Comments of any kind are eagerly invited.
Let me know also if I made clear that we are no longer trapped in conceptual forms.
Also please let me know if the works I refer to seem interesting.
Thank you.

Jede Sorte von Kommentar ist sehr herzlich eingeladen.
Bitte sagen Sie mir auch ob es klar wurde das wir nicht mehr in Begrifflichen Formen eingesperrt bleiben müssen.
Auch möchte ich gerne wissen ob die Werke die ich zitiert habe interessant erschienen.
Danke vielmals.

DRAFT   "We can now adopt a new understanding of scientific"

We can now adopt a new understanding of scientific knowledge and its role in our society. The concepts which science presents change every year. Neither today's nor next year's concepts are representations of reality.   Many people mistrust science altogether and gladly adopt anything from any other source. Our best thinkers also attest to the fact that every picture, every representation, every theory and set of concepts can break down and be found false.

On the other hand it has become quite impossible to live without science. Science has already gone into most of the things we touch all day. Without science 6 billion people could not live in our crowded space.

Neither believing nor attacking the scientific pictures makes sense. Every scientist is aware of the constant change and ambiguity in every field, but no critic of science would like to board an untested airplane or do without electricity and computers. The scientific concepts are not just true but they are not just invented.

We cannot get further if we stay within concepts. But we can shift from the concepts to consider how they are generated. Instead of being trapped in the picture of nature which science presents, we can think about the process by which concepts are constantly formed and reformed in a wider context. We can examine the reciprocal interaction, the zig-zag between the wider context and the changing conceptual pictures.

To think about concept-formation is most urgent where technology is applied to human beings. This is studied so poorly and primitively, there is no real science of applications at all. Compare the market-application studies with the process in the natural sciences where every new finding is replicated in many laboratories. Every study is many times improved upon. The instruments and measures are based on many layers of careful studies. In contrast, where technology is applied to millions of people, what masquerades for "science" consists of one or two studies never actually replicated, always on the starting level without validated measures, often paid for by parties interested in the market. The well-earned respect for science is mistakenly transferred to these few studies. Government policy committees feel forced to heed such "findings." Where technology is applied to life there is urgent need to become able to think beyond "science." (1)

In every kind of knowledge we can look at the process, the activity by which the knowledge is generated. Here lies a whole territory that has always been treated poorly. Traditional philosophy of science told a simplistic story which no working scientist could use.

Actual observations of scientific activity are rare. How science is generated in practice is left mostly to a kind of political process among scientific institutes, journal editors, and grant-giving agencies. On the theoretical side, the process of concept-formation has been left almost entirely dark. New concepts seem to come to scientists in the shower or in dreams, at any rate in their private space.

A large scientific project involves many kinds of people with different functions. There are laboratory people, equipment designers, many kinds of specialists. Usually there is one theorist in the whole project. When the findings are surprising, this theorist goes home to revise the theory, while everyone else waits. The theorist returns next morning or a few days later with the best possible revision that can be made to bring the theory just a little closer to the findings. He also brings questions which lead everyone to discuss and reexamine the equipment and all the procedures and circumstances. Each kind of specialist works in a different context, including the designers of the equipment and the graduate students who run the labs. They all reenter their implicit contexts and then some of them will have something to say. The theorist goes home and returns a few more times.

Why can only the special theorist revise the theory?   It is because the theory is embedded in a large context in which it arose.   It was fashioned to take account of many considerations. Some changes in it have already been proposed over the years, and for various reasons. Every concept in the theory is embedded in detail, some defined, some anecdotal. Any revision will force changes in related theories. Revising a theory would be easy if one could simply change it to fit new findings. But the revision has to fit everything else too! Every concept is logically connected to other relevant concepts. All this far exceeds what can be thought bit by bit, one bit at a time. It requires feeling the whole context at once, so that precise logic can be used in a relevant way. This is possible only for someone who is spending years consistently living and working with that theory. Only that individual can hope to come up with a workable revision.

Many factors will be fed into computers with various models. But the whole context does not consist of definable units such as a computer requires. (2) **Revising a theory is precisely what computers cannot do.** This fact can lead to a central recognition:

Dreyfus has written pioneering works about the fact that computers cannot understand or create metaphors.   Metaphor does not reduce to a set of rearranged parts. Language is not just a system of tags for separate things. Languaging consists of newly modulated meanings. Much of what we say is repetitious, but several times a day we find ourselves in unusual situations without a routine. Odd sentences come to us. The old words come in new phrases with new meanings. No computer can create such sentences, nor can a computer respond sensibly to them. But a person can. The human process does not remain within a set of unit meanings. It involves an implicit context which must be had as such.

