



Gastvortrag

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(Cardiff u. Oxford)

Objective Bayesianism and Uniqueness

Gastvortrag im Rahmen der Vorlesung "Vertiefung erkenntnistheoretischer Grundfragen"
von Christoph Jäger

Di., 13. 06. 2017, 14:00-15:30 Uhr s.t., Seminarraum VI (Karl-Rahner-Platz 3)

Whether and to what extent the modern school of objective Bayesians can vindicate their view of probability is a matter of considerable significance. An important suggestion of theirs is that the maximum entropy principle can replace a principle which is known to get into paradoxical difficulties of non-uniqueness: the principle of indifference. I have shown elsewhere that the maximum entropy principle cannot get round Bertrand's chord paradox. Yet objective Bayesians have recently taken to announcing they are unworried by non-uniqueness. In this paper I show that early objective Bayesians in part distinguished themselves from subjective Bayesians over this very point. Furthermore, insofar as modern objective Bayesians claim to be offering a comprehensive and philosophical theory of probability that warrants the name 'objective', they must meet the constraint of uniqueness, since non-uniqueness is just a polite term for inconsistency.



Dr Nicholas Shackel is a Reader in Philosophy at Cardiff University and a Distinguished Research Fellow at the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. Research interests: rationality and the relation of rationality and normativity; his work here includes practical reason and also the relation of rational belief and the ethics of belief. He also works on the application of formal methods to philosophical questions; here he has published widely on metaphysics, epistemology and paradox.

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