Fred Dallmayr

Taming Leviathan
Towards a Global Ethical Alliance

Innsbruck Lecture in Honor of Hans Köchler
Preface

In June 2014, colleagues, students and friends at the University of Innsbruck paid tribute to one of its leading scholars. The “Symposium in Honor of Hans Köchler” was organized by the Department of Philosophy and honored by the laudations of Professor Sabine Schindler, Vice-Rector for Research, and by Christopher Miess (London) as well as a keynote lecture by Professor Fred Dallmayr from the University of Notre Dame.

Hans Köchler, born in the Tyrolean town of Schwaz, was appointed Professor at the Department of Philosophy in 1982 and served as its Head from 1990 until 2008. He has received numerous awards, including two honorary doctoral degrees, and is the author of more than five hundred scholarly books and articles, written mostly in English – although some of them have already been translated into a dozen other languages.

Internationally acclaimed in particular for his contributions to the democratization of international relations and to the dialogue of civilizations, Professor Köchler has promoted an understanding of philosophy as a discipline of theoretical reflection and clarification that can be applied to the entirety of questions meaningful to human existence.

This orientation, together with his emphasis on ideological non-alignment, makes Professor Köchler “a philosopher in the strongest sense of the word”, as Prof. Schindler phrased it on that occasion. His commitment is a shining example for all scholars of the humanities who desire to open up the windows of their alleged ivory tower and to demonstrate responsibility. With regard to the extended involvement in global academic exchange that becomes manifest in Professor Köchler’s extensive list of professional activities, his colleagues can be assured of the continuance of his research endeavors. For his students, however, according to Christopher Miess, his retirement amounts to a deprivation of inspiration. Praising Professor Köchler as an academic teacher who is “strict, but fair”, Miess emphasized the cosmopolitan outlook he came to appreciate so much about Professor Köchler’s courses.

Professor Dallmayr, who traveled all the way across the Atlantic for this oc-
occasion, expressed what the friendship to Professor Köchler means to him. After working together from time to time in the field of political philosophy in the course of the past decades, both are now prominently involved in the World Public Forum and champion its initiative “Dialogue of Civilizations”.

A graduate from the University of Munich in the field of law in 1953, Fred Dallmayr continued his studies in political science in the United States, where he received a Full Professorship at Purdue University in 1968 before being appointed Packey J. Dee Professor in the Departments of Philosophy and Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. Visiting professorships and research visits took him to Hamburg, New York and as far as India. His publications include twenty-four monographs and hundreds of articles.

On this occasion, he has been kind enough to delight the Innsbruck audience with his re-lecture of a philosophical classic and his emphatic plea for steps towards an ethicalization of world order and the overcoming of hegemonic structures inimical to global peace. As one of the “giants” of American political philosophy, we are honored by and indebted to Professor Dallmayr not only for being with us on that beautiful June evening, but also for granting permission to have his lecture manuscript published in this way. We hope it will reach out to a global public responsive to his deliberations and warnings in an era which is tested by so many types of state hubris and malfunction at the same time.

We would also like to once again express our gratitude to our sponsors who have made this symposium possible: The University of Innsbruck, the City of Innsbruck and the Tiroler Wasserkraft AG.

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Marie-Luisa Frick and Andreas Oberprantacher
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I refuse to accept the cynical notion that nation after nation must spiral down . . . into a hell of nuclear destruction.

Martin Luther King, Jr.

