World War II
and the (Re)Creation of Historical Memory
in Contemporary Ukraine

An international conference
September 23-26, 2009
Kyiv, Ukraine

Organizers/Sponsors:

British Council, Kyiv, Ukraine
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U. S. Department of State
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
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The Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., USA
I. F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, NASU, Kyiv, Ukraine
Krytyka, Kyiv, Ukraine
Memorial Complex “National Museum of the History of the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945,”
Kyiv, Ukraine
National University at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Kyiv, Ukraine
Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, Kyiv, Ukraine
University of Vienna, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Sciences, Vienna, Austria
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Vladyslav Verstiuk, Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, Assistant Director

Andriy Mokrousov, “Krytyka” Publishing House and Journal, Managing Editor

Lyudmyla Hrynevych, Institute of History of Ukraine, NASU, Research Associate

Karin Liebhart, University of Vienna, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Sciences, Professor
Wednesday, September 23, 2009

15.00 – 18.00  Conference Registration
Goethe Institute
Voloska Street, 12/4

18.00 – 20.00  Visit to the National Museum of the History of the Great Patriotic War and Opening Reception
Welcome
Exhibition Opening
Reception
Memorial Complex, National Museum of World War II
Ivan Mazepa Street, 44

Thursday, September 24, 2009

8.30  Conference Registration
Goethe Institute
Voloska Street, 12/4

9.30 – 10.15  Conference Opening Session

Greetings
Myron O. Stachiw  Conference Co-Chair
Director, Fulbright Program in Ukraine (Kyiv, Ukraine)

Vladyslav Hrynevych  Conference Co-Chair
I. F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, NASU
(Kyiv, Ukraine)

Ihor Yukhnowskiy  Director, Ukrainian Institute of National Memory
(Kyiv, Ukraine)

Session 1.  Models of National Memory of World War II
10.15 – 14.15

Moderator: Yuriy Shapoval  I. F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, NASU,
(Kyiv, Ukraine)

10.20 – 10.30 – Moderator’s introduction

10.30 – 11.05 – Richard Ned Lebow  Dartmouth College (USA); London School of Economics and Political Science (UK)
Rethinking the Past, Remaking the Future

11.05 – 11. 30 – Vladyslav Hrynevych  I. F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, NASU,
(Kyiv, Ukraine)
World War II in Official Politics of Memory and Political Disputes in Ukraine Today

11.30 – 11.55 – Rafal Wnuk  Lublin Institute of Public Memory
(Lublin, Poland)
Polish Historical Memory of World War II with a Special Focus on the Period after 1989

11.55 – 12. 25 – Coffee break

12.25 – 12. 50 – Volodymyr Nevyezhin  Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences
(Moscow, Russian Federation)
Historical Memory of Russians at the Beginning of the 21st century and Reception of the Facts of the Second World War
12.50 – 14.15 – Discussion

14.15 – 15.00 – Lunch

Session 2. Models of Official History of World War II
15.00 – 17.15

Moderator: Aleksandra Hnatiuk  Embassy of Poland in Ukraine (Kyiv, Ukraine)

Discussant: Yuriy Shapoval  I. F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, NASU (Kyiv, Ukraine)

15.00 – 15.10 – Moderator’s introduction

15.10 – 15.30 – Vladyslav Verstiuk  Ukrainian Institute of National Memory (Kyiv, Ukraine)

15.30 – 15.50 – Janusz Kurtyka  Institute of National Remembrance (Warsaw, Poland)

15.50 – 16.10 – Birute Burauskayte  Lithuanian Institute of Genocide Studies (Vilnius, Lithuania)

16.10 – 16.30 – Discussant’s comment

16.30 – 17.15 – Discussion

17.15 – Exhibition Opening “The Ukrainian Insurgent Army: A History of the Undefeated”
Culture and Art Centre National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy
Illinska Street, 9

19.00 – Reception – Embassy of Poland in Ukraine
Yaroslaviv Val St., 12

Friday, September 25, 2009

Session 3. Politics of Memory in Ukraine
9.00 – 11.30

Moderator: Yaroslav Pylynskyj  Kennan Kyiv Project (Kyiv, Ukraine)

Discussant: Vladyslav Hrynevych  I. F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, NASU (Kyiv, Ukraine)

9.00 – 9.10 – Moderator’s introduction

9.10 – 9.25 – Olena Radziwill  Publishing house “National Aviation University-Druk” (Kyiv, Ukraine)

