EDUCATIONAL EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE (EEI)
The notion of epistemic injustice should not be limited to the wrong done to an already formed knower engaging in epistemic exchanges, but should include the wrong done to someone when they are prevented from becoming knowers in the first place.

Addressing formational injustice (a form of EEI) in a post-colonial African community.
ABSTRACT
This thesis introduces a broader concept of epistemic injustice called Educational Epistemic Injustice (EEI), that addresses the wrong done to someone not just in their capacity as knowers, but also in their attempts to become knowers. Existing accounts of epistemic injustice have been limited to wrongs done to someone in their capacity as a knower. They have also limited themselves to the perspective of discriminatory injustice, and further to propositional knowledge only. These accounts exclude a crucial stage in the epistemic process, which is the stage that builds one into becoming a knower in the first place. They also exclude distributive injustice and non-propositional knowledge. My account of EEI redresses these limitations. I will discuss two forms of EEI, each of which occurs at a different stage of the learning process: formational injustice and post-formational injustice. Formational injustice occurs when one is wronged by denying them crucial learning resources. This in turn leads to post-formational injustice, which manifests as epistemic malformation and epistemic discrimination. I argue that epistemic injustice is not just discriminatory, ie a result of prejudice, but also distributive – arising from systemic failures that deny individuals the basic resources to become knowers. My account is not just limited to propositional knowledge (knowledge-that) but includes practical knowledge (knowledge-how). The task of my discussion of EEI is to provide a well-grounded account of epistemic injustice that moves beyond interpersonal exchanges to the conditions that build an individual's epistemic agency even prior to such exchanges occurring.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The aim of this thesis is to provide an elaborate account of epistemic injustice that addresses the wrong done to individuals first in their attempts to become knowers and in their capacity as knowers. To achieve this aim, I will:
- Develop an elaborate account of epistemic injustice that analyses the injustice done to individuals, both in their process of becoming knowers, and as knowers.
- Explain the concept of formational injustice as a distributive epistemic injustice with practical examples from post-colonial African communities showing how this injustice plays out.
- Examine epistemic malformation and epistemic discrimination as forms of post-formational injustice and discriminatory epistemic injustice.
- Extend the scope of epistemic injustice to include practical knowledge (know-how) and not just propositional knowledge (know-that).
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
- How do existing accounts of epistemic injustice fail to address the wrong done to individuals in their attempts to become knowers, and how does the notion of educational epistemic injustice capture epistemic injustice from both a descriptive and discriminatory perspective?
- What are the resources needed for an individual to develop as a knower, and how does a denial or unequal distribution of these resources lead to formational injustice?
- What is the nature of the harm individuals experience at the post-formational stage of educational epistemic injustice, and how does this harm affect their epistemic agency and dignity as humans?
- How does educational epistemic injustice extend the concept of knowledge beyond propositional knowledge (knowledge-that) to include practical knowledge (knowledge-how) in the discourse of epistemic injustice, and what is the relevance of knowledge how in understanding and addressing epistemic injustice?
RESEARCH METHOD
This research will use the method of analytic philosophy which includes conceptual analysis, logical argumentation, and critical questioning to understand EEI (a phenomenon that has not been brought to light previously), and give a full account of it. Primary and secondary sources will be used which include: case studies of victims of educational epistemic injustice, existing literatures on the subject matter such as; books, articles, journals, electronic sources and other written materials relevant to this research.
LITERATURE
Coady, D. (2017). Epistemic injustice as distributive injustice. In The Routledge handbook of epistemic injustice (pp. 61-68). Routledge.
Dotson, K. (2011). Tracking epistemic violence, tracking practices of silencing. Hypatia, 26(2), 236-257.
Dunne, G. (2023). Epistemic injustice in education. Educational philosophy and theory, 55(3), 285-289.
Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford university press.
Ryle, Gilbert. (1945). Knowing how and knowing that: The presidential address. In Proceedings of the Aristotelian society (Vol. 46, pp. 1-16). Aristotelian Society, Wiley.
SUPERVISOR
Univ.-Prof. Katherine Dormandy, DPhil.
Department of Christian Philosophy, University of Innsbruck.
DOCTORAL STUDENT
Essence Ene Ujah, M.A.
essence.ujah@student.uibk.ac.at
