PEACE RESEARCH: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE*

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The term “peace research” has now been used for about half a century to refer to existing institutes and activities. Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) was the first to use it in its name, even if a couple of other institutes came before it. Both the term and what it refers to are a couple of decades older than that. The first proposals to create institutions for what was called “peace research” came already before the Second World War. So did the early publications of such founding parents as Lewis Fry Richardson, Quincy Wright and Pitirim A. Sorokin. Many languages translate it directly by adding the word for “research” to the word for “peace”, some use versions of the French “polemologie” or other terms. Many institutes have some permutation of “peace”, “conflict” and even other terms in their names.

There will never be any universal agreement on the term. Both “peace” (not to mention “security”) and “research” are what the philosopher Gallie (1956) called “essentially contested concepts”, which will never get consensual definitions except, perhaps, in quite small or even sectarian communities. Different cultures - and different political orientations in the same culture - use the term “peace” (as crudely translated between different languages) to connote different combinations of values with different relative emphases: absence of war, welfare, (divine) justice, social harmony, inner personal peace, and so forth (Ishida 1969; Galtung 1981; Koppe 2001). As for “research”, we had several waves of debates, whether general or specific to social science, about the criteria (epistemology, theory formation, empirical methods, etc.) an activity or its results should satisfy in order to qualify as “research” or “scientific”. None of them resulted in consensus in the scholarly community.

A third controversy is from the 1960s: what to mean by juxtaposing “peace” and “research” into one term? The interpretation “research on peace” is often used to indicate that it should be seen as an academic discipline among others? “Research for peace”, on the other hand, tends to underline the value orientation that is often emphasized in formulations at conferences and in journal editorials. Apart from the ambiguity of “peace”, there is a risk of circularity: to know (rather than guess) what research promotes peace, we should already have some research results on precisely this.

A whole book could be written about various definitional discussions. For the purpose of the present article, however, the most practical thing is to proceed in the same way as if it had been about, e.g., oncology: to proceed from notions that are widely shared by scholars referring to themselves as oncologists or peace researchers, rather than from how those who do not think the research field should be defined. Several facts about peace research are only to a limit extent affected by definitional shades.

If we look at peace research from the perspective of sociology of science, some important questions to ask about its gradual institutionalisation concern numbers. The number of institutes and of their

staff can be followed in UNESCO directories (see below). Several authors, using slightly different criteria, have listed and commented on the professional journals in peace research (Chatfield 1979; van den Dungen 1981; Scharffennorth et al. 1983; Gleditsch 1987). National and international professional organisations are intermittently listed in, e.g., International Peace Research Newsletter, the German AFB Information and newsletters from the Peace Science Society. Each criterion gives approximately the same picture: Forty years ago, peace research was a new idea with an uncertain future, with a few institutes, a couple of professional journals and international associations just founded. Thirty years ago, we had a three-digit number of institutes and a two-digit number of journals as well as a number of national and regional associations and conferences. Twenty years ago, there was even more of all these, but the period of very rapid growth was over and the situation is not vastly different even today. Peace research today has all the signs of having come of age: Festschriften to several early scholars (e.g., Trittmann & Schmidt 2002), bibliographies (among the classics are Boulding et al. 1979; Peace and World Order 1981), directories (UNESCO 2000 – earlier editions were published every few years since 1965), publications on its history (van den Dungen 1977; Boulding & Väyrynen 1979; Wiberg 1988; Koppe & Reichardt 1994; Kodama 2004).

Behind these sheer numbers we have a more complex story. The first institutes were largely in the Protestant North Atlantic area (Scandinavia, Netherlands, Germany, UK, North America). The later growth has two components: many new institutes are founded in that area, at the same time as research traditions in Latin America (the ‘dependencia’ tradition, etc.), India (the Gandhian tradition, etc.), Europe (the Marxian tradition, etc.), Japan (Hook & Kan 1983) and elsewhere began to identify themselves as peace research and appear in associations, journals and conferences. This dual nature of the process of growth had important consequences.

A BRIEF HISTORY

The history of peace research is to an important extent the history of its crises – but it should be remembered that the Chinese sign for “crisis” consists of the signs for “danger” and “opportunity”. I have argued elsewhere (Wiberg 1995) that we have had three essential crises in peace research: around 1970, around 1980, and around 1990. The first crisis was about legitimate agendas for peace research. The second crisis was to some extent an outcome of the first crisis broadening the research field rather than settling for just one of the competing agendas: peace research had problems with a well-defined hard core and a clear identity. The third crisis was related to the success of what was important in the original agenda of peace research and remained a part of it all the time: transcending the Cold War.