In metaphors, in fresh word-use, and in revising a theory something functions implicitly beyond the defined units. In every creative process something implicit exceeds the discrete units. This happens wherever we look for novelty and change.

For example, psychotherapy. My philosophy led to quantitative research to pinpoint a variable that correlates with successful outcomes when most other measures do not. Successful clients much more often refer to something implicit that is palpably sensed and spoken from. They use a characteristic mode of language which can be reliably recognized on tape recordings.

We went on to create a step by step training system for direct reference to the implicit. There is now a world-wide network of trainers and users. (See www.focusing.org)

In recent decades a major social change is noticeable: Many more people have become able to refer directly to the implicit, or can learn to do so. But there are great differences among people. Some refer to the implicit only in very odd situations; others do it frequently all day, giving them much greater capacities with most situations. The degree of depth also varies. Some people can directly refer to a bodily-sensed implicit meaning; some find it by going back into where they have just spoken from.

Language is part of the human body's interaction in situations. Language-forms and civilized human situations developed together and are sensed implicitly in the body. (See my "Thinking Beyond Patterns: Language, Body, and Situations" and "Crossing and Dipping.") When we think freshly into something that is not yet clear to us, fresh phrases come to us.

We have also devised a step by step procedure for fresh thinking which has been used by high level theorists and by eighth graders. (See TAE Folio) We ask people to work on something they deeply know but have been unable to say much about. We ask them to write a few sentences and underline key words. Then we ask them, quietly and invitingly: "If this word could mean just what you want it to mean, what would it mean?" In response come fresh metaphorical sentences to say what has never been said before.

If the new sentences still employ the usual "big words," the instructions are again: "If this key word could mean just what you want it to mean, what would it mean?" Fresh phrases need to replace all big words. To do this turns out to be possible both for ordinary people and for those who want to go on to create new concepts. For the latter we provide further steps to define precise terms. Fresh phrasings contain the roots of new concepts.

Fresh metaphorical language has the power to originate new meanings. From these one can define new concepts.

Language has been studied mostly as a system of words and grammar. The process of word-use has hardly been examined at all. Wittgenstein pointed out that no concepts determine what words mean. Concepts come later. The meanings of words depend on their use in situations. We have gone on from him to study how words actually come to us. No one else has looked at how words come, so far as I know. If we enter into how they come, we can examine their implicit meaning directly. The implicit meaning is never equivalent just to the words, although it is what we mean by saying them. The words mean the change that saying them makes in a situation. **Words do not represent; they do something.** They mean what they do.

It turns out that all word-use is metaphorical in a new situation. To put it more precisely, metaphor and ordinary word-use are both instances of a wider process of "**crossing**" **which opens a whole arena of philosophical questions that can now be worked on.**

Philosophy has long been stymied before the problem that what we think about concept-formation is just a concept, not its making. No mere concept can replace the role of the person doing the concept-making. But why omit us? It is not as if we had to plan on people disappearing. We were taught that a concept should stand alone, be true alone, a representation.

A number of philosophers have advanced beyond the representational view. Wittgenstein did, although he said he could not say, only "show." Heidegger did in Being and Time, but then spent the rest of his life with the conundrum that what exists hides behind what it

presents. Bakhtin and Bataille said that we can think beyond what is presented, but only in very odd cases. This has changed.

We need no longer be trapped within concepts cut off from their genesis and re-genesis. There is no longer the problem of having only concepts. We can conceptualize so as to keep a concept connected to where it arises. We can re-enter there, and return with something further. The concept embodies its own capacity to be "revised."

Many new strategies of thought become possible. We can enter into the implicit context when we just used a concept, to find just what strand of its meaning was at work.

From the new precision we can generate a new set of units for logic and the computer. We need not always stay within our starting set of terms. (3)

The new precision (which we then say) "was" implicit was not there as such before. Finding and formulating it may shift our understanding of the whole context. But the shift will not be to something different, rather to what (we then say) was what we really meant all along.

When people explicate something implicit they usually say that their words **"<u>match</u>"** their experience, as if they were comparing two forms. But an implicit sense does not have the kind of form that could match words or concepts. What people call "matching" is indeed an important relation between implicit and explicit but the relation is not representation. It is rather the characteristic continuity we experience when new sentences and then new concepts articulate and explain what we had understood only implicitly. We call this relation "***<u>carrying forward</u>***." (A metaphor is one instance of carrying forward. See long derivation of this concept in ___.)