The War over The War: World War II and the Great Patriotic War in Ukrainian History Textbooks

9.25 – 9.40 – Aiste Bertultyte-Zhikiavichiune  Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Vilnius, Lithuania)

Armed Anti-Soviet Resistance in Lithuania and Western Ukraine: Why the War in Europe Did Not end in 1945

9. 40 – 9. 55 – Roman Serbyn  Université du Québec à Montréal, Emeritus (Montreal, Canada)

The Clash of National-Consolidating Myths: ‘The Great Patriotic War of the Socialist People’ and the ‘Genocidal Holodomor (Famine) of the Ukrainian Nation’

9. 55 – 10.10 – Oleksandr Zaitsev  Ukrainian Catholic University (Lviv, Ukraine)

World War Myth War in contemporary Ukraine

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10.10 – 10.25 – Volodymyr Kulyk
I. F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, NASU (Kyiv, Ukraine)

The Role of the Media in the (Re)Creation of Historical Memory: Competing Narratives of World War II in Ukrainian Mainstream Newspapers

10.25 – 10.40 – Oleksandr Melnyk
University of Toronto (Toronto, Canada)

Learning Like a State: Archives, Repression, and the Politics of Historical Knowledge in Ukraine, 1942-1944

10.25 – 10.40 – Discussant’s comment

10.40 – 11.30 – Discussion

11.30 – 11.45 - Coffee break

Session 4/Session 5 (Parallel sessions)

Session 4. Theoretical and Methodological Approaches to Comparative Studies on Political Memory: Ukraine and the Central and Eastern European Region

11.45 – 14.30
Moderator: Karin Liebhart
University of Vienna (Austria)

Discussant: Dominique Arel
University of Ottawa (Ottawa, Ontario, Canada)

11.45 – 12.05 – Moderator’s introduction

12.05 – 12.20 – Andrej Findor
Comenius University (Bratislava, Slovakia)

Politics of Memory and Identity: How (Not) to Study Museum Exhibitions

12.20 – 12.35 – Heidemarie Uhl
Austrian Academy of Sciences; University at Graz (Graz, Austria)

The presence and absence of memory: How societies deal with remains of National Socialism

12.35 – 12.50 – Tatiana Zhurzenko
Karazin Kharkiv National University/University of Vienna (Ukraine/Austria)

Re-narrating World War II: Politics of memory in the Ukrainian-Russian borderlands

12.50 – 13.05 – Heiko Paabo
University of Tartu (Estonia)

Analysis of national master narratives in the post-imperial space: Ukraine vs. Russia

13.05 – 13.20 – Per Anders Rudling
University of Alberta (Edmonton, Alberta, Canada)

The Shukhevych Cult in Ukraine: Myth Making with Complications

13.20 – 13.35 – Alexandra Goujon
University of Bourgogne (Dijon, France)

Memorial Narratives of WWII Partisans and Genocide in Belarus

13.35 – 13.55 – Discussant’s comments

13.55 – 14.30 – Discussion

14.30 – 15.15 Lunch

Session 5 Models of Collective and Individual Memory

11.45 – 14.30

Moderator: Vladyslav Verstiuk
Ukrainian Institute of National Memory (Kyiv, Ukraine)

Discussant: Margaret Paxton
The Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Washington, DC, USA)
11.45 – 11.55 – Moderator’s introduction

11.55 – 12.10 – Tetiana Pastushenko  Institute of the History of Ukraine, NASU (Kyiv, Ukraine)
*Memory of the German Occupation of Ukraine, 1941-1944: Evidence from the Countryside*

12.10 – 12.25 – Iryna Rebrova  V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University (Kharkiv, Ukraine)
*Official Soviet politics of memory of forced labor in Nazi Germany*

12.25 – 12.40 – Gelinada Grinchenko  V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University (Kharkiv, Ukraine)
*The Memory of Forced Labor in Nazi Germany: Eastern European, Soviet, and Contemporary Ukrainian Versions*

12.40 – 12.55 – Orest Subtelny  York University (Toronto, Ontario, Canada)
*Ukrainian Concentration Camp Guards: World War II Realities and Post-War Trials*

12.55 – 13.10 – Marta Dyczok  University of Western Ontario (London, Ontario, Canada)
*Re-examining the World War II Ukrainian Refugee Experience*

