



Institut für Christliche Philosophie

Workshop


Randolph Clarke

(Tallahassee, FL, USA)

Agent Causation and the Phenomenology of Agency

Di., 4. 7. 2017, 16.30 Uhr s.t., Dekanatssitzungssaal (K-R-Platz 1)

A number of philosophers claim that the phenomenology of first-person agency is agent causal, and that it thus conflicts with theories of action on which actions are caused by—or are causings by—mental events, states of affairs, or states of agents. Here it is argued that even granting the characterization of agentic phenomenology as agent causal, it presents no threat to the targeted theory. A distinction is drawn between agent causation that is ontologically fundamental and agent causation that is not fundamental, but instead grounded in causation by mental events, states of affairs, or states of agents. It is argued that the theory of action in question is compatible with agent causation of the latter kind. The phenomenology may be veridical, then, even if, speaking of what is fundamental, it is correct to say that actions are caused by—or are causings by—mental events, states of affairs, or states of agents.



Randolph Clarke is Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University. He is author of *Libertarian Accounts of Free Will* (OUP, 2003) and *Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility* (OUP, 2014) and co-editor of *The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays* (OUP, 2015). His other publications include “Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism” (*Mind*, 2009) and “Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will” (*Noûs*, 1993).

Anmeldung erforderlich bei: daniel.wehinger@uibk.ac.at