There is a fond belief among progressive thinkers that, in the modern age, humankind has at long last been liberated or emancipated from age-old forms of oppression. Seen from this angle, what characterizes the last three or four centuries is a string of rebellions, revolutions and radical transformations which ultimately ushered in the “age of man,” an age when a mature humanity is finally in control of its destiny. No matter how pleasing this picture may be—and how much supported by historical episodes—a closer look quickly reveals its shallowness or limitation. For what that look shows is that—alongside and in opposition to the growth of popular emancipation and self-rule—something else has grown or “developed”: namely, the modern “state” seen as a military-industrial-technological complex or apparatus. Although situated at the very dawn of the process, Thomas Hobbes coined an apt term for this complex: “Leviathan” meaning a huge fish or beast. Fond of baroque language, he also used other epithets to describe the state: such as “artificial body,” huge “machine,” and even “mortal God”—the latter term reflecting the fact that, like the transcendent God, Leviathan is released from all human rules and constraints. What Hobbes could not have foreseen is that, as a result of military and technological advances, modernity would spawn a super-Leviathan or (what is often called) a “global security state.” Viewed from this angle, the outcome of modernity is not so much the “age of man” but the age of a monstrous beast or machine.¹
Pondered seriously, the Hobbesian scenario is clearly frightening—and it is meant to be frightening because the “sovereign” (representing Leviathan) is said to rule by fear and not by reason, by the “sword” and not by the “word.” The fear factor is bound to be magnified immensely in the modern super-state or super-Leviathan where the Hobbesian vocabulary is replaced by the language of “terror.”Victimized by fear, people are bound to look for antidotes. Even during Hobbes’s own time, efforts were afoot to try to “catch Leviathan” or “tame Leviathan” or perhaps erect a counter-Leviathan. What tends to be often forgotten is that sovereign power cannot be tamed or curbed by more sovereign power, or Leviathan by a super-Leviathan (in an infinite regress). Hence, resources for taming have to be found outside of sovereign power or in areas not controlled by Leviathan. Curiously, Hobbes himself has provided a clue: for Leviathan in his work does not exist by itself but comes into being due to guiding motivations—motivations in which fear (of violent death) certainly plays a role but finally gives way to inter-human deliberations anchored in ethical considerations which he calls “laws of nature” (and which we might translate as maxims of moral conduct). It is at this point that a different curbing or taming of Leviathan comes into view as both possible and promising.

In the following, I shall explore, first of all, the availability of widely shared norms of conduct and their ability to constrain both fear and the Hobbesian Leviathan. In a second step, I review how such norms have to some extent been globalized or institutionalized in the international arena. In a final step, I propose for consideration a non-governmental counterpoise: a global ethical alliance for peace and justice located in global civil society and operating in a way as humanity’s “conscience.”

Hobbes and the Golden Rule

With regard to Hobbes’s Leviathan, the role of ethical maxims or “laws of nature” in that text is not always sufficiently recognized. Some prominent interpreters ignore or sidestep these maxims entirely, while others view them simply as “medieval” leftovers not fully expunged by modern science. However, Hobbes’s discussions of the topic are much too prominent and elaborate to be excised or
be ascribed to an inadvertent medievalism. Despite his fondness for scientific explanation, “Leviathan” for Hobbes is a deliberate construct and not simply an automatic process. Certainly the author himself did not consider the maxims as marginal or irrelevant; nor did he view them as particularly time-bound. As he writes firmly: “The laws of nature are immutable and eternal; for injustice, ingratitude, arrogance, pride, iniquity and the rest can never be made lawful. For it can never be that war shall preserve life, and peace destroy it.” He does not hesitate to ascribe to the same maxims a divine or religious quality because—although in one sense rational postulates—they can also be seen as “delivered in the word of God who by right commands all things.”

Whether the products of reason or divine commandment, the maxims in Hobbes’s account are fundamental for human life—a fact that is evident from their sequential order in his text. We need to recall here the starting point of his argument: the “state of nature” which is a “war of all against all” (*bellum omnium contra omnes*). It is in this condition—and not in some abstract realm—that for Hobbes ethical norms emerge. The first ethical maxim is that we should strive for peace and avoid deadly harm (*pax est quaerenda*). In order to accomplish this, we should seek to understand each other and reach some kind of agreement or covenant—an agreement in which every partner relinquishes his/her absolute freedom (*ius ad omnia*). From the need to safeguard this agreement, a third basic maxim arises: that pacts or covenants mutually arrived at should be kept (*pactis standum est*). From this foundational wellspring of norms, Hobbes adds, one can derive a host of other maxims or rules of conduct—as he shows in a crucial chapter where he lists some fifteen moral principles (adding that there are others “not necessary to be mentioned in this context”).