13.10 – 13.25 – Oksana Tovaryanska  National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (Kyiv, Ukraine)
*Peculiarities of Collective Memory Formation of the Former Soldiers of Division ‘Galicia’*

13.25 – 13.40 – Olesya Khromeychuk  School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London (London, England, United Kingdom)
*The Re-construction of WWII Memory and its Contemporary Political Framing: The Case of Ukrainian Surrendered Enemy Personnel*

13.25 – 14.30 – Discussion

14.30 – 15.15 – Lunch

15.15 – 15.25 – Moderator’s introduction

15.25 – 15.40 – Iroida Wynnyckyj  Ukrainian Canadian Research and Documentation Center (UCRDC) (Toronto, Canada)
*How World War II Affected the Lives of Ukrainian Women: An Oral History*

15.40 – 16.00 – Anna Wylegala  KARTA (Warsaw, Poland)
*Negation, Separation, Marginalization: Repressions and the War in the Biographical Narrations of the Oldest Generation of Poles from Zhytomyr, Kyiv and Podillia Regions*

16.00 – 16.15 – Kate Brown  University of Maryland-Baltimore County (Baltimore, Maryland)
*Atomic Forgetting and the Tragedy of Chornobyl*

16.15 – 16.30 – Coffee break

16.30 – 16.50 – Johanna Lärkner  Linköping University (Linköping, Sweden)
*Weddings and War in Kyiv*

16.50 – 17.10 – Guido Hausmann  University of Freiburg (Freiburg, Germany)
*A Different Version of the War: Memory of World War II of the Residents of a Burned Village in the Kyiv Region*

17.10 – 17.50 – Discussants’ comments

17.50 – 18.30 – Discussion

**Session 6. Culture and the Formation of Memory**

15.15 – 19.30

_Moderator: Myron O. Stachiw  Fulbright Program in Ukraine (Kyiv, Ukraine)_
Discussants: Boris Dubin
All-Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (Moscow, Russian Federation)
Tamara Hundorova
Institute of Literature, NASU (Kyiv, Ukraine)

15.15 – 15.25 – Moderator’s introduction

15.25 – 15.45 – Oleksandr Lysenko/Lyubov Lehasova
Institute of History, NASU (Kyiv, Ukraine)/Memorial Complex “National Museum of the History of Great Patriotic War (Kyiv, Ukraine)

Visualization as a Means of Formation of Historical Memory About the War: Soviet and Contemporary Ukrainian Experiences

15.45 – 16.05 – Valentyna Kharkhun
Institute of Literature, NASU (Kyiv, Ukraine)
Modification of the Aesthetics of Socialist Realism under the Conditions of a “Threatened” Culture (on the basis of Ukrainian war-time prose)

16.15 – 16.30 – Coffee break

16.30 – 16.50 – Mykola Soroka
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS) University of Alberta (Edmonton, Alberta, Canada)
Memory of World War II in Ukrainian Immigrant Literature

16.50 – 17.10 – Bohdan Klid
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS) University of Alberta (Edmonton, Alberta, Canada)
Historical Memory of World War II and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in Ukrainian Rock and Hip Hop Music

17.10 – 17.30 – Oksana Moussienko
I. Karpenko-Karoho National University of Theater, Film and Television (Kyiv, Ukraine)
Film and the Mythology of the Soviet Totalitarian Era

17.30 – 17.50 – Sofia Dyak
Center for Urban History of East Central Europe (Lviv, Ukraine)
The Second World War in Lviv Cityscape: Creating the Cornerstone for the City’s Postwar Identity

17.50 – 18.10 – Serhiy Kot
Center for Codification of Historical and Cultural Monuments of Ukraine, Institute of History, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, (Kyiv, Ukraine)

18.10 – 18.50 – Discussants’ comments

18.50 – 19.30 – Discussion

World War II Documentary Film Festival
20.00 – 05.50
Center for Polish and European Studies
10 Voloshka St., Rm. 6
National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy

20.00 – Opening remarks

20.20 The Other Side of the War (Directed by D. Pleshkov, Ukraine, 2005)
• “The Versailles Time Bomb”
• “The Partitioning of Europe”
• “Catastrophe of 1941”

21.50 Between Hitler and Stalin: Ukraine in the Second World War, the Supressed History (Directed by S. Novytskyi, Canada-Ukraine, 2003)
Union in Blood (Directed by I. Korbyn, Ukraine, 2006)
- “False Gold of September”
- “A Policy of Accepted Facts”
- “Army without a Country”

