INTRODUCTION

1. Aims

Multilingual dictionaries are commonplace in most fields of research. Unfortunately, this does not appear to be the case in philosophy. This gap is to be filled by the dictionary in hand, which provides an essential reference work and an instrument for the acquisition of foreign language competence in the field of philosophy.

Since English is becoming the *lingua franca* of philosophy as well as of other disciplines, an acquaintance with English technical terminology has become increasingly important in gaining access to the international scientific community. As mobility (in the context of academic exchange programmes and guest professorships) is dependent on foreign language competence, a command of technical English has become an important precondition of participation in the global job market. For the English speaking world this dictionary provides a means to gain better access to the language which is of particular significance to philosophy through thinkers such as Kant and Hegel, Nietzsche and Freud, Heidegger and Habermas.

This dictionary aims to open up new possibilities. As this is a pioneering intellectual undertaking and the editors were not able to rely on the efforts of past generations of scholars, the authors were confronted with the difficult realization all pioneers have to face: *Pigmei gigantum humeris impositi, plusquam ipsi gigantes vident.*

2. Selection of terms

The question of a clear demarcation of topic is a crucial one for every dictionary and, as every user knows, is always only successful in part. For the following reasons this issue is a particularly complex one for a technical dictionary of philosophy.

(1) As a foundational science or theory of principles (of being, knowledge, ethics, art etc.) philosophy does not occupy a specific sector in the spectrum of humanities and sciences, but addresses principal questions in virtually all fields. Accordingly, the terminology used in philosophy is equallly broad, making the specific selection of technical terms particularly difficult.

As philosophy touches on so many related subjects it has been considered prudent to include technical terms from related fields as far as they are relevant to philosophical discussion. In keeping with this principle, concepts deriving, for example, from mathematics, economics, technology, and art have been included in so far as they pertain to the *philosophy* of mathematics, the *philosophy* of economics, the *philosophy* of technology, and the *philosophy* of art, whilst technical terms that have no significance outside their specific field have not. As the views concerning the necessary terminology of a specific field of philosophy vary, the selection of terms will always contain a certain degree of arbitrariness. What seems a dispensable entry to one user may appear to be of great significance to another. In cases of doubt experts in the respective fields have been consulted. Every selection of terms is based on the knowledge that it is impossible to meet each and every user's expectations. We have also tried to avoid a prescriptive approach, not giving in to the temptation to define what philosophy is and what it is not.

(2) Viewed historically, difficulties derive from the fact that many scientific disciplines were once part of philosophy and only slowly separated from their mother subject. The mathematicians and natural scientists of the past were once philosophers, just as the founder of modern economics, Adam Smith, was. The same holds for theory of law, theory of the state, theory of art, social theory, psychology, and other subjects.

The fact that some terms included can also be found in other general or technical dictionaries can hardly be seen as an argument for the exclusion of the term. Terms that are considered to be philosophically relevant are listed for practical reasons. If one were, for example, to look up *uncertainty principle* in a dictionary of physics, *labour theory of value* in a dictionary of economics, and *high-risk technology* in a dictionary of technology, one would need to draw on a plethora of reference works containing a very high percentage of entries probably never used in philosophical discussion.

Frequently, the impression of excessive generosity in the inclusion of terms is a superficial one. In fact, many entries share a specific philosophical meaning with a general one we might recognize.

Thus Heidegger's *equipment* might provide such an example with others to follow:

> **Zeug** *n* • equipment [Heidegger] [ont]
>
> **Heimatlosigkeit** *f* • homelessness [Heidegger] [met] < Seinsvergessenheit, Uneigentlichkeit, Entfremdung
>
> **passion** • Passion *f* [rel, psy], Leidenschaft *f*, Emotion *f*, Affekt *m* [psy, eth, aes] → emotion, affection < theory of affects < W 381, 761, 1106; Gefühl *n* [Hume etc] [psy] < sentiment
>
> **quality** • Qualität *f*, charakteristische Eigenschaft *f* [ont, gep]; [Kant] [epi] < reality, negation, limitation
>
> **primary qualities** • primäre Eigenschaften *pl*, primäre Qualitäten *pl* [Locke etc] [epi, met] ↔ secondary qualities < sensible qualities
>
> **humour** • Humor *m* [gen]; Charakter *m* [psy] < theory of humours

What at first glance seem to be terms derived from everyday language turn out to be concepts taken from philosophical discourse.

But even where the philosophical meaning coincides with everyday meaning, this also constitutes an important piece of information for the user. When this is not the case, this kind of information is also significant as it helps to distinguish between everyday meaning and the philosophical use of the term.