In pondering these maxims, we move quite a distance from the premise of royal absolutism with which his work is frequently identified. For Hobbes, the ethical rules of conduct—although numerous—are by no means obscure once they are properly explained and derived; nor are they locally specific or circumscribed. Basically, they all boil down to the Golden Rule: “Do not that to another which you wouldst not have done to yourself” (*Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri nec feceris*). This simple rule, in turn, is fully in accord with what he calls the “law of the gospel”: “Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do you to them.” Now, it is true that Hobbes at this point introduces a distinction (which
is not found as such in the gospel): the distinction between internal intention and external performance. As he writes: “The laws of nature oblige in foro interno, that is to say, they bind to a desire they should take place; but in foro externo, that is, to putting them in act, not always”—that is, not when their performance would directly endanger human life.

As previously indicated, such danger exists in the “state of nature” where all individuals are constantly in fear of violent death. The danger also arises in situations of self-defense in the face of imminent attack. However, what is often forgotten or neglected is that external danger or the inability to perform in foro externo does not in any way cancel the binding character of moral rules in human conscience or in foro interno. It is precisely the binding character of ethics in conscience which contributes to the transit from the state of nature to the social covenant. As Hobbes adamantly states: “The laws of nature are immutable and eternal,” adding: these laws oblige the human desire or endeavor, “I mean an unfeigned and constant endeavor”; and “he that endeavors their performance, fulfills them, and he that fulfills the law is just.”

Once a social pact or covenant has been concluded, internal endeavor and external performance should in normal circumstances coincide. What is required to maintain this balance or accord is the avoidance of harm or violent threats on the part of both governors and citizens, that means, the genuine observance of the Golden Rule on all sides. In this respect, Hobbes may perhaps be charged to have sidelined in his text the role of the Golden Rule in the commonwealth and especially the importance of education and the cultivation of civic virtues. Yet, his book does pay attention to and castigate unjust or non-virtuous conduct, that is, selfish behavior falling short of both the intention and the performance of ethical rules. There is a famous passage starting with the words: “The fool has said in his heart: there is no such thing as justice, and sometimes also with his tongue.” What the fool alleges is that, since every person’s preservation is his/her own business, “there could be no reason why every man might not do what he finds conducive thereto”—meaning that “to make or not make, to keep or not keep covenants, is not against reason when this conduces to one’s benefit.” From this kind of argument the fool concludes that injustice fully accords with reason whenever injustice is profitable, useful or advantageous—a conclusion that is in violation of both ethical intention and performance. As Hobbes states firmly:
Under these auspices “successful wickedness has obtained the name of virtue . . . and those actions are deemed most reasonable that conduce most to one’s ends.” Yet, “this specious reasoning is nevertheless false.”

Admittedly or arguably, the concordance of intention and performance is most difficult in inter-state politics, that is, in the relations between commonwealths which, in many ways, encounter each other in a state of nature. Hobbes is quite aware of this condition. As he writes: “In all times, kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independence, are in continual jealousies and in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed on one another, that is, their forts, garrisons and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies upon their neighbors—which is a posture of war.” Curiously, Hobbes assumes that inter-state conflicts can promote “industry” or general alertness—which may be the result of watching gladiator battles. His view would surely have been shaken, had he paid closer attention to the Thirty-Years War during which in many places the population of the Continent was nearly decimated. It would have been totally undermined, had he been able to foresee the total mayhem of recent world wars and genocides. When taking these experiences into account, he surely would have ascribed to inter-state wars the same consequences which he ascribed to the “state of nature”: namely, that there is “no place for industry,” “no culture of the earth,” “no navigation,” “no commodious building,” “no knowledge of the face of the earth,” “no arts, no letters, no society,” while on the other hand there is “continual fear and danger of violent death.”

