Meeting Zone, Department of Political Science, University of Innsbruck, SoWi building, 2nd floor west, Universitätsstrasse 15, 6020 Innsbruck (A) How to reach us
See the dates below
11:30 to aprroximately 12:30, unless otherwise stated
Language: English
Coordinator: Fabian Habersack
We look forward to welcoming students and all other interested parties! No registration necessary. Free entry.
15.10.2024
How Sexist are We, Really? Investigating Gender and Generational Differences in Hostile Sexism and Vote Choice across 13 European Countries
Mariia Tepliakova
University of Salzburg
Troubling developments in the field of public opinion on gender equality and the far-right support in Europe made clear that a linear trajectory towards universally accepted egalitarian values might have been a utopian dream. The rise of the so-called anti-gender backlash, which manifests as sexist attitudes on the individual level, highlights the need to assess the multitudes of these beliefs and their connection to the voting choice and policy preferences of contemporary Europeans. To date, studies on different sexism dimensions: hostile, benevolent and modern – either stemmed from a field of political psychology with smaller, often convenience, sample sizes, focused on a single-country case, and rarely utilised items from more than one type of sexism. Using the special rotating module dedicated to attitudes towards gender equality policies of the European Social Survey Round 11, this study examines how sexist attitudes relate to party family preference and approval of gender equality policies in the context of thirteen EU countries. We find a significant sex cleavage and conclude that hostile sexist values are especially prominent among younger men (below 25) voting for radical right parties across Europe. Moreover, this cohort is more sexist than their fathers and grandfathers, with the sex gap in these attitudes widening for the youngest generation in this sample. Younger men and women have indeed “drifted apart” and prefer different kinds of parties, with Greens emerging as the new “women’s parties”, while the radical right are steadfastly Männerparteien. This study provides much-needed detailed empirical evidence of Europeans’ support for, or backlash against, gender equality policies and measures and contributed to our understanding of the younger cohort’s voting behaviour.
05.11.2024, 18:30-20:00, HS 1 (SoWi)
Will we possibly wake up to a new world order in the morning of 06 November? Can the outcome of a presidential election, can a single politician ‘make’ or significantly influence world order? The answer is simply: “it depends”. And it particularly depends on what one understands under the term “world order”, and the understandings of history and relevant periodizations that come along with this. The presentation will argue that the complexity of contemporary ‘world order’ can only adequately be grasped if one accounts for a co-existing plurality of ordering principles and the different time horizons that come along with this plurality.
Attention: This lecture will take place in the HS 1 (SoWi) from 18:30 to 20.00!
This lecture is also part of our lecture series on US politics: US Politics Uncovered. Wohin steuern die USA?
10.12.2024
This paper examines whether apolitical affect explains affective polarization and its implications for democracy (e.g., trust, democratic norms, violence). The more positive (negative) people feel in their everyday life, we posit, the more (less) benevolently they feel about opponents and democracy. We test this argument in two representative studies. Study 1 exploits natural variation in affect in the Netherlands, Study 2 induces affect in a US-based online experiment. The evidence broadly supports our argument, such that positive affect brightens democratic views, whereas negative affect darkens it. However, the results indicate additional complexity for affective polarization, which we explore in further analyses and discuss for future research. This paper adds an apolitical explanation to affective polarization, contributing to the vast literature on the political causes of affective polarization. Moreover, the relevance of everyday affect alludes to the potential of a short-term and cost-efficient intervention to reducing political conflict: positive affect.
21.01.2025
Economic Inequality, Group Conflict, and Affective Polarization Between the Rich and the Poor
Denise Traber
University of Basel
Authors: Daniel Höhmann and Denise Traber
Does economic inequality lead to higher levels of group conflict and affective polarization between the rich and the poor? We present two contrasting theories: psychological theories suggest inequality heightens class identification and animosity between low- and high-income groups, increasing polarization. Conversely, political economists argue that inequality reduces class identity among the poor, potentially lowering conflict. To explore these hypotheses, we conduct a survey experiment in Germany, exposing participants to information on wealth distribution, and analyze data from the International Social Survey for 17 countries over 30 years. Preliminary findings show that inequality increases class identification among the lower class but has no effect on national identity and yields inconclusive results for perceived social class conflict.
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