The first crisis around 1970 had a composite background. Among external factors there was the US war on Vietnam and the USSR invasion of Czechoslovakia, as well as the related upsurge at universities and scholarly controversies there, in particular in social sciences, all of it sometimes summarised as “1968”. In addition, the broadening of peace research by entrance of new research traditions, also from other parts of the world, had started. The crises pitted the protagonists of the “old agenda” (studying causes of war, armament dynamics, integration, peaceful systems, etc.) against those of the “new agenda”, who wanted to focus on exploitation, dominance and dependence, imperialism, etc. The debate (IPRA 1970) was rather heated (to put it mildly), the latter group often condemning the old agenda as “pacification research” (as opposed to
emancipatory), “liberal peace research” (as opposed to critical), etc., while some in the former group saw the latter as promoting armed revolution under the name of peace.

The first crisis had several results. The most important one was that the peace research community soon opted for “both/and”, rather than “either/or”, with respect to the agendas. The “hardliners” of each agenda tended to leave peace research, frustrated with there remaining too much of the opposite agenda, but the community as a whole broadened its scope, as can be seen in the institutional research agendas, conference programmes and proceedings, etc. This was not merely a matter of “peaceful coexistence” between the agendas, but in some cases also of successful synergy. Johan Galtung’s structural programme now included “a structural theory of violence”, where the notion of structural violence was introduced as a counterpart to the already established term of “positive(ly defined) peace”: if “negative(ly defined) peace” is the absence of war, the former was seen as the absence of structural violence. The new notion was first worked out conceptually and theoretically, but empirical studies soon followed, where structural violence was operationalised by using statistics on life expectancy, infant mortality, etc. Wallensteen’s (1973) path-breaking doctoral thesis was also synthetic, relating trade structures and war structures empirically, one main conclusion being that the traditional liberal idea that trade made for peace found support in case of symmetric trade relations, whereas the opposed Leninist tradition got more support in the case of asymmetric relations.

On balance, the crisis turned out to have beneficial effects: the period between the mid-sixties and the mid-seventies was indeed one of fast growth in the number of peace research institutions, journals, and researchers. Around 1975 it was evident that peace research had come to stay. The growth continued during the following decade, but now at a more modest pace, at the same time as the second crisis began to emerge.

The second crisis was much less dramatic than the first one, with no spectacular battles at peace research conferences or in peace research publications. It was to a large extent a result of the successful negotiation of the first crisis and the greatly broadened total agenda of peace research that this created. Its essence was formulated by Hylke Tromp (1981:xxvii), the second professor and Director of the Polemologisch Instituut in Groningen:

“(...) peace research has become what a black hole is in astronomy. There seems to be no social problem which in the final analysis does not have its legitimate place within peace research, and therefore is absorbed by the definitional processes in peace research.”

The crisis was to some extent an identity crisis for peace research in general. It also became a crisis for many individual institutes. The field had become so vast that it is far beyond the capability of any individual to be well-informed about the entire field or contribute to more than relatively small parts of it. Any institute that tries to cover the entire field of peace research is likely to spread itself out too thinly to be able to contribute to it at a qualified level. Simplifying, we can discern two types of institutes: those where the mandate and agenda were fairly circumscribed from the very beginning, and those that tried to replicate the very broad agenda of the international peace research community as a whole. Among the latter, some managed to meet the crisis by getting better focused than before, very few main research programmes being substituted for the previous multitude of diverse projects. Institutes that were of, or were transformed into, the first type tended to survive and prosper, whereas those of the second type often got into – sometimes terminal - problems. New institutes continued to be founded and the total resources and the number of researchers continued to increase during the 1980s, so the second crisis also did peace research more good than harm.
The third crisis was created by an entirely exogenous factor: the end of the Cold War, which was predicted by few – and then usually for the wrong reasons, Galtung being one of the rare exceptions (I recall his speech at the END conference in Berlin in 1983; cf. Galtung 1980). This engendered considerable soul-searching within several disciplines: why had they been unable to predict it? (Allan & Goldmann 1995). For peace research in particular, there was an internal debate about where to go from here: what research traditions to continue and expand, what research topics to add to the agenda (Wiberg 1995). There were also new (or quite old) external questions on the raison d’etre and identity of peace research, partly leading to “territorial battles” with other disciplines (more on this below).