The philosophical treatment of carrying forward is unavoidably complex because there is no such thing as an implying alone. Something implicit is always also an explicit occurring. Direct reference is already a kind of symbolization, when we say "this," or "that whole thing," or even when we only point our attention. And even without attention, the events always (as it were) "symbolize" just this implying, and no other. There is always an inseparable implying-occurring *pair*, but a kind of separation is possible at our next move, because from the implying we can go on differently than we can from what occurred. We can go from any pair to a direct reference pair, and from this to many other kinds of pairs. Each makes for a characteristically different kind of "logic." Seven major kinds of paris have been examined. Or, we can move by logical inferences and from computer to computer on the explicit side. We can make long chains of either kind, or go between them.

<u>In our further move the implicit always responds with exactly this, always just so.</u> The implicit is always highly demanding and leads to special phrases and concepts which can arise without any scheme. If a scheme is applied it crosses with the implicit to yield a specific result which could not have been found from the scheme alone. If one is just playing, there are many possibilities. If one is working on a problem, even trying many schemes my fail to produce an advance. But there is no arbitrary variety. From the implicit the various new concepts constitute a grouping, a "fan" that retains its link to its origin. We can think directly with **<u>implicit and fan</u>**. In this way we can employ many models, not just one. Each may lift out something relevant. We can also find what precise strand of a model functioned to do so. To "find" and define what function**<u>ed</u>** is always a further carrying forward.

We refuse to read a philosophical scheme into the implicit. The implicit is more intricate, more finely ordered than any scheme, as we see from its capacity to respond in a specific way to mutually exclusive schemes. I called the implicit "multischematic." It does not consist of

discrete units: I called it "nonnumerical." It functions as an **unseparated multiplicity**.

Past present and future are not separate positions. All the past functions in new ways in the present. Everything that happens **crosses** with everything that happened. The implying of a next event is always a finely webbed intricacy. Top-down distinctions so often have no effect, no traction at all, whereas distinctions found from direct reference carry forward in their very forming and coming. From direct reference the words come to us already crossed in new phrases, crossed with everything that has led up to the present moment in that situation.

"Crossing," "carrying forward," and "unseparated multiplicity" are instances of a new kind of pattern. that emerge from explicating can seem "illogical" because they include their own relation to their implicit source. The relation cannot be represented before us. **With such patterns we can generate logically connected stable concepts but do not reduce to separable parts because they carry implying forward.**

We do not lose the power of "flat" conceptual patterns if we study anything with new concepts that have the carrying forward power as well, and as philosophers we want especially to study **the explicating process. We study it with phrases and concepts that retain their link to the process they explicate and instance.**

COMPARING THE TWO KINDS OF PATTERNS:

When existence is thought of as filling space-time, our concepts are not understood as occurrences within the wider context of interaction, **only "about"** entirely separate external things. Therefore they are taken as "representations." Truth is understood as representation, correspondence. Discrete external entities are understood in a positional patterning presented before us. Perception is taken as basic, and percepts are treated as if they were independent entities.

To consider a living process we cannot begin with perception; we must put **interaction first**. Thinking and research are living activities. We are always already in a contextual interaction with what we then conceptualize and re-conceptualize. Presentations relate to each other not only externally but also in carrying forward the interaction with them in which we live, operate, and understand them.

Although we can have bridges to the older kind of concepts, the new kind of patterns render things very differently than the current kind of concept.   For example, the word "values" that facts exist, so that there is something separate called "values" which have to be brought to facts. The word "consciousness" assumes that human behavior and perception can be understood scientifically as spatial occurrences so that "consciousness" is something separate which has to be added and could be unnecessary in science.

We do now also have ecology and other holistic approaches. With ur new approach living process can be understood as a sequence of carrying forward wholes.

Almost all common phrases and scientific concepts are still structured so as to render everything as something that exists in empty space and has separable parts. Earlier philosophers saw no way out. To get past this we replace the main old words with new metaphorical phrases and we formulate our new logically precise terms directly from them.

In experiments and applications the living things and people are assumed to be nothing but what the scientific concepts render. There is assumed to be nothing else sitting there. With

the new concepts one would we able to think about the wider context in which the reductive entities are a changing subset.

