



## **EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY: PREEMPTION THROUGH UNDERCUTTING DEFEAT**

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We defend a limited version of the Preemptionist View on epistemic authority, based on the idea that an authority's belief provides a layperson with an undercutting defeater. Due to plausible characteristics of epistemic authority, learning of an authority's belief typically gives the layperson not only good prima facie reason to adopt that belief, but also to believe that it is the result of a superior evaluation of the layperson's own evidence. This amounts to full undercutting defeat and thus rationally requires the layperson to no longer directly rely on her evidence in evaluating the subject matter, vindicating the preemptionist verdict on such cases. Naturally, however, this result is limited to situations where no defeater-defeater in the form of domain-independent information is present. This makes it possible to explain both plausible cases of rational preemption and of rational reliance on one's own evidence within a unified, defeater-based framework.