Christoph Jäger’s academic work is the Consequence Argument (CA) – the alleged master argument for incompatibilism about free will and determinism. In my talk, I will suggest that the CA is overrated and that, despite its intuitive appeal, it should not be regarded as the master argument for incompatibilism. The CA comes in three variants: nomological, logical, and theological. After briefly discussing the reference to the past in the first premise – specifically, whether temporal asymmetry is relevant, given that nomological determinism is time-symmetric and given alethic eternalism –, I will turn to the theological version, which Christoph Jäger refers to as the Boëthius-Pike-Fischer argument. I will argue that the BPF argument has a blind spot by considering only the actual world in which S exercises her two-way power in the way she does. This world is individuated by the first premise, which reports God’s infallible belief that S does X. In an uninteresting sense of “cannot”, S cannot do otherwise in that world: S cannot both have the cake and eat it in the same world. It’s hard to see, however, why this impossibility should make S unable to choose. S’s possession of the two-way power of choice is fully compatible with the fact that alternative exercises of that power are distributed across possible worlds. I will probably argue that the conclusion of the BPF argument – in Christoph Jäger’s formulation: »Therefore, S does not have the power at T2 to refrain from doing X at T2« – exploits an unresolved ambiguity in the notion of »not having the power«, and that the false impression that refraining from doing X requires S to be able to falsify God’s past beliefs arises from mistaken assumptions about the nature of truth.

Arnon Keren (Haifa): Fake Epistemic Authorities and What They Tell Us 

Abstract: The existence of fake authorities is a phenomenon that is very difficult to deny, as is the fact that this phenomenon is the cause of much evil. And yet, in the growing literature on epistemic authority the phenomenon has only recently started to gain more serious attention. This is one reason why Christoph’s “False Authorities” (Acta Analytica 2024) is so important. In this talk I rely on Christoph’s discussion of the phenomenon, focusing on one important kind ofof false authorities—fake epistemic authorities. I ask about the nature of the false claim that fake epistemic authorities make, and the nature of the evil associated with them. I argue that a preemptionist account of epistemic authority gives the most plausible answer to these questions. Nonetheless, accepting this claim, and hence a preemptionist account of what epistemic authority is, still allows us to accept many of Christoph’s normative claims about how we should reacts to those whom we recognize as epistemic authorities, and how epistemic authorities should best function to epistemically help subjects of their authority.

Federica Malfatti (Innsbruck): Meta-Emotions as Epistemic Tools

Abstract: My aim is to create a bridge between two philosophical domains which lie at the heart of Christoph Jäger’s philosophical interests: the philosophy of emotions on the one hand, and the epistemology of understanding on the other. In the philosophy of emotions, Jäger has made a very significant contribution, analyzing an undertheorized or maybe even completely overlooked affective phenomenon: the phenomenon of meta-emotions. The topic of understanding, on the other hand, permeates, more or less directly, Jäger’s entire philosophical contribution in social epistemology. There is a long philosophical tradition acknowledging the important epistemic role that emotions play in our lives. We have moved away from the naive picture of emotions as irrational aspects of ourselves that leads us away from reality, that should be silenced or “kept into a cage” to see reality properly or to appreciate reality for what it is. It is clear now that emotions are not (always) opposed to reason; if cultivated properly, they can be allies to reason. They can be a channel that leads us to appreciate aspects of reality that we would otherwise overlook. As meta-emotions have been neglected in the philosophical literature, what has also been neglected is their epistemic role, i.e., the role that they play in our epistemic life. Drawing and elaborating on Jäger’s work, I will argue that meta-emotions are very important epistemic tools. More specifically, they have an important role to play in processes of self-understanding. So, very much like emotions can help us make sense of the world, or the reality surrounding us, meta-emotions can help us make sense of ourselves. I will proceed in three steps. I will start by reconstructing Jäger’s account of meta-emotions. I will then sketch an account of self-understanding. In a final step, I will show how and under which conditions meta-emotions contribute to self-understanding. If my arguments are along the right lines, achieving self-understanding is not a matter of uncovering hidden truths about ourselves but rather a matter of learning to live reflectively with the affective signals that reveal our inner dissonances.

Nicholas Shackel (Cardiff): Partial Belief and Testimonial Knowledge

Abstract: I give an overview of Christoph Jaeger and my recent work on testimonial knowlege, including our Bayesian model for the uptake of testimony, its implications for two traditional principles of knowledge transmission, our view of the correct principles and what those principles imply for speaker knowledge as a cause of hearer knowledge.

René van Woudenberg (VU Amsterdam): Epistemic Autonomy and Deference to AI

Abstract: This paper examines the tension between two epistemic goods: having instant access to accurate information through AI, and thinking for ourselves. If you can get any answer immediately from AI, is that copying rather than genuine understanding? I begin with Kant’s call to “use your own reason” and ask what this means—and whether we should even want it. After rejecting both extreme and weak epistemic egoism, we develop a graded, non-egoistic account of autonomy. I suggest that epistemic autonomy consists of stereotypical features that come in degrees: figuring things out yourself, trusting others with good reason, forming beliefs without bypassing your cognitive competences, and believing conscientiously. Using Alvarado’s framework of AI as epistemic technology, I then examine concrete cases. When nine-year-old Agnes uses Grammarly, her autonomy is minimal; when professional editor Agnes uses it, her autonomy remains high. The same AI system can enhance or diminish autonomy depending on the user’s competences and AI literacy. I identify “autonomy self-deception”—maintaining illusions of competence while developing genuine dependency. The opacity of AI systems poses particular challenges, requiring users to develop calibrated trust to preserve autonomy while benefiting from AI assistance.