Surely, far from being a mere gladiator match, inter-state war is a condition of extreme danger, filled to the brim with fear and terror. At this point, it appears possible to move with Hobbes beyond Hobbes: namely, by invoking again his distinction between forum internum and forum externum. Clearly, if people in the state of nature are filled with the desire to bring this condition to an end, people in the midst of inter-state wars—and late modernity is a condition of almost ceaseless warfare—must acknowledge in their heart, or in foro interno, the validity and urgency of the basic law of nature: namely, that peace is to be sought (pax est quaerenda). From this acknowledgement there follow the inevitable conclusions which have been mentioned before. First, that—instead of killing or seeking to annihilate each other—nation-states and their leaders must seek to reach a mu-
tual understanding and settlement of differences, which in turn requires that they put aside their absolute freedom to commit mayhem (that is, relinquish the *ius ad omnia*). From this follows, secondly, that states and their leaders enter mutually into pacts or covenants for the maintenance of peace, pacts which are binding and not unilaterally revocable (barring extraordinary circumstances). To this one can add a host of other ethical norms and maxims, especially those rules which writers in that field have called rules of international “comity” or civility.

Globalizing the Golden Rule

As indicated, these comments involve a move with Hobbes beyond Hobbes. Just as people in the state of nature, when trying to exit from it, enter into a social bond, so also people in the global state of warfare, in trying to overcome it, enter into a kind of global or cosmopolitan bond or relationship. Although this bond may not or only embryonically have existed in the time of Hobbes, the ongoing process of globalization—apart from other effects—has brought into view something which can be (and has been) called a “global civil society.” To be sure, this global civil society—to the extent that it is acknowledged—is still extremely vulnerable and fragile. Moreover, it is not a homogenous community but struck apart by a multitude of different cultures, languages and traditions. However, it needs to be remembered that the maxims cited above are of a very general character and to some extent boil down to the Golden Rule or the rule of fair reciprocity.

As it happens, some variant of the Golden Rule can be found in nearly all cultures or civilizations, and also in most religions—as numerous writers on the topic have established. To be sure, formulations of the Golden Rule vary. Some statements of the maxim prefer a positive formulation (“do unto others as you wish to be treated by them”), while others lean toward a negative phrasing (“do not do unto others what you do not wish them to do unto you”). Scholarly treatises are available documenting the near-global extension of the Golden Rule and the shared meaning underlying different expressions. Rather than delving into this literature, I want to return to political philosophy (the province of Thomas Hobbes), and especially to a late-modern thinker who, better than others, has
captured the gist of public life: Walter Lippmann. In his book *The Good Society* (of 1936)—which deserves to be much more widely read—Lippmann extols the global importance of the Golden Rule, referring to a number of its formulations from the Indian *Upanishads* to the Confucian *Analects*. As he indicates, the Rule emerges as binding whenever human beings come to “recognize each other as ethical persons” (rather than as objects of domination) and to acknowledge in others an inalienable dignity (perhaps even a divine imprint).

As Lippmann indicates, moreover, the Golden Rule is not merely an abstract principle reserved for contemplation by philosophers. Rather, it is part of the broader field of ethics; and according to the consensus of most philosophers, ethics is a matter not so much of theoretical knowledge as of practice, not so much of knowing than of doing. This means that—in the domestic as well as the global arena—the Rule needs to be enacted, which in turn involves the sincere effort to approximate as far as possible ethical performance to moral intention (or the *forum externum* to the *forum internum*). As it happens, steps along this steep incline have not been entirely lacking in the global arena. One of the major initiatives has been the development of modern international law. (I shall return to this point shortly.) Other significant breakthroughs have been the conclusion of major peace treaties—from Westphalia to Vienna and Versailles—and the later establishment of comprehensive pacts or covenants. What, unfortunately, limits the role of all these initiatives and advances is their dependence on the will power of contracting state governments—the same governments they are meant to tame or curb and whose good will cannot always be presupposed.

