



THE TRUST ARGUMENT FOR PREEMPTIONISM

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Preemptionist accounts of epistemic authority argue that when you learn that an epistemic authority (fully or partially) believes that p you should (i) adopt the authority's doxastic attitude and (ii) replace your own reasons concerning whether p with the sole reason that the authority believes that p . An important argument for this view is the trust argument: Trusting someone (to do something) involves making oneself vulnerable to her; so trusting an epistemic authority requires "lowering one's epistemic guard" and thus to abstain from employing own reasons (even as additional or back-up justifiers). I examine the trust argument and argue that it fails to support preemptionism. Instead, the risk constitutive of epistemic trust can be explained in terms of the trustor's uncertainty about reaching the truth when adopting the authority's attitude.