00.20 – 00.40 – Break

Union in Blood (Directed by I. Korbyn, Ukraine, 2006)
- “The Struggle for the People”
- “Alliance over the Abyss”
- “Triumph of the Great Bluff”

02.20 Spell Your Name (Directed by S. Bukovskyi, USA, 2006)

03.50 War and Peace: Occupation (Directed by Y. Heles and B. Korovchenko, Ukraine)
- “Invasion”
- “The New Order”
- “Between the Gestapo and the Partisans”
- “Collaborators”

Saturday, September 26, 2009

Session 7. Genocide, Holocaust and Inter-ethnic Conflicts
10.00 - 18.30

Moderators: Leonid Finberg
Anatolyi Podolsky

Discussants: Blair Ruble
Bogumila Berdychovska
Dominique Arel

10.00 – 10.10 – Moderator’s introduction

10.10 – 10.30 – Hulnara Bekirova
The Deportation of 1944 in the Historical Memory of the Crimean Tatars

10.30 – 10.50 – Marco Carynnyk
‘Jews, Poles, and Other Swine’: Ruda Różaniecka, 30 June 1941

10.50 – 11.10 – Ihor Illyushyn
The Ukrainian-Polish Nationality Conflict in Public Consciousness and Collective Memory: The Humane Stereotypes and The Historical Facts

11.10 – 11.30 – Mykhaylo Tyahlyi
A Secondary Genocide: ‘The Troubles’ (Poraimos) as an Element of the Historical Memory of Ukrainian Society and an Instrument in the Construction of the Identity of the Roma
11.30. – 11.45 – Discussant’s comments. Dominique Arel

11.45 – 12.00 – Coffee break

12.00 – 12.20 – Tarik Cyril Amar  Center for Urban History of East Central Europe (Lviv, Ukraine)
*A Noisy Silence: Soviet Discourse on the Holocaust in Lviv 1941-1987*

12.20 – 12.40 – Lyudmyla Hrynevych  Institute of History of Ukraine, NASU (Kyiv, Ukraine)
*Politico-Ideological Conception of the ‘Justification of the Holodomor Through the Victory of the Great Patriotic War’ in the Political Battles and Historiography between Russia and Ukraine*

12.40 – 13.00 – Jared McBride  University of California-Los Angeles (Los Angeles, California, USA)
*Through an Ethnic Lens, Darkly’: The Massacre at Malyn, July 1943*

13.00 – 14.00 – Discussion

14.00 – 14.45 – Lunch

14.45 – 14.55 – Moderator’s introduction

14.55 – 15.15 – Maksym Gon  Rivne State Humanitarian University (Rivne, Ukraine)
*Memory of the Holocaust: Its Subjective Formation and Functionality in Ukraine*

15.15 – 15.35 – Olena Ivanova  V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University (Kharkiv, Ukraine)
*The Creation of Collective Memory About the Holocaust and National Identity*

15.35 – 15.55 – Discussant’s comments. Blair Ruble

16.00 – 16.15 – Coffee break

16.15 – 16.35 – Discussants’ comments. Bogumila Berdychovska

16.35 – 17.30 – Discussion

17.30 – 18.30 Roundtable: Conference Summation
Participation of Session Discussants

18.30 - Reception
Session 1.  Models of National Memory of World War II

Lebow, Richard Ned

Dartmouth College (White River Junction, New Hampshire, U.S.), and London School of Economics and Political Science (London, England, United Kingdom)

“Rethinking the Past, Remaking the Future”

I discuss three kinds of memory – individual, collective and institutional, their relationship and why they are important resources for individuals, groups and nations. Attempts to restructure memories at any of these levels are generally responses to social and political agendas, and these efforts are often highly contested. Memory contestation in postwar Europe indicates that such restructuring may nevertheless be necessary for democratization and better relations with neighbors. Drawing on the experience of Western and Eastern European countries, I explore the conditions under which painful but personally and politically therapeutic reexaminations of the past are likely to occur and the practical benefits they are likely to have.

Hrynevych, Vladyslav

I. F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, (Kyiv, Ukraine)

“World War II in Official Politics of Memory and Political Disputes in Ukraine Today”

More than six decades after the end of World War II, the historical memory of this conflagration remains relatively painful. Every country has adopted its own “official” recollections and remembrance. Democratic societies have tended largely to reject the pompous and grandiose celebration of May 9th as “Liberation Day,” and chose to honor and pay tribute to all victims of the war and to condemn the war as an inhuman event. This attitude finds its most explicit expression in Canada’s and other states’ of the Commonwealth tradition of the Memorial Day on November 11. A red flower worn that day on the outer garments by officials as well as by the average citizen has become a symbol of remembrance and grief for the victims of several wars.