This limitation is evident in the evolution of modern international law. Although I cannot delve here deeply into this evolution, it can be shown that the modern “law of nations” has always exhibited, and continues to exhibit, an internal tension orienting it in two directions: on the one side, toward contractual agreements between states (traditionally called *ius inter gentes*) and, on the other side, toward an underlying ethical matrix—a kind of global common law—binding humankind together (traditionally termed *ius gentium*). This tension was present in the School of Salamanca, and especially in the work of Francisco de Vitoria (1485-1546) who endeavored to keep a precarious balance between the two orientations. It surfaced also in the work of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), the contemporary of Hobbes, although the balance tended to be tilted in the direc-
tion of the *ius inter gentes*. In a new form, the tension was present in the work of Immanuel Kant who proposed the formation of a loose federation or league of countries (*Voelkerbund*) through which the rash and all-too-frequent resort to warfare hopefully could be contained. In his famous essay “Perpetual Peace” (1795), Kant added to the Grotian conception of inter-state law the notion of a “cosmopolitan legal order” (*ius cosmopoliticum*) anchored in the idea that individuals and states, although coexisting “in external relations of mutual influences,” can also be regarded “as members of a universal community of peoples.”

Kant’s covenantal idea was shelved or put aside for the time being; but it was not entirely forgotten. The Napoleonic wars animated the striving for closer covenants or alliances among nations—a striving which found expression after the Congress of Vienna (1815) in the Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe. However, the real fruition of the covenantal idea came as a result of the mayhem of World War I and the even more horrible experiences of World War II—experiences which gave a powerful push to the establishment of the League of Nations in 1919 and the United Nations in 1945.

**Toward a Global Alliance for Justice and Peace**

Despite the noted advances of the covenantal idea, its limitations cannot be overlooked. Basically, the global institutions I have mentioned are founded on interstate treaties or agreements; the same is true of the sprawling panoply of specialized agencies and affiliated organizations of the United Nations. To this extent, our world today is covered over by a dense network of inter-state norms—in the older language: by an elaborate “*ius inter gentes*.” But is there still room or a role for the “*ius gentium*,” for what Grotius had still called the “common sense of mankind,” what Kant had termed the “universal community of peoples,” that is, for the ethical conscience or sense of rightness of humankind? Clearly, sustained only by the voluntary acts of states, the entire elaborate structure of international laws, institutions and agencies is bound to crumble in the absence of the will power or the good will of state governments. Given the character of modern states—their transformation into huge bureaucratic apparatuses—trust or confidence in their good will is bound to be tenuous or in short supply.
The tenuous ethical reliability of states and their agreements was fully recognized by Water Lippmann in his *The Good Society*. There he clearly distinguished between laws as sovereign enactments and the underlying matrix of ethical dispositions or good will. As he stated, echoing Aristotle and the tenets of English common law: “The laws depend upon moral commitments which could never possibly be expressly stated in the laws themselves: upon a level of truthfulness in giving testimony, of reasonableness in argument, of trust, confidence, and good faith in transactions.” Underscoring this point, he added: “There must be an habitual, confirmed, and well-nigh intuitive dislike of arbitrariness; a quick sensitivity to its manifestations and a spontaneous disapproval and resistance.” Differently put: “There must be a strong desire to be just.”

Here we are back in the Hobbesian *forum internum*, the domain of a sincere inclination toward justice and peace. In order to link or reconnect intention and performance, do we have to follow the Hobbesian logic of fear and postulate a global super-state or super-Leviathan able to coerce states and peoples to be peaceful? This, in my view, would be a counsel of despair—a counsel unlikely to be acceptable to modern people loath of totalitarianism. Under prevailing circumstances, I think the best option is to maintain existing inter-state laws and agreements coupled with the strengthening of global dispositions or virtues, that is, the preservation of the *ius inter gentes* coupled with the re-invigoration of a shared *ius gentium*. The maintenance of international laws and agreements is the province of governments and legal experts; but the strengthening of civic virtues—both domestically and globally—is the task of individuals and communities everywhere, that is, of general education. There is no doubt that there is a spreading awareness of the latter need today. Several prominent intellectuals and institutions have championed the formulation and public endorsement of declarations of a global ethic; in addition, numerous institutions and learning centers have sprung up devoted to the promulgation of ethical ideas in schools and colleges. The problem, however, is the linkage of ideas and public practices and, more specifically, the proper correlation of ethics and governmental policies.