VALUES AND PEACE RESEARCH

One broad consensus in peace research, at least at the declaratory level, concerns value orientation. Repeated editorials in the Journal of Peace Research (JPR) since 1964, and statements from the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), emphasize that peace research is value related or value based (a related formulation is "policy oriented"). A more general epistemology for this is provided by Johan Galtung (1996, Ch. 1), who sees peace research as resembling, e.g., architecture or medicine, all of which include a complete triangle of data, theory and values (peace, health, beauty, etc. – each of which then need further specification). Some parts of law, ethics or theology deal with one corner only: norms and values. Some parts of science or social science focus entirely on another corner by developing conceptualization and theory, while some other parts again focus entirely on the third corner, collecting and analysing data while believing that they leave theoretical speculations to others (“believing”, since there are always elements of theory underlying the measurements that provide the data). Some scholarly activities collide two corners: data and theory are confronted in various ways ("generating", "(dis)confirming", or "developing" theory; "refining" measurement); data and norms are related when a judge pronounces his verdict on whether the behaviour demonstrated by the facts violates the corpus of legal norms s/he is to administer. The ideal for peace research Galtung presents relates all three corners of the triangle: values, theory, data.

This leads us to two sets of questions in different directions: logical and epistemological questions about the relations between values and research, and empirical questions about what peace researchers are actually doing. The relationship between values and research was debated in several waves, the first one a century ago, including Windelband, Rickert, Dilthey and Weber – many of the points are still valid. A second wave is linked to early logical empiricism in the 1920s and 1930s (the “Vienna Circle”) with its ambitions to purge any metaphysical and normative propositions from scientific language by means of strict logical criteria. More developed versions acknowledged that completely “value-free” science is not possible in some of the senses of this very ambiguous term. We can, however, develop methodology so as to reduce the unconscious biases created by the values of individual researchers, which is also the line of the peace research classic Lewis Fry Richardson (1960). Another option, stated by Myrdal (1958), is to have the value premises underlying a study so clearly stated that it can be checked whether normative conclusions follow from the research results in conjunction with the value premises. If they do not, then some other value premises must have been smuggled in, perhaps unconsciously, and it becomes important to find out what they are and how they may have biased the research process. The problem is often more difficult in reality than in principle: how do we know what value premises we operate with.
and whether we have stated openly exactly those value premises that figure in the total analysis? Research on research has shown that researchers easily underestimate the difficulty of this and overestimate their capability of self-reflection. This problem, however, is not specific to peace research and will not be pursued further here.

When different cultures and political currents combine values differently to define "peace", differences in the peace research community cannot surprise. There was always one current identifying "peace" with "absence of war", which after all is the least common denominator to peace concepts of different cultures. Others have argued, in the footsteps of Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther King (1963) et al. that this is too narrow and that the existence of peace also calls for other values. Traditionally, peace defined as the absence of something (war) was called “negatively defined peace”, or “negative peace” for short, whereas “positive peace” became peace defined by the presence of something. These terms are somewhat unfortunate, since they seem to carry value connotations, which was not intended; but they have settled firmly. The logic is also a bit arbitrary: already in the first crisis debate, the new values could be defined either way, as presence (social justice, freedom) or as absence of exploitation, dependence and dominance. Since the 1960s, several values have been proposed as supplements to absence of physical violence; today, the main candidates seem to be 1) equity or welfare (absence of structural violence); 2) freedom (absence of oppression); 3) identity (absence of alienation or of cultural violence). The debate will certainly go on and it does not constitute any problem for serious and competent research that different research programmes focus on different (combinations of) values. It is enough for a research programme that it specifies what values it connotes by "peace", i.e. what its value premises are. Medical research has hardly suffered much from there being no exact and consensual definition of "health".

Let us now return to our triangle with another question: at what level is it supposed to operate? Rather few scholars have Galtung’s ability to operate competently with all three corners, so it makes little sense to make this a criterion for whether an individual scholar is doing peace research. In most cases an implicit or explicit division of labour is called for, where some specialists collect data, e.g. to provide a basis for normative assessments or to test hypotheses, other specialists focus on theory development and generalists try to combine all three corners. The relevant level for such "triangulation" may therefore be an entire research programme at one institute or even a collaborative network of geographically dispersed scholars, programmes and institutes.