> **posit** • Setzung *f*, Gesetztes *n* [Quine] [log, lan]; Positum *n* [Ockham etc] [log] → positum
>
> **to posit** • setzen [Fichte, Hegel] [met] < I posits a non-I

Occasionally ordinary language terms serve as cross-references to technical terms:

> **Interesse** *n* • interest [psy] < Erkenntnisinteresse
>
> **Erkenntnisinteresse** *n* • cognitive interest, knowledge interest [Habermas], interest in knowledge [epi, sci] < erkenntnisleitendes Interesse, Wissensdurst, Objektivität
>
> **Ironie** *f* • irony [epi, psy] < sokratische Ironie, Selbstironie < W 1222
>
> **sokratische Ironie** *f* • Socratic irony [gep] < existentielle Ironie
>
> **Kolonisation** *f* • colonization [pol, eco] < Besiedelung, Dekolonisation
>
> **Kolonisierung der Lebenswelt** *f* • colonization of the life-world [Habermas] [soc]

One of the problems to be addressed is the question of how far rare terms associated with particular philosophical schools should be included. To ensure a balanced approach, we determined that the question of the significance of entries should be decided on the basis of immanent criteria by adherents of the respective traditions and schools. To the analytical philosopher Heideggerian terms will largely appear dispensable, whilst Heideggerians will show little interest in the terminology of analytical philosophy. The main aim must be to ensure that the adherent of a school finds the core terms in his or her field of work. While one philosopher may be glad to discover a translation/an equivalent for *inborn inhibition to kill* as found in research on aggression and peace studies, another will be pleased to find *eccentric positionality* in philosophical anthropology, and another *falsificationism* in the theory of science, or the metaphysical *Abschiedlichkeit*. The main aim must be to provide every user with an answer to his or her specific query.

Names of philosophers

These are only listed if the spelling differs in the respective language (e.g. *Aristotle* • *Aristoteles, Albertus Magnus* • *Albert the Great*). Names used as identifiers are provided in English only.

Latin, Greek and other foreign language terms

These (e.g. *res cogitans, aletheia*) are included in so far as they are considered customary terms or expressions that play a significant role in the English or German language of philosophy. The same applies to the inclusion of *Asian terms* (e.g. *sunyata* or *pandit*).

Irrespective of our attempts to ensure a balanced choice of entries, the particular problems resulting from the nature of philosophy make it clear that the issue of the subject-related selection of entries will never be solved to everyone's satisfaction. Those required to work with a large number of dictionaries will, however, concede that this problem applies at least in principle to most fields.

3. List of philosophical works

As it is, generally speaking, very difficult to determine an appropriate translation of *philosophical titles,* and these frequently contain information relevant to the entries in the dictionary, a list of titles is found in the appendix. Where appropriate, the dictionary entries contain cross-references to the titles listed.

The list of works provides common translations of titles that are often difficult to determine or discover. A typical reference would be: *the accidental • das Zufällige n [met] < W In Defense of the Accidental • Apologie des Zufälligen [Marquard].* This provides useful additional information on the work from whence the concept is derived, or philosophical literature relating to the concept.

The original title is provided in italics if the work was originally written in a language other than those given and this information is considered of interest to the user. The title is marked *sic!* if titles or spellings appear strange, but are spelled in that way, e.g. *The Medium is the Massage (sic!) • Das Medium ist Massage [McLuhan, Fiore].* It is to be noted that titles are frequently cited, using their original spellings that may deviate from present day spelling.

4. Entries

As we assume that a bilingual technical dictionary is only used by people with some command of the target language, the relevant information is presented to the user as succinctly as possible – in accordance with the example set by technical dictionaries in other fields. Each entry is intended to provide as much information as possible using a minimum of words.

Choice of lemma and nominal expressions

The lemma is generally entered as a noun or noun combination. Verbal expressions such as *schlussfolgern • to conclude* and adjectives such as *rationell • efficient, economical* are listed separately, providing they are considered to be philosophically significant in their own right.

Noun expressions are by default listed in the singular if the plural expression is not the established philosophical term, as in *notiones communes • common notions* or *Produktionsverhältnisse • relations of production*.

Spelling

For practical reasons we have opted for British spelling. The inclusion of both British and American spelling would have made a large number of entries very confusing. The American spelling of entries such as *behaviour, labour, fulfilment, centre* and others are generally listed in good monolingual dictionaries and have therefore not been specified here. Furthermore, a number of terms allow different spellings (e.g. *medieval/mediaeval*). In such cases we have chosen the most common spelling, rather than the etymologically correct one.

In the case of some entries as with, for example, *Großbürgertum • haute bourgeoisie, upper middle class* there are subtle differences between British and American English even with regard to *content*, which a dictionary is not in a position to clarify through commentary. Thus, since Britain has an aristocracy, the equivalent of *Großbürgertum* there is *upper middle class*, whereas in the United States, which does not have an hereditary aristocracy, *Großbürgertum* would correspond to *upper class*, that being the highest social stratum there is.

