In the contemporary literature, there is not agreement on what moral intuitions are. I begin my talk by distinguishing between a doxastic and a non-doxastic interpretation of moral intuitions, and argue in favor of a doxastic interpretation—largely on the grounds of the benefits to be derived, theoretical and practical. I then discuss three salient (although not uncontroversial) roles for first-order moral intuitions:

- **Role 1:** To serve as a test for moral theories.
- **Role 2:** To provide a particularist grounding for moral judgment.
- **Role 3:** To stop a vicious infinite regress of justified moral belief.

I argue that a doxastic interpretation of moral intuitions better serves these roles than a non-doxastic interpretation. I conclude the talk with a discussion of a variety of indicia regarding the reliability of moral intuitions, drawing on comparisons between moral and non-moral intuitions, and argue that in many contexts, moral intuitions are very reliable, sufficiently so that some rise to the level of qualifying as instances of first-order moral knowledge.

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