POLICY ORIENTED – BUT WHOSE POLICIES?

Instead of "value oriented", peace research is sometimes stated to (strive to) be “policy oriented”. In its early years, the Journal of Peace Research encouraged authors to conclude a submitted article with a section on policy recommendations. This was soon given up, however; it turned out that it was often highly artificial when the distance between the topic analysed and any policy was considerable: the policy recommendations tended to be quite weakly founded in the analysis, or require a lot of *ceteris paribus* reservations - or be so abstract as to be of little policy relevance. There are several problems with policy orientation, however laudable in principle (Wiberg 2003). One is expressed in the question, "Whose policies?". A frequent answer is "those of the policy makers", usually meaning national governments or parliamentarians or international organisations. It has the merit of going straight to those who decide on policies, aiming at a role of expert advisor; it also has several drawbacks. One is that the value “peace” may well be shared by decision makers, perhaps even as specified by the researcher, but is very unlikely to be their only value and will often
have lower priority than some others. The peace researcher may thus be answering other questions than those that interest decision makers, who may be more interested in how to avoid this threat and make those gains without increasing the risk of war too much. In some cases, such as US administrations after the Cold War, there may even be reasons to suspect that it was precisely war that was wanted under various pretexts; advice to them about how to avoid it is then futile.

Decision situations of governments and similar bodies are often characterised by what the Swedish sociologist Johan Aslund (REFERENCE) called “precarious ignorance”: they know that they know too little, at the same time as whatever decision is made may have disastrous consequences. It then becomes important for later political alibis that experts are unanimous; those that are officially consulted tend to be selected in such a way as to produce this unanimity. Hans Morgenthau once told an audience in Lund, Sweden, that when he was on his way to his first meeting in the White House as a new advisor to the Kennedy administration, he told a friend already working there that he had prepared a few policy alternatives and got the reply that he had completely misunderstood his task: it was to throw alternatives out, not to conceive them.

Another problem appears in case of access to decision makers: it is commonly assumed that to get any message across one must "speak their language" or, to put it in more recent terminology, "stay within the dominant discourse". The problem with this is that this dominant discourse may remind of “Newspeak” (Orwell, 1949), being constructed in such a way that its basic assumptions cannot be questioned without appearing ignorant, illogical or immoral. In the worst cases, "speaking their language" leaves little meaningful to say, no matter whether this is the result of complex processes or goal-directed spin doctoring. A central thesis already in Berger & Luckmann (1966) captures the gist of Orwell’s idea: power is the power to define reality.

One alternative to "speaking their language" is to put research findings in respectable academic form, with all reservations and delimitations needed in order not to have said more than one has solid grounds for. But decision makers rarely have time to read - and if they do, it is in the form it gets when passing through overworked journalists with stringent deadlines and professional norms about what constitutes "news".

These are problems, but not necessarily insuperable: some researchers may indeed have a message to which decision makers are receptive as well as the combined skills required to get it across. Many others attempt another road to policy orientation by addressing political opposition, peace movements and other NGOs or the general public, rather than trying to pass all the gatekeepers around the powers that be. This may reduce the problem of access, but certainly does not eliminate it: mass media also have their gatekeepers, especially TV. It may also reduce the problem of getting research results across, but peace organisations, political parties, etc. do not differ fundamentally from foreign ministries: they often have their orthodoxies, though with a content that may be different or even opposite. Yet, they may be less entrenched and more malleable, making it easier to create something in the direction of Habermas’s ideal dialogue situation, where it is arguments rather than power that counts. The role remains that of an advisor, though the audience may be more sympathetic and receptive.

The researcher may also go beyond this role by working with, or even in, the organisation the advice is directed to. This calls for additional intellectual and social skills, but many successful examples can be cited. TRANSCEND, led by Johan Galtung, runs an on-line university and serves as consultants in many conflicts all over the world. The Transnational Foundation for Peace and
Future Research (TFF) in Lund runs a vast homepage with thousands of hits every day and has also served as consultants in several conflicts. INCORE in Ulster has a global reputation for combining scholarly analyses and consultations.

New problems then emerge: is it possible to be a politician (perhaps in a broader sense) and a scientist at the same time? Max Weber (1919a, 1919b) argued that these are two different vocations with so different rules that they can hardly be combined, and no convincing rebuttal has really been made. One solution may then be to move back and forth between the roles, rather than trying in vain to combine them; a problem with this is that people who have been long in politics may find it difficult to readapt to the much stricter norms in academia as to what constitutes respectable arguments, relevant evidence, binding logic, etc. Capable consultants, however, may serve as go-betweens or “translators” between the scholarly world and the political world if they manage to keep some distance.