Discrete entities with separable parts cannot be alive. Discrete entities have only external (formal, logical) relations to each other. In contrast, in living tissue, animal behavior and language the factors are **crossed**. From fresh metaphorical sentences we can define a new kind of terms that remain consistent and can employ logic, yet also have internal relations to each other. Because the terms relate to each other in both ways, the result of a logical inference can open major further understandings.

For discrete entities "existence" means filling space-time. Each "is." In living process "existence" has a more intricate meaning.   One finds not just discrete "is-entities, but always also a further **implying**. Occurring which is always also an implying is found in any topic that involves living, including the philosophical explicating the living process of explicating, as we are just now doing. A living process never has only a static "is," always also a further implying.

Now we can sense that a great many things in our world could be understood very differently if we had concepts that include implying. A system of such concepts has been formed for a new understanding of living tissue, animal behavior and perception, and human symboling. (These concepts can also constitute bridges to the usual kind of concepts). Better ones will no doubt be devised once many people see understand this initial set of concepts. (A Process Model, www.focusing.org/process.html).

A living body **is** an environmental interaction. Body life is always also environmental eventing. A living body always implies its next whole occurring, and enacts it when possible. We can think about living tissue as coordinated interaffecting in which body-environmental sub-processes differentiate and imply each other (ibid IVA).

Animals behave in a context of behavior possibilities. The enacting of any one behavior changes whether and how the others can occur.

Animals do not just move. Only humans have a perception of "just" moving, i.e., only a change of location in an empty space consisting of location points. This is a purely human symbolic creation which does not exist alone, but only with a bodily carrying forward to which one pays no attention. Even the highest monkeys cannot put two sticks together to make one long one, to reach some bananas. They cannot see **a length** just as a pattern outside themselves. They lack the capacity called "the external tie," to see things as if separate from themselves. This is the capacity of "homo faber," the power to make things by treating things as patterns that can be moved while nothing else changes, dividing and combining discrete parts, as if things were just spatial patterns (ibid VIIA).

Our new philosophical terms enable us to derive knowledge as representation and to show that the supposedly empty space is symbolic and rests on a more original bodily process. In a puzzling way this has been known that the presentations before us cannot represent existence.

Logic is powerful but of course it requires discrete which are artificial products. Scientific prediction succeeds to the extent that we get **the same** result from **the same** operation under **the same** conditions.   But the question is how a repeatable procedure is discovered, and a result becomes recognizably "the same." This is achieved only after a long time in which one

gets nothing the same. And, when something does repeat, one may not know just what one did. Everyone in science knows this daily work and play.

So it is obvious that whatever we study does not come in already-cut units. In Austin's phrase, "there are no handy denotative packages" which can just be filled into logical relations and fed into a computer.

But this raises a vital question: If the changing presentations before us do not represent existence, why do they carry the implicit forward? Why do they further **explain** what we knew implicitly? What does "explain" mean here?

Logical patterns and patterned discretes "explain" by generating before us a whole field in which we can act in new ways and move and make new things. But this new moving and making also carries forward the living tissues and the context of behavioral possibilities in which we humans do not only move patterns, but of course also eat and sleep and procreate. The usual kind of concepts cut the separate entities off from the wider process, as if they represented reality just because they explain and let us do and make so much. And of course, the new doing eventually leads to new findings which force changes in next year's presentations. So we need not complain about the changes either, but we can think with **a new kind** of concepts which incorporate and remain connected to the implicit context from which they arise.

When we make concepts from and with directly reference to the implicit, a new world opens. The doubled kind of patterns also generate a different kind of space in which we can move and act and understand in new ways. We are only at the very beginning of creating that new world.

When there will be a great many more such concepts, they will be new kind of world in which we can live major parts of our lives. The social institutions (including science) will have changed. No longer will they employ so little of what a person can be. Currently our society seems to know nothing about what it is to be a persons inside. But it can become understood that the audible language is only the top of a continuity with our intricate aliveness. People will be able to speak freshly from there if they want. No longer will our social patterns be so utterly wasteful of what a person can be. People will always still want many simple restful routines, but freshly newly generated speech and thought will be an understood possibility in our social relations. Concepts like "crossing," "carrying forward," and "unseparated multiplicity" (by these or other names) will play a role in how we understand each other and our contexts.

We can recognize how little the empty categories actually reach, especially in the social realm. Much finer and more effective distinctions can arise directly from the implicit context. For example, government committees are empowered to examine social and economic policies with just the existing categories. Often the members have very limited experiential backgrounds but even when they do there is no room for their individual explications of new aspects that need to be considered.

References: see philosophy on www.focusing.org