Most of the countries in Central and East Europe also attempt, on the one hand, to break with the tradition of an excessive exaggeration of heroes’ statuses and demonic descriptions of the enemies of past wars, and strive to establish an overall picture and understanding of World War II as a huge tragedy. On the other hand, during this process to establish an official policy of remembrance for WWII by a number of former Soviet bloc countries, a tendency has emerged to regard this day of the liberation by the troops of the Red Army from the Nazi occupation at the same time as a “day of change from one totalitarian regime to another”.

In present-day Russia the victory over the Fascists in the “Great Patriotic War” 1941-1945 is viewed as one of the most important holidays for the entire nation. The Russian practice and experience of viewing May 9th as a Great Victory Day and filling it with a political and ideological content differ from those of many European nations. In a real sense this can be seen as a major Russian attempt at the political and ideological rehabilitation of Stalin and Stalinism as well as a means to celebrate a Russian nationalism and to propagate the idea of Russia’s power as a nation and state.

The official Ukrainian policy of memory concerning World War II can generally be characterized as an attempt to unify elements of the “old” (the Soviet) and the “new” (the Western) traditions in a new model. On the one hand, it still at times leans towards an excessive idealization
of the war and to the creation of myths by constructing new symbolic systems to describe “heroes” and “enemies”. On the other hand, anti-Communist and anti-Imperialist motives are noticeable in the official evaluations of the war given by the highest Ukrainian political authorities. In this respect, the Ukrainian model of a historical memory to describe the war is very similar to the models of remembrance delivered by a number of European post-Communist countries.

In addition, the whole process of an establishment of Ukrainian official policy of memory concerning World War II is complicated by a number of other factors. Among these are – as a result of the specific impact of a Soviet propaganda – different experiences and a different perception of this war by those who participated actively in it; an excessive politicization of the war topic; and its active utilization by various politicians for their own goals. One basic negative impact on that process is also the repeated attempt of the contemporary Russian officials to force upon the Ukraine its “own” view of World War II history as the one “common and only acceptable” interpretation for the Ukraine as well as for Russia.

Without a doubt, the negative influence of Soviet propaganda will persist and continue to concern several generations of Ukrainians. Within the official policy of remembrance in the former-USSR in connection with World War II, the “myth of the Great Patriotic War” was based on ideological principles such as the moral-political unity of the entire Soviet nation (folk or people), the leading role of the Communist Party, the unity of Soviet society, the unity of the leading party and the people, the unity of front-line and the rear-lines during the conflict, the fervent Soviet patriotism and mass heroism, and the friendship of all people of the Soviet Union. All of these mythical elements, in addition to the creation of a symbolic system of “heroes” and “enemies,” were transferred to the new Ukrainian society. When an independent Ukraine was proclaimed in 1991, when the urge for freedom and democracy was expressed so strongly, a remarkable and decisive need for a distance from the Soviet historical versions concerning World War II was required. A new model of historical memory had to be created that could unify Ukrainian society. In particular, the idea of reconciliation between the fighters of the Red Army and the UPA at the graves of the victims of the war was actively propagated by the current President of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko. Another important element of the official policy of remembrance that emerged was the practice of paying respect to all the soldiers who fought for the Liberation of the Ukraine from the Nazi regime and those who engaged in resistance to the Stalinist regime. Finally, the recent attempt of the highest Ukrainian officials to create a multi-ethnic version of Ukrainian history in World War II can be seen. The clearest expression of this attempt can be found in President Yushchenko’s appeal to regard the Holocaust not only as a tragedy of the Jews but also as a catastrophe for all Ukrainians.

In this paper I analyze contemporary (2006-2009) politics of memory in Ukraine with a focus on the activities of state institutions such as the Archive of SBU (State Security Services), the Institute of National Memory, and the Administration of the President of Ukraine.

Session 3. Politics of Memory in Ukraine

Radziwill, Olena.