Use of brackets

When parts of words or phrases are bracketed, e.g. *(Wieder)Vergeltungsrecht, Grenzen der (sinnvollen) Sprache, ontological proof (of the existence of God)*, this indicates that there are two legitimate readings of the entry, either the extended form *Grenzen der sinnvollen Sprache* or the shorter form *Grenzen der Sprache,* which is to all intents and purposes interchangeable and therefore synonymous.

When individual letters or syllables/morphemes are bracketed, as in *judg(e)ment, dialectic(al)* or *Lamarck(ian)ism,* this indicates morphological or spelling variants. The variation between *al* formations (i.e. *dialectical* versus *encyclopaedic*) reflects usage while not excluding a possible morphological form not given.

Order of entries

The entries are placed in alphabetical order, the German umlauts (ä, ö, ü) being treated as their non-umlaut vowel equivalents (a, o, u). In accordance with the example set by many technical dictionaries, groups of words are sorted word by word, the hyphen (e.g. in *fact-value distinction*) being ignored. Compounds that can also be written as one word and are hyphenated only for better readability (e.g. *co-evolution/coevolution*), are sorted as one term as the use of hyphens is largely arbitrary, and meaningful clusters of entries often result from this sorting algorithm.

Heideggerian terms, however, are treated differently as the words with hyphenated prefixes are generally marked by a change of philosophical meaning compared to the unhyphenated prefixes (e.g. *dis-stance* or *onto-logic*). Entries containing a genitive apostrophe *s* (e.g. *the people's will* or *Newton's formula*) are sorted without the apostrophe. Bracketed expressions, such as *being-(in-)present • Dabeisein*, are sorted ignoring the expression in brackets.

In the case of bracketed expressions or keywords, where part of the word has been bracketed to indicate two possible spellings or variants, the bracketed element is ignored in the sorting procedure. This is intended to aid finding the sought-for term as the user is likely to use a top-down procedure and shall therefore hit upon the entry, reducing the risk of (mistaken) failure to retrieve the entry. If someone is trying to find *Paradox(on) von Achilles und der Schildkröte* failure to discover the entry under *Paradox von Achilles und der Schildkröte* might result in the user terminating the search, assuming that the entry does not exist. In the few cases where the bracketed expression forms a necessary part of the keyword as in *(m, n)-Matrix* the entry is sorted according to the bracketed expression (cf. below).

Abbreviations and acronyms

Acronyms, such as *AID → artificial insemination by donor* are sorted in the same way as all other words in the dictionary, i.e. according to the acronym proper, rather than its underlying constituents.

Use of article

Generally speaking, the definite article *the* is only given where necessary. If dispensable, it is not listed, as a prepositioned article makes finding the appropriate entry more difficult. Where it occurs the article is ignored in the sorting process and is accordingly entered in lighter print (e.g. *the invisible, the ought*). The infinitive indicator *to,* placed before verbs (as in *to live dangerously*), is also ignored for sorting purposes.

A sample list of entries would therefore run as follows:

a fortiori argument
a posteriori
ABC art
AID

dialogic(al) form of philosophizing
dialogic logic
dialogic(al) philosophy
dialogics

fact of pure reason
fact of the matter
fact-value distinction
factual argument

Ichtrieb
Ich-Überschreitung
Ichverhaftetheit

Logik
Logik, axiologische
Logik der ersten Stufe
Logik, dialektische
Logik erster Ordnung
Logik, intensionale
Logik von Port Royal

Logik, wilde
Logikkalkül

Machiavellismus
Machtdemonstration
Mächte
Machtelite
M-Grammatik
(m, n)-Matrix
M-Semantik

Nemesis
Neo-Aristotelismus
neokantianische Philosophie
Neo-Konfuzianismus
Neokreationismus
neolithische Revolution
Neo-Marxismus
Neoplatonismus

Paradox(on)
Paradox, absolutes
Paradox der Existenz
Paradox, moralisches
Paradox(on) von Achilles und der Schildkröte
Paradoxien der Mengenlehre

Reduzierbarkeitsaxiom	*Tatsache der reinen Vernunft*
re-écriture	*Tatsache, empirische*
reelle Zahl	*Tatsache-Wert-Unterscheidung*
re-emphatische Definition	*Tatsachenargument*
Referentialität	

Grammatical categories of entries

Entries are generally nouns or nominalizations, even if not preceded by an article, e.g. *as if* • *Als Ob* should be read *THE as if.* This principle does not apply to abstract nouns that are preceded by zero article.