Another alternative role is that of Cassandra. Homer tells us that the gods had gifted her with the ability to see into the future, but with the accompanying curse that nobody would believe her. Her notions of, e.g., the Trojan horse were therefore ignored and it only turned out in hindsight that it would have been wise to heed them. The essence of this role is warning against predicted consequences of actions (or inaction), rather than presenting alternatives, perhaps even considering the latter a trap to avoid: when decision makers ask "but what is your alternative?", that usually means some alternative accepting their basic premises, which is then easy to shoot down, given the logic of Newspeak. This approach tends to be based on assessing the motives of political leaders on the basis of looking at what they are doing rather than what they are saying. If this is not enough to prevent getting heard by them, the social psychology of cognitive dissonance also comes in: actors who think that they have good motives for their actions will also tend to think that the actions will have good effects - and therefore filter away messages to the opposite effect. In addition, whoever enters the Cassandra role will have to make statements about the future, which are not only difficult to assess a priori (Wiberg 1976), but also shunned by traditional academic standards, at least until the future they refer to has already passed and they become confirmed -or disconfirmed- hypotheses.

“Policy orientation” of peace research may thus mean different things and lead to different roles. What role fits best depends, inter alia, on the set of research questions, the political and mass media structure of the country of the researcher and what his or her personality and social skills permit or inhibit. The best opportunity for dissemination of peace research may lie in all roles being filled by at least some researchers.

**WHAT PEACE RESEARCHERS REALLY DO**

It is no less true for peace research than other disciplines that programmatic statements is one thing and actual research another. So it must be formulated as an important empirical question to what extent the repeated self-image of peace research as value-oriented fits with the reality of actual research. It is not as straightforward as it may look. If we want to know what peace researchers tend to think, we might make sociological surveys as to whether they regard "value orientation" or "policy relevance" as a normative ideal - or as a correct description. If we are more interested in what they do, a content analysis of what is actually presented at the conferences or published in the journals of the profession seems the thing to do – and will have to be preceded by a delimitation of
what counts as "peace research" scholars, institutes, conferences or publications. Yet even if we limit ourselves to institutions highly self-identified as peace research, such as the JPR or IPRA, I am fairly certain - admittedly without a quantitative analysis - that the majority of publications are not explicitly value related. That does not end the debate however. There are further questions to ask, depending on how we define the issue. The value orientation may be implicit, rather than explicitly stated. A publication that does not deal with values may be a part of a wider research programme that is value oriented, the absence in this specific publication due to some division of labour.

THE BATTLE FOR COGNITIVE TERRITORY

The history of academic disciplines is one of fission by successive specialisations of what was once theology, philosophy, medicine and law. The natural sciences emancipated themselves from philosophy centuries ago and were then divided into an ever increasing number of disciplines; for the social sciences, this process started in the nineteenth or even twentieth centuries, the genesis of various disciplines varying a bit between academic systems in different countries and areas. Political science sometimes emerged directly out of philosophy (occasionally with “political philosophy” as transition), sometimes it was broken out of history or statistics. As a result of these and other processes, we now have a vaguely circumscribed concatenation of areas of research, a cognitive territory, for which four disciplines compete in shifting coalitions: political science (PS), International Relations (IR), strategic studies (SS) and peace research (PR). PS is the oldest one; the others were either created by breaking out of PS or by “starting from scratch”. The first chair in International Relations was created in Aberystwyth after World War I by a donation from a Quaker who believed that a better understanding of the international system would make it more peaceful. In some countries there are separate chairs in IR, whereas in others PS has managed to retain this territory. Institutes of SS and institutes of international affairs were often created by political decisions or by civil society initiatives and were usually situated outside the university system. Some of the PR institutes in the Nordic countries were created de novo (rather than by disciplinary sub-divisions) at the universities, e.g., the chair at Oslo University, the university departments in Lund, Gothenburg and Uppsala. Others were created as independent institutions: SIPRI in Stockholm, TAPRI in Tampere (later moved into the university), PRIO in Oslo, the Life and Peace Institute in Uppsala, COPRI in Copenhagen, the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Futures Studies in Lund, etc.