National Aviation University-Druk. (Kyiv, Ukraine)


School courses on national (Ukrainian) history, and school history textbooks in general, are one of the most important factors in the (re)construction of historical memory in contemporary Ukraine. Currently, teachers, parents, journalists, and historians are all focusing their attention on
how schools and textbooks teach Ukrainian history. Therefore, analysis of the interpretation of World War II / the Great Patriot War in contemporary and Soviet-period school textbooks is a topical subject.

In the research, changes in approaches to the interpretation of World War II / Great Patriotic War in schoolbooks on the history of Ukraine for secondary school are investigated. School textbooks on the history of Ukraine recommended or approved by the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine are basic material for the analysis. The following textbooks have been the most accessible in Ukrainian schools during the period since independence: M.Koval (1991); S.Kultschitskiy (1991); Y.Kurnosov (1991); V.Sarbey (1991); F.Turchenko, P.Panchenko, M.Tymchenko (editions of 1995, 1998, 2001, 2006, 2007); S.Kultschitskiy, Y.Shapoval (2004); N.Hupan, O.Pometun, H.Freiman (2007); Y. Hrytsak (1996, republished in 2000), one of the most popular textbooks for specialized humanitarian schools; as well as textbooks for the introductory course “Essentials of the History of Ukraine” for the 5th year (V.Mysan (1995, 2005); V.Vlasov and O.Danyljevska (1999, 2005). The textbooks of the Soviet period – school book for 9-10th years of the secondary school “The History of Ukrainian SSR” by F.Los and V.Spitsky (1969) as well the textbook by V.Sarbey and V.Spitsky (1965) are also analyzed for comparison.

The main accent is made on the most disputable topics in the history of World War II starting from the proper use of the terms “World War II” and “The Great Patriot War”, the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, the reasons of the Soviet Army defeat at the beginning of the war, the role of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (OUN and UPA), and the Soviet underground resistance and the partisan movement, as well as the results and influence of the war on Ukraine.

Serbyn, Roman
Université du Québec à Montréal, Emeritus (Montreal, Quebec, Canada)


The rise of the myth of the Great Patriotic War started from the very first day of the Wehrmacht’s attack against the USSR. On June 23, 1941, Pravda informed Soviet citizens that “The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union started.” An article by ideologist Yaroslavsky imposed the main ideas of the future political myth: a) patriotic rise of the Soviet people in defending their motherland, b) liberation of the country from the invaders, c) victory of the Red Army over the enemy. During the Soviet-German war, these ideas served as war cries, and after it was over they were embodied in the myth of the Great Patriotic War, concentrated in the meaning and celebrations of Victory Day.

The myth of the Great Patriotic War was neglected during Stalin's regime, which canceled Victory Day as a work-free holiday after three celebrations and displaced crippled veterans from major cities, so as not to remind people about the price of “their victory”, and was restored only in 1965 by Brezhnev. During his rule as the Communist party general secretary, Victory Day became the main state holiday, and new museums and war memorials emerged as indicators of the new political myth. The myth of the October Revolution, on which the Communists had been building their scattered empire, had to yield to the Great Patriotic War myth, which then was to be used to consolidate the empire and to transform it into the new nation. This myth did not prevent the collapse of the USSR in 1991, yet it still remains the consolidating idea for the new Russian Federation and a nostalgic event for those who did not accept the newly-forming competing myths in the emergent states. In Ukraine it remained Russian-centered, although there were some attempts to "Ukrainize" it.

Ukrainian society is divided by the attitudes toward the Red Army, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Halychyna Division. For this reason the war cannot be turned into the consolidating
myth for Ukrainian society. The myth aspiring for such a role is the politicized memory about the Holodomor. Kept by the Diaspora, in dissident circles, and in the depths of souls of the older generations of Ukrainians, memories of the Great Famine started to develop uncontrollably and suddenly came in conflict with the dominating myth of the Great Patriotic War supported by the government. Presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma showed pragmatic, i.e. indifferent, attitudes to the myths. President Yushchenko implemented the policy of using the Holodomor to preserve and consolidate the Ukrainian nation. To retain Russia’s influence over Ukrainians, Putin's regime supports the Great Patriotic War myth in Ukraine, and develops the issue of the famine in the spirit of having “one and the same famine for all in the Soviet Union,” thus implying there was no separate Holodomor famine for Ukrainians, much less “genocide”. The clash of the myths is continuing; it has started to involve many politicians and historians.

Kulyk, Volodymyr

Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Kyiv, Ukraine)
The Kennan Institute, The Wilson Center for International Scholars (Washington, D.C.)