Both in German and in English the noun is only preceded by an article if the expression occurs as such (as in *die Viel-zu-Vielen* • *the many-too-many* and *the Inquisition* • *Inquisition*). As German, in contrast to English, has a grammatical as well as a natural gender, nouns are followed by a gender marker *(m, f, n),* specifying which grammatical gender is to be attributed to the noun. Occasionally, a noun is followed by two gender markers (e.g. *Kalkül m/n*) referring to the difference in meaning between *der Kalkül* and *das Kalkül* or indicating the possible use of both variants. If an adjective-noun phrase is listed without preceding article the adjectival form is inflected, i.e. *logisches Quadrat* can also be read as *das logische Quadrat.*

Word order in multiword phrases

In accordance with established lexicographic practice fixed expressions are listed according to the first word of the phrase (e.g. Nietzsche's *blonde Bestie* • *blond beast*). In other phrases these are listed under the significant headword (e.g. *Seins, Wesen des* • *being*, *nature of/essence of*). As in some phrases the choice of headword is not necessarily obvious the entry is then provided under more than one headword to ensure that the entries can easily be found. This seemingly redundant practice is advantageous as it contributes to the clustering of related entries. This preferred mode of entry is used in the German-English dictionary. Synonymous phrases are also listed in the English-German part, providing useful clusters here as well (e.g. *analysis of meaning, meaning analysis* • *Bedeutungsanalyse*).

Compound nouns and periphrastic genitive constructions

In English many entries are used both in an attributive and in periphrastic form (e.g. *process of individuation, theory of value(s)* versus *individuation process, value theory*). This corresponds to the German use of compound nouns or genitive constructions. Where this is the case, frequently both expressions are listed to indicate that these expressions can be considered semantically synonymous. Generally, however, the entries are listed according to common usage.

Use of hyphens

Whether a word is written with a hyphenated prefix (such as *anti-*, *contra-*, *neo-* or *pseudo-*) or not does not follow a strict rule (c.f. *pseudo-fact* • *Pseudotatsache, pseudoscience* • *Pseudowissenschaft, anti-illusionism* • *Anti-Illusionismus*). Entries are therefore either hyphenated or not according to common usage and have neither been systematized nor entered in both the hyphenated and unhyphenated form as this would have resulted in a loss of information regarding current usage. Note comments on sorting principles (cf. *Order of entries* above)*.*

Sometimes hyphenation does not vary as usage is fixed (cf. *Möchtegern-Philosoph* • *would-be philosopher*). Nietzsche and Heidegger frequently use the hyphen to highlight specific meanings, which can therefore only be rendered with hyphen (cf. *Schwester-Seele* • *sister-soul, Ent-fernung* • *de-severance, dis-stance*).

In cases where (for whatever reason) entries differ from standard German orthographic practice or are used inconsistently (e.g. *In-Sein, In-der-Welt-sein*) we have followed the spelling of the original texts.

Variable spellings

As already mentioned, a number of terms do not have only one consistent spelling (cf. *medieval/ mediaeval*). In such cases the most common spelling has been chosen and not the etymologically most correct. If individual letters as in *judg(e)ment* or syllables as in *dialectic(al)* or *Lamarck(ian)ism* are bracketed these indicate alternative spellings. The fact that English adjectives vary between the final

morpheme *-ic* and *-ical,* as in *dialectic* or *dialectical*, is due to variation in the usage. In the entries *Friede(n)* or *Glaube(n)* the bracketed *n* indicates that the nominative has two forms/variants, i.e. *Friede* and *Frieden*, *Glaube* and *Glauben*. If an entry only indicates one of the variants, such as Kant's *Vernunftglaube • rational faith/belief,* this shows that the philosopher used only this expression.

Capitalization of foreign words

In German Latin and Greek terms are capitalized if they have become German loanwords (cf. *Iustitia, Terra incognita*). If this is not the case the terms have small initials (e.g. *intellectus archetypus, orthos logos*). English terms are capitalized when they are established as German loanwords (e.g. *Big Brother, Scientific Community*). This also applies to other terms of foreign language origin (e.g. *Dharma, Tao, Bodhisattva*).

Capitalization in English

English terms are generally capitalized when they are considered proper nouns/names in English (e.g. *Theatre of the Absurd, Post-Metaphysical Age*). The same principle applies to Latin and Greek entries, as well as those derived from other languages. Note that such decisions are frequently a question of interpretation. The capitalization of technical terms derived from German (e.g. *abschiedlichkeit, entwicklungsroman, realpolitik)* depends on the extent to which they have been incorporated into the English language – which is also open to interpretation. The fact that these German expressions are frequently rendered in italics is ignored.