In some countries and periods, PS was sufficiently well-organised and positioned to claim the entire territory and prevent any other tribe from claiming some part of it. In other cases, a single discipline (IR, SS, PR) was successful in claiming an identity of its own. When all disciplines were on the scene, we may get various coalitions. Three-against-one may be everybody against PS, with defence of separate identities as common interest; or everybody against PR, with largely coinciding paradigms as common interest. Two-against-two coalitions may form along ideological lines or on the basis of common interests. For instance, PR and SS traditionally tended to have clearly different, even antithetic, orientations, even though this has become less pronounced after both being intellectually challenged by Barry Buzan (1982). Since both tend to define themselves as “applied research”, that gave them a common interest, as distinct from the “purely academic” PS and IR, in getting established quality criteria that are neutral between “academic” or “basic” research and “applied” research, rather than favouring the former only.
It may be impossible to give unambiguous definitions of the territory and the sub-territories that the four are competing for, not least because the claims change from time to time. Yet, some dividing lines may be hinted at. One is the distinction national/international, on the basis of which IR tends to claim a separate identity, often challenged by PS claiming both sides of that dividing line. SS might then be seen as studying the international system from a “national” (or alliance) perspective, whereas PR does this from an “international” perspective. Another basis for distinctions is defined by what kinds of institutions and relations are studied: the political ones only (however defined), or a broader range? Do we merely include those relations and institutions that determine war and peace, or a broader range? In the first case, IR may claim separate identity from PS with the “broader range” argument; in the second case, IR may claim all the territory of PR (as well as that of SS) by insisting that IR has a broader range. The counterargument from PR may then be that PR covers territory that IR cannot claim: conflicts, peace and war inside nations. Or it may argue the other way around: because IR has a broader range, PR is a suitable specialisation – just as IR argues vis-à-vis PS.

Any mapping meets additional complications. First, we may go by the abstract self definitions of the different disciplines - what they are doing “in principle” or what they intend to do -, or we may survey what kinds of research are actually carried out at various institutes. Second, there are complex issues about the interaction between intra-national and inter-national phenomena and relations; the dividing lines will be affected by political developments as well as new research results. Other nations often, and perhaps increasingly, intervene into what used to be termed civil wars, and this linkage can be used by the different disciplines in their competition. These definitional battles tend appear –or escalate- when territory is going to be (re)distributed, for instance by government reports or the creations of chairs or institutes.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

Let us start with the external aspect: institutions and resources, and limit ourselves to the north eastern corner of Europe, so as to get a relatively precise picture rather than a more vague one about a wider area. On balance, there has been further progress for peace research in the last few years. The balance is entirely positive in Norway, with the creation in 2003 of a well-endowed Centre of Excellence, located at PRIO in Oslo, which is to deal with the different kinds of civil wars; the recent creation of the Centre for Peace Studies at the University of Tromsø; and plans for creating a new chair related to peace research at the University of Oslo. In Sweden, a second chair was created at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research in Uppsala, and the new teaching programme on peace research and human rights at the University of Malmö had dozens of times more applicants than the number of students it could take in. The major event in Germany has been the creation a few years ago of a fund of 50 mn. DEM to promote scholarship and education in peace research at German universities. The State University of St. Petersburg started a peace research institute in 2004. The negative side of the balance mainly includes the loss of independent status of TAPRI in Finland by subordination to a university department (more a belated result of the second crisis than of the third) and the closing down of COPRI in 2002 after Denmark getting for the first time in decades a pure right-wing government (COPRI 2002; Guzzini & Jung 2004). In purely quantitative terms, peace research stands stronger than ever in northern Europe, notwithstanding these setbacks, no matter whether we look at the number of undergraduate or postgraduate students, doctoral dissertations, number of employees, total economic resources, etc. While it is still the area with highest “peace research density” in Europe, a number of institutes have emerged in other areas, both
in South Eastern Europe and Latin Europe, where, with several institutes in France, Italy and Spain and now also a first centre in Coimbra in Portugal.

