Suche:

Moskauer Deklaration 1943 und die alliierte Nachkriegsplanung

Dokument 1
The Moscow Declaration on Austria, 30 October 1943

Dokument 2
No Austrian State Continuity, 6 January 1944 (OSS draft)

Dokument 3
Austrian Nationalism, 23 April 1944 (PWE directive)

Dokument 4
Austria within a Federation, 11 January 1945 (U.S. State Department)


Dokument 1

The Moscow Declaration on Austria, 30 October 1943

The Government of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America are agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German domination.
They regard the annexation imposed upon Austria by Germany on March 15, 1938 as null and void. They consider themselves in no way bound by any changes effected in Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see reestablished a free and independant Austria, and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves, to find that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace.
Austria is reminded, however, that she has a responsibility which she cannot evade for participation in the war on the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation.

Robert H. Keyserlingk, Austria in World War II, Kingston - Montreal 1988, S. 207 f.


Dokument 2

No Austrian State Continuity, 6 January 1944 (OSS draft)

The major problems are the establishment of a new state and the creation of favorable conditions for the development of a specific Austrian national consciousness.
[...]Because the Anschluss had integrated completely the Austrian political structure into the Third Reich, Austria had ceased to exist as a legal and administrative unit in February 1938 [sic], a fact acknowledged by the foreign powers. There exists therefore no legal continuity between the old Austrian Republic and the new state to be established. This conclusion is not only required by a correct legal construction of the historic event, but it recommends itself also for political considerations. Any other construction would lead to the thorny problem of which Austrian constitution should be deemed valid [...]

Robert H. Keyserlingk, Austria in World War II, Kingston - Montreal 1988, S. 210.


Dokument 3

Austrian Nationalism, 23 April 1944 (PWE directive)

Summary

This study brings up to date the P.W.E. paper "Opinion and Morale in Austria" dated 6 Jan 1943, the findings of which are confirmed.
Austria is not to be regarded as a mere part of Germany, but also not as an ordinary satellite or occupied country. The difference may be expressed by saying that the Austrian has a local patriotism even stronger than that of a Bavarian, but no real national feeling in the British, French or even Bavarian sense. Genuine desire for local autonomy is probably almost universal; the Anschluss is unpopular, even among Austrian Nazis, because it proved to involve unexpected domination by "Prussians". Desire for national independence, though present, is probably less deep-seated. It is due partly to the association of Anschluss with war, which followed in the next year, leading to the association of Austrian independence with conditions of peace. It is considerably encouraged by the belief that an independent Austria would receive more favourable treatment from the victorious Allies than a part of Germany. Many intelligent Austrians do not believe that Austria is capable of permanent independent existence. Continued attachment to a democratic Germany is favoured particularly by the parties of the Left. Attachment to Bavaria on the side or the states of the Danube basin on the other is favoured (1) by advocates of a revived Habsburg empire and (2) by those who believe that the Allies would forbid a continuation of the Anschluss. Many dislike the prospect of attachment to the Danubian states on any terms implying the equality of German-speaking with non-German peoples.
The natural "softness" of the Austrian character and the weakness of the patriotic motive for unreasoning hope combine to produce greater pessimism regarding Germany's chances in the war in Austria than in Germany proper. There seems also to be much more active opposition to the Nazi regime in Austria, to which the authorities replied during 1943 with a policy of mass executions. But it is possible that this opposition is largely ineffective. In the first place, Austrians are more disposed to talk than to act. In the second place, the opposition is divided against itself regarding the objectives to be aimed at.

Robert H. Keyserlingk, Austria in World War II, Kingston - Montreal 1988, S. 210 f.


Dokument 4

Austria within a Federation, 11 January 1945 (U.S. State Department)

This review is based on previous memo (PWC 218, 217 A) of 8 June 1944, which was reviewed by the joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the President.

[...] Independence alone, however, would not be an adequate basis for Austria's future. The continuation of the revived state will depend on a solution of its political and economic relations with its neighbours. [This may consist of special economic relations, political federation] or even a merger of sovereignties, provided that such an arrangement is approved by the parties concerned and is acceptable to the international organization.

Robert H. Keyserlingk, Austria in World War II, Kingston - Montreal 1988, S. 212.