Special cases

Heidegger's *Sein* is generally capitalized in English (e.g. *Sein als Jetztzeit – Being as nowness*, *Sein und Zeit – Being and time*) in order to emphasize the special nature of his concept of time. The term *angst* (German *Angst*) in contrast is not capitalized in English due to its being more common.

Singular or plural forms

In principle, nouns are entered in the singular. Entries normally or exclusively cited in the plural are listed as such (e.g. *property relations, common notions*).

If a singular entry is rendered with a plural form in the other language (e.g. *verstaatlichte Industrie • nationalized industries*) then this is because the German or English singular term is used as a collective noun/term.

Gender and case in German

German phrases that include more than one noun have a gender marker for the key word or lemma (e.g. *Gesetzes, Abschreckungstheorie des f* to be read as DIE *Abschreckungstheorie des Gesetzes*). This principle also applies to expressions where the attribute and not the noun is the key word or lemma, (e.g. *Sprachgeschöpf, Mensch als m* = DER *Mensch als Sprachgeschöpf*). For pragmatic and logical reasons the lemma/keyword is rendered in the case it takes in the phrase (e.g. *Werdens, Stufen des* reads *Stufen des Werdens*). In adjective/noun phrases the adjective is rendered in its inflected form (e.g. *ursprüngliches Sein* instead of *das ursprüngliche Sein*). Two gender markers, as in Orwell's *Altsprech m/n • Oldspeak* are listed if both are possible. Sometimes the article varies according to the meaning the term expresses, as in *Kalkül m/n der Kalkül m, das Kalkül n,* or *der Moment m*, *das Moment n*.

Noun endings have two gender markers if both the phrase contains more than one noun (as in *Schein und Sein m,n • appearance and reality, Form und Funktion f,f • form and function* and *Angebot und Nachfrage n,f • supply and demand*. If the noun phrase is a fixed expression as in *Gebote und Verbote pl • dos and don'ts, Händler und Helden pl • traders and heroes, Werke und Taten pl • words and deeds* these are marked as plural. No gender marker is used if the fixed expression occurs without article as in *Brot und Spiele • bread and games*.

Gender and case with loan words

In view of the fact that grammatical gender does not reflect natural gender in German (e.g. *die Person* refers to both man and woman) we have not specifically added female gender markers to nouns referring to persons or professions (e.g. *logician • Logiker* not *Logiker/in*). The editors place greater significance on the inclusion of terms derived from feminist philosophy and gender studies than the

need to include variants of grammatical gender that can confuse non-native speakers. The adoption of English terms including *man* (e.g. *man as social being, man as the end of history*) renders the expression as it is to be found in traditional historical texts. Otherwise the entries reflect common usage as in *humans/human beings* instead of *man*, or *humanity/the human race* instead of *mankind*. The entries thus register the usage and not the attitude of the authors towards the language norm or a need to change it. As far as the context permits one can replace *man* by *humans*, *human beings* and *mankind* by *humanity/the human race* and similar.

Order of translations/equivalents

If more than one corresponding term/translation is suggested, these generally occur in a weighted order – a) the most accurate equivalent/translation is given first, b) the most frequently used form is listed next as in e.g. *äußere Erfahrung • outer experience, external experience*. This indicates that *outer experience* is more accurate and/or found more frequently than *external experience*.

A foreign language expression will be listed first if it corresponds to the expression of preference used by a particular philosopher or philosophical school of thought (e.g. *amor fati • Amor fati, Liebe zum Schicksal* with reference to Nietzsche) or if it is commonly used in the target language *(blank slate • tabula rasa, leeres Blatt, unbeschriebene Tafel).*

cf. **Systematic identifiers**

Entries including a slash indicate ordered sets of alternatives. Thus *umstrittene Urheberschaft • dubious/contested/spurious authorship/origination* is to be read as *dubious authorship* or *contested authorship* or *spurious authorship* or *dubious origination* or *contested origination* or *spurious origination*. Similarly *mental states • geistige/ mentale Zustände* would have to be read as *geistige Zustände* or *mentale Zustände.*

Bracketing

If parts of the entry have been placed in brackets, as in *ontological proof (of the existence of God),* this indicates that the shorter form as well as the extended one are used in English. Thus the entry *Grenzbegriff • limit(ing)/boundary/marginal concept/notion* is to be read as *limiting* or *limit* or *boundary* or *marginal concept* or alternatively as *limiting* or *limit* or *boundary* or *marginal notion*.

Abstract nouns

Frequently, abstract nouns are derived from adjectival forms. Next to the etymologically plausible suffixes we now also find suffixes the language purist might object to, e.g. *logicality vs. logicalness*. In nouns derived from adjectives we thus find the etymologically plausible suffix *logicality* but also a more questionable suffixation *logicalness*. These entries reflect current usage.