PEACE BY PEACEFUL MEANS

With peace research getting even more institutionalised, it is likely that we will get new rounds of struggle over cognitive territories, with political science and International Relations as main challengers. Some have argued that peace research, being a product of the Cold War, should be closed down now when it is over (but do not draw the same conclusion concerning, e.g., NATO). Some have argued that it should be merged with IR (but then always under the name “IR”, not “peace research”). The territorial struggle and the encompassing debate will no doubt go on. In the total cognitive territory, some areas, e.g. research on causes of war, are claimed by several disciplines, and here peace research and its institutes often face the dilemma that if it does not do well in the scholarly competition, they risk getting closed down – and if too well, they risk getting merged. It may therefore need to strengthen research areas where it can claim being unique or having particular traditions. One option here is to go back to the origins of peace research, when “peace by peaceful means” was still implicit or even explicit, like in Galtung (1996). Peace research ideas for transcending the Cold War were certainly not in terms of one side conquering the other militarily and there was little disagreement about this. Notions of “the good violence” (to fight against oppressive regimes and sometimes the great powers backing them) appeared during the first crisis, but the (left wing) protagonists usually left peace research when failing to significantly influence the peace research community in this respect. Some of the arguments against such influence could be taken from the analysis in Gene Sharp’s monumental work, The Politics of Non-Violent Action (1973), where he makes the point that even where such violence is successful, it tends to leave a heavy heritage of violence being seen as a legitimate political instrument, whether by the new regime or its opponents.

Later on, we got a new disagreement in the peace research community, with the dissolution of Former Yugoslavia as a trigger: some opposed military intervention by great powers with various arguments, whereas others supported or even called for such intervention with other arguments. Something decisive had happened since the early years, when non-violence was much more on the agenda, whether in the Gandhian terms of Galtung, the more pragmatic terms of Sharp or the strategic, or the Clausewitzian terms of Boserup and Mack (1975). Neither of them were radical pacifists rejecting any use of violence under any circumstance (nor were Gandhi or King). The point was rather that the prospects of non-violence were so underestimated –and the long term costs of using violence equally underestimated- that the use of violence would mostly constitute a moral and intellectual capitulation rather than a promising solution.

Since then, furthermore, a long list of successful non-violence has been added to the classical cases treated by the authors above: oppressive regimes of various kinds have been successfully toppled in large parts of Europe, several countries in Latin America and in Asia and elsewhere. The European peace research community has done remarkably little so far to study this array of cases more profoundly in order to draw consequences for the future. The classical studies deal with non-violent resistance in Denmark, Norway and some other countries during the Second World War, some of them also looking at the defeat of the coup in Algeria in 1961 and the resistance in Czechoslovakia in 1968-9. Since then, there came studies of the Polish learning process of non-violent action (JPR 1982) and the liberation of Lithuania (Mniotaite 2002). There has, however, been remarkably little scholarly analysis (at least in English) of all the other cases. Even if we limit ourselves to Europe
after the first great success in Portugal in 1974, civil society has toppled authoritarian regimes in
Spain, Greece, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, many parts of
the former Soviet Union (notably including Russia itself), Serbia and Georgia – which would
therefore merit particular attention. There is much material to study and compare.

The notion of peace by peaceful means goes far beyond non-violent action however. Alternatives to
war or threat of war when trying to influence deviant regimes have long been sought, and economic
sanctions appeared early at peace research institutes (Galtung 1967; Wallensteen 1968) and still
does (Wallensteen 2000). Early optimism had to be revised when it was found that economic
sanctions were often counterproductive and furthermore sometimes far more deadly to civilians
than major wars (most notably in Iraq), so the research programme has to be accordingly revised.

An even wider approach was also discussed in early peace research: the creation of peace systems.
That debate was often theoretical and normative, but we have seen an increasing number of
empirical cases to study. The Nordic area was an early case, pointed out by Karl Deutsch et al.
(1957 - he uses the term “security community”). The long term development of the system was on
the early agenda of Nordic peace research (Wallensteen et al. 1973) and there are recent studies of
how the system managed to find peaceful solutions to a long list of conflicts about such explosive
things as territory, autonomy, independence and language (Wiberg 2000a, 2000b; Archer &
Joenniemi 2003). If the Nordic area (and Benelux) were once particular in this respect, they no
longer are: today the EU seems to have become a peace system in Europe, where nobody expects
even serious conflicts to lead to internal military threats - although this aspect of it seems to have
attracted little research interest; a gap that Tavares’ article in this journal aims to fill - and we also
find emerging peace systems in South Asia and the Western hemisphere.

Here is a vast area to study, especially with a multidimensional peace concept. The absence of war
or even threats of war is merely one aspect: it remains to see what systems satisfy the other values
that appear in peace concepts to what degree and what are the mutual relationships between their
doing this and their having abolished military means in their internal conflict transformation.

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