This correlation is difficult to achieve because it must overcome the modern divorce of politics from ethics while also avoiding their fusion or amalgamation (which would jeopardize the integrity of both public institutions and ethical demands). The best one can achieve here is a tensional coordination where eth-
ics or the voice of conscience retains its basic autonomy and thus its ability to “speak truth to power,” when this is needed. A coordination of this kind seems to have existed at some points in Chinese history in the relation between Confucian scholars or scholar-officials and imperial rulers; in institutionalized form it was called the “classics mat” (ching-yen), a place from which the scholar could speak freely as the ruler’s mentor or guide. In the words of China-expert Theodore de Bary: “The scholar-official was obliged to take most seriously the need for government to serve the general welfare (kung) rather than private or selfish interests (ssu).” De Bary points to the example of the neo-Confucian scholar Ch’eng I who, during the early Sung period, opposed some particularly brutal polices of the emperor, stating in his defense: “When sages and worthies know that the ‘Way’ is being destroyed in the world, can they remain seated, watching the chaos, and refuse to save the world?”

As de Bary acknowledges, speaking from the “classics mat” has always been dangerous in Chinese history—at least as dangerous as it has been for individuals to “speak truth to power” in the West. The danger, he adds, has greatly increased in late modern times due to the immense increase in state power—what he calls the rise of the “Leviathan state” in the world and also in Asia, a state dwarfing in might all inter-human relations. To make up for the loss of the traditional “classics mat,” de Bary recommends a resolute strengthening of civil society institutions (what Montesquieu had called corps intermédiaires), especially educational institutions on all levels acquainting students with the core of Confucian teachings and also the great wealth of other cultural and religious traditions. The basis point, he emphasizes, is to maintain the crucial Confucian distinction between civil and peaceful culture (wen), on the one hand, and military exploits (wu), on the other, and the subordination of the latter to the former. The role of education and other civil society institutions, de Bary concludes, is paramount at a time “when political conflicts and culture wars incline some people to believe in the inevitable clash of civilizations or the basic incompatibility of different cultures.”

A particularly intriguing and promising proposal for a corps intermédiaire or counterpoise to state power was introduced by Mahatma Gandhi at the time of India’s independence. Although not strictly opposed to a formal constitutional structure with its panoply of legal norms and procedures, Gandhi held that the
entire edifice was built on sand in the absence of a lively ethical culture in civil society. Thus, as Gandhi-scholar Bhikhu Parekh has documented, during the last years of his life when independent India was just emerging, Gandhi was engaged in a strenuous effort to supplement state structures with a civil society institution or movement called *Loka Sevak Sangh* (Association for Service to People), entrusted with the task of promoting moral and political awakening and ethical transformation. In his conception, the two institutions of the state and the *Sangh* were to be neither entirely divorced nor conflated but to function in creative tension. Thus, while accepting the state as an “essentially legal institution,” moral and spiritual authority deriving from “the trust and confidence of the people” belonged, in Gandhi’s view, to civil associations and especially the *Sangh.* Building on Gandhi’s initiative, Parekh in his own work has postulated the creation of a “public forum” anchored in civil society where the ethical dimension of public issues could be discussed by different groups from diverse angles—an idea which clearly is significant not only for domestic settings but also (and preeminently) in a global or cosmopolitan context.