Obsolete terms

As the dictionary does not merely include current philosophy but tries to cover the whole range of philosophical terminology, it also contains obsolete or antiquated terms whose meaning has changed, without this being marked us such, e.g. *body politic • politischer Körper (Hobbes, Rousseau).*

Systematic identifiers

Systematic identifiers such as *epi, log, ant* etc. (cf. *Abbreviations and symbols*) are intended to provide an indication of the philosophical field to which the terms are to be attributed. These identifiers serve to distinguish different usages of the same term such as *constitutional types • Verfassungstypen pl [Aristotle etc] [pol, jur] → types of constitution; Konstitutionstypen pl [Kretschmer] [psy] < theory of constitutional types*. As the thematic categorization of philosophical terms is not always unambiguous the contextualization provided by the identifiers is only of an approximate nature and neither exclusive nor exhaustive.

Identifying names

Sometimes it has appeared useful and/or important to add a name to a term to specify with whom the term is generally associated and to provide a more specific contextualization. Although this may indicate the philosopher who actually coined the term, it can also simply mean that the individual is

generally associated with the expression. The inclusion of a name is particularly useful in identifying certain translations of a word with the use of a term suggested by a particular philosopher. If the terms suggested differ and are identified with more than one name, more than one philosopher may be listed in brackets. In view of the fact that the dictionary user is assumed to be acquainted with the field, first names are only given when there is a likelihood of confusion (e.g. **F**rancis Bacon, **R**oger Bacon, **A**dam Smith, **B**arry Smith). Yet, the Freud mentioned in the dictionary is always assumed to refer to *Sigmund Freud*. Where his daughter *Anna Freud* is meant the initial of the first name is given to provide the necessary specification.

5. Abbreviations and symbols

a) Thematic identifiers

act	philosophy/theory of action	*his*	philosophy/theory of history
aes	philosophy of art and aesthetics	*jur*	philosophy/theory of law
AI	artificial intelligence	*lan*	philosophy/theory of language
ant	philosophy of anthropology	*log*	Logics
asp	Asian philosophy	*mat*	philosophy/theory of mathematics
cul	philosophy of culture and	*met*	metaphysics
	cultural anthropology	*min*	philosophy/theory of mind
dec	decision theory	*nat*	philosophy/theory of nature,
eco	philosophy and theory of economics		natural science
env	ecology and environmental	*ont*	ontology
	philosophy	*pol*	political philosophy
epi	epistemology	*psy*	philosophy/theory of psychology
eso	esoteric philosophy	*rel*	philosophy/theory of religion
eth	ethics, moral philosophy	*sci*	philosophy/theory of science
fem	feminist philosophy/gender studies	*soc*	social philosophy
gen	general term	*sys*	systems theory
gep	general philosophy	*tec*	philosophy/theory of technology

It is clear that *asp* for Asian philosophy is not so much a thematic as a geographical marker. This is used since the origin of Asian terms is frequently obscure and the technical terms are often difficult to categorize according to an essentially Euro-centric taxonomy.

b) Other abbreviations and symbols

f   *Feminine*

m   *Masculine*

n   *Neuter*

Two gender markers separated by a slash indicate that both articles are possible (e.g. *Kalkül m/n)*. Two gender markers separated by a comma, on the other hand, (e.g. *Erscheinung und Wirklichkeit f,f*) refer to the respective grammatical gender of both nouns of the phrase. Only one gender marker is used if the expression generally occurs as a pair *(*e.g. Kant's *Notwendigkeit-Zufälligkeit f)*.

When the entry consists of more then one noun, the gender marker refers to the head (noun) of the phrase and determines which article is to be used with the expression, e.g. *Abschreckungsfunktion des Gesetzes f* means *DIE Abschreckungsfunktion des Gesetzes*. This principle also applies to reordered entries such as *Sprachgeschöpf, Mensch als m* which should be read as *DER Mensch als Sprachgeschöpf*. For reasons of brecity the lemma is always provided just as it occurs in the respective expression, e.g. *Werdens, Stufen des*. In attribute-head phrases the adjective is generally given in its inflected form (e.g. *ursprüngliches Sein* instead of *das ursprüngliche Sein*).

As far as possible, in German entries gender markers have also een attributed to Greek, Latin and Asian terms. Note that these do not always agree with the grammatical gender of the nouns in the languages of origin but refer to the gender attributed to the entries in German, which are generally rendered in italics (e.g. die *lex naturalis*) to indicate that German principles of capitalization are not complied with.