“The Role of the Media in the (Re)Creation of Historical Memory: Competing Narratives of World War II in Ukrainian Mainstream Newspapers”

The media is the primary public site of the maintenance and transformation of historical memory, at least for adults who, unlike children, are not systematically affected by educational discourse. In transitional societies, the media’s role is further enhanced due to the discrepancy between new and old historical narratives of many public domains, which also enhances those narratives’ contradiction to many people’s private/family memories. Against this background, mainstream media preoccupied with the maximization of audience seek to present their historical discourse as merely reflecting popular memories and scientific truth, both allegedly free from ideological distortion and thus different from inherently partisan versions of political and ideological elites. At the same time, the selection of topics and manner of their presentation are based on ideological preferences of editors/journalists, owners, political “overlords” and/or major advertisers, and therefore shape popular attitudes rather than just reflect them.

As a controversial ideological issue and, more importantly, one of the main sites of people’s living memory and historical imagination, World War II occupies a central place in historical discourses of the Ukrainian media. This centrality is most obvious in the case of television where WWII has lately become the most actively employed historical topic in such ubiquitous and ideologically influential (largely due to their supposed ideological neutrality) TV series and movies. While on television the topical choice of Ukrainian media is largely determined by that of Russian producers and (as they perceive it) of Russian viewers, newspapers are free of such external dependency. That is, editors can choose their historical and other topics as they see appropriate in view of (known or assumed) preferences of their readers and owners/advertisers. This makes newspapers a particularly interesting object for studying such preferences and editorial assumptions. Also of importance is the fact that newspaper discourse is easier to analyze than that of television series or movies, so even a single researcher can work with rather large discursive formations, which allow more systematic and multi-faceted analysis.

In this paper, I analyze WWII-related discourses of four Ukrainian mainstream newspapers that target audiences of different ideological orientations with regard to historical memory and identity. These newspapers also reflect different stages of Ukrainian post-Soviet journalism which employ different strategies of attracting readers and advertisers. Ukrainian-language Ukraїna Moloda and Russian-language Kievskie Vedomosti dominated the respective language parts of the newspaper market since early 1990s, while Segodnia (in Russian) and Hazeta po-ukraїns'ky (in Ukrainian) became particularly influential in the 2000s. I combine quantitative analysis of large textual corpora and qualitative analysis of a small number of supposedly representative texts. To
generate such corpora, I employ both internet searches by topic-defining key phrases such as “UPA” or “Velyka Vitchyzniana viina” and, for a more systematic study of discursive practices, thorough analyses of specific pages/headings such as “Istoriia” in Hazeta po-ukraïns’ky or “Khronograf” in Segodnia. The systematic analysis covers the first half of 2008, although I also include texts and practices from earlier periods to make some preliminary diachronic comparisons.

Melnyk, Oleksander

Department of History, University of Toronto (Toronto, Ontario, Canada)

“Learning Like a State: Archives, Repression, and the Politics of Historical Knowledge in Ukraine, 1942-1944”

“Archives are a very important political institution. In each country they are in the hands of the ruling class, which exercises an extremely thorough control over them. As a result, no Marxist or Communist is ever allowed to administer the archives anywhere outside the USSR.”

Mikhail Nikolaevich Pokrovskii (1868-1932), Bolshevik historian.

In February 1942, as the Red Army mounted its first major counter-offensive, regional branches of the Department of State Archives of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (Upravlenie Gosudarstvennymi arkhivami NKVD SSSR—further UGA NKVD ) received a directive identifying their tasks under the new circumstances. “Circular No.1,” as this document became known among the Soviet archivists at the time, required that all the documentation of the Nazi occupation authorities discovered in the newly “liberated” territories, as well as materials of Bolshevik organizations and partisan units, be immediately secured for subsequent use for criminal-investigations and scholars.

Soon after, special task forces of the UGA NKVD and secret police, following in the footsteps of the advancing Red Army units, rummaged the country in search of enemy archives. Upon discovery, such documents were immediately subject to rigorous analysis by military intelligence officers, NKVD investigators, professional archivists, and eventually establishment historians.

This paper has two objectives: to explore this relatively little-known aspect of Soviet history and attempt to elucidate the specific role of the UGA NKVD in the process of wartime repression; secondly, to assess the significance of the UGA NKVD to the politics of historical knowledge in the USSR in general and in Ukraine specifically during and after the Second World War. I suggest that Soviet archivists provided vital informational support for the punitive organs of the Soviet state in the process of identifying “war criminals”, “collaborators”, and other “enemies of the people” by collecting and surveying what equated to tons of captured archival documents.