To conclude, let me return to the famous passage in *Leviathan*: “The fool has said in his heart: there is no such thing as justice; and sometimes also with his tongue.” Thomas Hobbes was no fool. At no point does he deny the claims of justice; at no point does he call into question our obligation always sincerely to strive after justice and peace. The distinction between the internal and the external forum is a counsel of prudence (or prudential judgment) and by no means a denial of ethics. For the sake of having a decent and livable public order, he would have agreed—I believe—with Walter Lippmann’s plea that “there must be a strong desire to be just” and also the additional plea that “there must be a growing capacity to be just.” As indicated before, the passage cited above is followed in *Leviathan* by comments on moral skeptics—let us call them shallow utilitarians or rational-choice devotees—for whom justice is nothing except the pursuit of self-interest guided by reason (for “reason dictates to every man his own good”). In the public and especially the global arena, skeptics of this kind are joined by “realists” who consider external conditions never propitious for ethics and especially for good faith efforts to pursue peace. Rigorously implemented, this “realist” view allows national self-interest or security always to trump the forum internum, thus erecting so-called “reality” into the tombstone of human aspirations.
Instead of enhancing ethical capacities in the world, this view renders the pursuit of justice and peace not only more difficult but impossible. To repeat Hobbes’s crisp verdict: “This specious reasoning is nevertheless false.”

Thus, it is the authority of Hobbes himself—the presumed arch-defender of realism (and neo-realism)—which urges as not to abandon our sincere striving for justice and peace even in the face of great odds, and which denounces such abandonment as based on “false” or specious reasoning. The reasoning is specious because we can never know with complete certainty the barriers *(in foro externo)* which limit or constrain our striving; hence, the only thing we can do is to test these barriers and hopefully push them back, while remaining firmly bound to the practice of the Golden Rule. To be sure, removing or pushing back barriers is very difficult for single individuals (or may be possible only at extreme cost). Hence, the proper way to proceed is to form an alliance or covenant with like-minded people, an alliance bringing together free people equally committed to ethical solidarity along the lines of the Golden Rule. As previously mentioned, Gandhi envisaged the formation of a *Loka Sevak Sangh* as an institution designed to curb or counter-balance the rule of political, military and economic elites. In our globalizing age—which entails also the globalization of dangers to human survival—the formation of a global *Sangh* or perhaps a series of regional *Sangh* seems imperative. Free from ideological platforms and partisan agendas, such communities would serve as vigilant guardians of the ethical convictions of humankind. They might also be seen as provisional stand-ins for deeper and perennial human aspirations—aspirations which traditionally have been fostered under such labels as “umma,” “promised land,” or the “coming kingdom.”
Notes

1. See Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (New York: Dutton & Co., 1953), Introduction, p. 1; Chapter 17, p. 89. With reference to Hobbes and especially the notion of a “mortal God,” Carl Schmitt has claimed that all the key concepts of politics, especially sovereignty, are merely “secularized” concepts transferred from theology; see his *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, trans. George Schwab (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), p. 36. In my view, it seems more likely that the reverse is the case: that concepts about God have been transferred from human political experience with mighty kings or emperors (with great damage to genuine religious faith).


3. As Hobbes writes: “The passions that incline men to peace are fear of death, desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living, and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And reason suggests convenient articles upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles are those which otherwise are called the laws of nature,” *Leviathan*, Chapter 13, p. 66.


5. *Leviathan*, Chapter 15, pp. 82-83.


8. *Leviathan*, Chapter 15, p.82.


12 *Leviathan*, Chapter 13, pp. 64-65.


19. Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” in *Kant’s Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. D. Nisbet (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 98-99). The central article of the cosmopolitan order for Kant was the principle of “hospitality.” What is often neglected (because of his “rationalist” reputation) is that Kant transferred the Hobbesian move from “state of nature” to commonwealth from the domestic to the cosmopolitan arena: “The means which nature employs to bring about the development of innate capacities is that of an-
agonism within society, insofar as this antagonism becomes in the long run the cause of a law-governed social order.” See “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” in *Kant’s Political Writings*, p. 44.


21. See, e.g., Hans Küng and Jürgen Moltmann, *The Ethics of World Religions and Human Rights* (London: SCM Press, 1990); also the “Center for Global Ethics” at Temple University; the “Center for Global Ethics” at George Mason University; the “Wittenberg Center for Global Ethics”; the “Golden Ethics Forum” in Geneva; and the “Global Ethics and Religion Forum” in Southern California.