In accordance with the publisher's guidelines and the fact that grammatical and natural gender do not always correspond (cf. *die Person* referring to woman and man alike), the suffix *-in* is not added to the entries where the object of reference might also be female (as in *Logiker*). As the use of the suffix *-in* is not consistent, the entries could have confused the non-native speaker.

pl   *Plural*

nt   *Not translated*
The English entry is the same as the German one; if *nt* is followed by a number of translations, this means that both the form given in the German and the suggested translations are identical. The italicized gender marker following the *nt* marker is placed in brackets to distinguish it more clearly.

etc   *Et cetera*
And others, either following or preceding (used in references to philosophers, e.g. *Hegel etc*). In English (unlike German) a comma always precedes *etc*, which has not been used in the entries for the sake of economy and to avoid excessive punctuation.

/   The entries preceding and following the slash are interchangeable.

;   What follows is thematically separated from the preceding, e.g. *mutualism • Mutualismus [nat]; [Proudhon] [soc] < exchange bank*: thus the reference to a cognate term only applies to what follows the semicolon, i.e. the specifically sociological interpretation of *mutualism*. In the case of *absolutes Nichts • absolute nothing(ness)* the reference < *Nirwana* only refers to Asian philosophy *[asp]*, not to the sphere of general ontology *[ont]* separated by a semicolon.

If the thematic identifiers are not separated by a semicolon the references point to all uses, e.g. *Unregelmäßigkeit • irregularity* [jur, eth, lan], [gep, aes] < *Ungleichmäßigkeit, Regelwidrigkeit, Anomalie*.

°   *With reservation*
This identifies entries that are either unusual or nonce words. When added to a name this indicates a spurious attribution.

6. Cross-References

In contrast to the entry format of other technical dictionaries, this reference work includes cross-references as these provide an informative context to the terms, supplying valuable information regarding the use of the term. This should make the tracing of particular expressions and undirected search processes much easier. The following symbols are used.

→   refers to a synonymous expression
↔   refers to an antonymic expression
<   refers to a cognate term or thematically related expression
< W   refers to a relevant title of philosophical works

Note that synonyms and antonyms are rather widely defined. They may be specified by one of the meanings given for an entry and/or relate to the specific uses of a term by a certain philosopher (e.g. Kant's opposition of *Verstand • understanding* and *Vernunft • reason*, Tönnies' distinction between *Gemeinschaft • community* and *Gesellschaft • society* or Jung's *animus ↔ anima*).

If a synonymous relation seems questionable, but the terms are clearly associated, then a cross-reference (<) is given to indicate that the terms are cognates or thematically related. In German, for example, *Ethik* and *Moral* are not considered to be synonymous terms but only cognates, whereas in English these terms are treated as being synonymous.

The reference to cognate terms (<) means that the term cited is semantically or historically related to the entry in the cross-reference. This will enable the user to refer to related words, if he or she does not feel the entry is suitable for his or her purposes.

It should be noted in general that with cross-references the question of choice of reference to a synonym or a cognate term cannot always be answered univocally, since in such an instance it is often a case of *partial synonymy*. As a bilingual dictionary – in contrast to a monolingual lexicon – cannot offer full explanations we have to trust that the user's intuitive understanding of the language will make comprehensible why, in seemingly dubious cases, a particular cross-reference has been chosen in preference to others.

Redirections

If an entry includes a synonymous reference to another entry without a translation the editors wish to indicate that the term listed is not normally used and that the equivalent word or phrase referred to is the more common equivalent (e.g. *common weal → common wealth*). In case of Latin, Greek and other foreign-language terms and expressions the user is generally redirected to the customary English equivalents. Synonymous back-references are provided (e.g. entry with a reference from *chain of chance events • Zufallskette f [met] → sequence of chance events*)to show that the two terms are interchangeable.

A redirection is also used to refer the user from the idiosyncratic spelling of an entry to the more usual and accepted spelling as in the case of *Aitiologie → Ätiologie • (a)etiology* in German and *Apollinian → Apollonian* in English or a redirection from a general term such as *Ausfluss* (emanation) to the philosophically relevant meaning *Animation → Beseelung*. A German entry redirects to an English term if the latter is an accepted loanword in German (e.g. *augmentierte Realität → Augmented Reality*).

Symmetrical synonymy

Commutative synonymy is indicated if the two terms or expressions are mutually interchangeable (e.g. *Verhaltensforschung → Ethologie* and *Ethologie → Verhaltensforschung)*. A commutative synonymous relationship is not indicated if, for example, one of the synonymous terms/expressions is obsolete (e.g. *Gynäkokratie* for *Matriarchat*). Latin or Greek terms are identified as synonymous expressions if they are still commonly used in philosophical discourse.

