

Gastvortrag

## **Ayelen Sanchez**

(Buenos Aires)

## Cognitive psychology and the Agency as fiction: a philosophical analysis of empirical evidence

Mi., 13. 4. 2016, 18.00 Uhr s.t., Seminarraum VI (Karl-Rahner-Platz 3)

The general topic of this talk is the self-ascription of agency. I will explore some influential models from the field of cognitive psychology defending the reductive view that the self-ascription of agency is a mere fiction. These accounts will be the following: Theory-Theory of self-awareness, Theory of Apparent Mental Causation, and Narrative theory of the Self. The main focus will be an analysis of the empirical evidence used in these three models. My claim is that this evidence doesn't support necessarily a reductive ontological account of agency. Finally, I want to point at some alternatives of how to think about agency, which by avoiding to conceive of the self as a (immaterial) res cognitans, do not reduce it to a mere fictional concept.

Ayelen Sanchez is a PhD student at University Nacional del Sur (UNS), Argentina. Her fields



of interest are philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology and modern philosophy. At present she is on a scholarship from the *Ian Ramsey Centre for Science and Religion, University of Oxford* for a research stay at the *Institut für Christliche Philosophie*. Her research topic is agency, specifically the philosophical analysis of empirical evidence on this topic from the field of cognitive psychology. She is a teaching assistant in Modern Philosophy, Metaphysics and Logic at UNS, and a member of the research groups "Argumentation and Rationality" and "Relationships between empirical evidence and philosophical thought".

Alle Interessentinnen und Interessenten sind herzlich eingeladen!