Cross-reference to cognates

Cross-references (i.e. references to a semantically related or cognate term) are intended to provide useful semantic contextualization and/or lead the user to the desired entry (e.g. *Big Brother < thought police, surveillance state*), or list the terms subsumed under the lemma (e.g. *logisches Quadrat < kontradiktorischer Gegensatz, konträrer Gegensatz, subalterner Gegensatz, subkonträrer Gegensatz,* or Plato's *schlechte Staatsformen < Tyrannei, Demokratie, Oligarchie, Timokratie*). In the case of *subalterner Gegensatz < logisches Quadrat* or of *Teilchenbeschleuniger < Teilchenphysik* the reference provides a link to the associated context or helps determine the meaning and use of the lemma more clearly.

Occasionally (as in *Ästhetiker < Ästhet; Theismus < Deismus*), the associated term points to a subtle difference between similar terms, despite the fact that the dictionary cannot explain precisely what that difference is. A lengthy note cannot, for example, be provided to explain the difference in meaning between the German *Diatribe* and the English *diatribe*. The distinguishing use of cross-references points to the different meanings the terms have acquired over time.

In some entries, cross-references may appear to be stating the obvious; for those not acquainted with the subject or language, however, such information may be valuable. When multiple synonyms, antonyms and cognate terms are referenced, these are sorted according to semantic proximity and frequency.

7. Translation problems and problems of equivalence

The entries have been obtained by diligent research based on primary sources, encyclopaedias, glossaries, reference works and current periodicals, which are so numerous that they cannot all be listed. The translations or equivalents have been checked and double-checked by multilingual experts in their respective philosophical fields. It should be emphasized, however, that – in contrast to the technical languages of, for example, medicine or technical science – philosophical terminology is indeed particularly complex and difficult, which means that it was sometimes impossible to get all the expert opinions to agree. Thus the editors bear the final responsibility for the correctness of the information provided.

It is generally assumed that the user of a technical dictionary is sufficiently acquainted with the term she or he is looking up. Therefore the dictionary does not try to explain the terms, but rather attempts to provide equivalents in the respective language.

Unusual terms

Like in English, German technical terminology tends to include unusual words. Lack of acquaintance with the expressions should not lead to the conclusion that these concepts do not exist. Just as the native English speaker is not likely to be conversant with all the technical terms found in the language, due to the vastness and versatility of natural languages, so the German native speaker is also not going to be acquainted with a large number of technical terms in German. All of the terminology given in this dictionary stems from reliable sources. Where this is not the case, as the terms are either inferred or nonce-formations, the entries are marked by the degree symbol °.

Order of translations/equivalents

The order of translations follows the criterion of usage rather than that of etymological correspondence or proximity (e.g. *predictability • Vorhersagbarkeit, Voraussagbarkeit, Prädikabilität).*

Usage

The sole criterion in the determination of the equivalents/translations is usage and not the logical consistency of the terminology used. This explains the differences to be found in the details of some terminological clusters.

Thus the translations of expressions containing *Zufall (Zufallselement, Zufallsentdeckung* etc.) are rendered as *random/aleatory element, chance/accidental discovery* depending on the context. The same principle applies to *desire* (as in *desire to communicate, desire to dominate, desire to kill,* etc.), where the corresponding terms depend on the respective context of use *(*compare Kommunikations*wille,* Herrschafts*bedürfnis,* Mord*lust* etc.). Special attention is paid to the subtleties of established usage: thus *social question* as a fixed phrase corresponds to the German *soziale Frage* (and not to *gesellschaftliche Frage*), whilst *social rank* can be translated as *sozialer* or *gesellschaftlicher Rang.*

Contextualization

It is to be noted that the specific meaning or significance of a translation can frequently be derived from the contextualization (i.e. thematic identifiers, identifying names and cross-references): e.g. *preservation • Aufhebung f, Bewahrung f [Hegel] [met] → suspension < sublation, dialectical triad; Erhaltung f [env, cul] < preservation of the species.*

Non-German translations/equivalents

Amongst the German translations the user will occasionally find Latin, Greek or other language terms which are not marked in any special way, if they have adopted the status of established loan words in German and can therefore be considered German technical terms (e.g. *blank slate • tabula rasa; appeal to pity • argumentum ad misericordiam).* The informed user is expected to be able to identify the terms and their origin.

Bracketed expressions

When parts of an entry are placed in brackets, as *in (Recht auf) Wahlfreiheit* for *right to choose,* this indicates that both the shorter form, as well as the extended one, is used in German.

8. Acknowledgements

*   *   *

The editors are fully aware of the fact that such a dictionary project can never be complete as philosophical discourse and the required terminology is constantly developing and changing. In this respect no truer observation has ever been made than: *"Making a dictionary is like painting a bridge: by the time one coat of paint has been applied, the bridge is in need of another."*

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