In the process they created the “Archive” of the German occupation that historians rely on to this day. No less significantly, these same individuals became intimately involved in writing early histories of the “Great Patriotic War” that became a foundation for emergent Soviet mythologies of the war.

I suggest that in dissecting this particular nexus of repressive power and creation of “productive” historical knowledge we can gain valuable insights into the particular features of the Stalinist politico-cultural system and achieve a better understanding of the Soviet politics of memory during and after the Second World War, as well as its legacies in contemporary Ukraine.

This paper is part of a doctoral dissertation with the preliminary title “In Search of the 20th Century Modern: Power, Knowledge and the Second World War in Stalinist and Post-Stalinist Ukraine” (University of Toronto, supervisor Lynne Viola). The role of the UGA NKVD in influencing the contours of repression and “political education” in wartime Ukraine must be located within the larger exercise of Soviet state information gathering. It also shaped public attitudes towards the experiences of the population in the territories formerly occupied by Nazi Germany and its allies. The activities of the UGA NKVD and criminal investigations by the Soviet punitive organs were supplemented by other types of informational work, which included the party led
verification of partisan units and various underground groups, creation of the “Extraordinary State Commission for the Investigation of Atrocities of German Fascists and their Henchmen,” and the “Commission for the Study of History of the Great Patriotic War.” The latter primarily documented “resistance” to the Nazi rule.

Besides the occasionally overlapping personnel, what united these seemingly separate ventures was the preoccupation with producing “knowledge” about the experiences of select groups of Soviet citizens. By shifting the focus from general representations of the wartime experience—a method favored by the bulk of studies on the politics of remembering—to specific memories and “knowledge” of the war, we can raise a number of important questions about the origins and attributes of Soviet mythologies of the Second World War (e.g. narratives of universal resistance) and their function in the postwar Soviet socio-political order. For instance, what does it mean that many state agencies and ordinary people took part in generating knowledge about the war? Does this diffusion signify a greater heterogeneity of officially sanctioned narratives than has heretofore been acknowledged in scholarly literature? Also, if many Soviet citizens participated in shaping narratives of the wartime experience, does it mean that we have to re-evaluate older notions about the alleged separation between “official” and “private” memories in the Soviet Union? And, conversely, if such an overlap existed, how do we explain it? Did Soviet citizens in the 1940s-1950s write themselves into history by constantly adjusting and re-adjusting their personal stories to keep in line with prescriptions of the master narrative created by the agents of the Soviet state?

Or did the official narratives themselves derive from popular representations of the war experience? What happened to the memories of groups that were barred from the “memory projects” of the Soviet state, such as members of Nationalist movements, Jews, Soviet POWs, “collaborators,” and women who during the war had affairs with German/Romanian soldiers, among others? Finally, what is the significance of competing memories of the Second World War in Ukraine for understanding the relationship between the Soviet state and local society in the postwar era, and ultimately for understanding the demise of the USSR and political polarization in contemporary Ukraine?

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**Session 4. Theoretical and Methodological Approaches to Comparative Studies on Political Memory: Ukraine and the Central and Eastern European Region**

Findor, Andrej

Institute of European Studies and International Relations, Comenius University (Bratislava, Slovakia)

“Politics of Memory and Identity: How (Not) to Study Museum Exhibitions”

Museums, together with maps, censuses and national histories, are some of the most important ways that imagined national communities define their temporal and spatial existence. Museum exhibitions and their visitors produce cultural meanings that reflect the intricate connections between national memory, history, and identification. Understanding what museum exhibitions present and how they are interpreted reveals not just the “politics of memory” but also the “politics of identity.” This article analyses the Europeanization of the representation of the Slovak National Uprising (SNU). Specifically it looks at the current exhibition at the Museum of the Slovak National Uprising in Banská Bystrica, Slovakia, with its presumed turn towards more democratic museum pedagogy. As a case study, it examines the implicit theoretical assumptions and analytical practices in the field.
Uhl, Heidemarie

Austrian Academy of Sciences (Vienna, Austria)

“Negative Memory and the Break of Post War Myths: How European Societies Deal with their Traumatic Past”

Memory has become a key concept for the analysis of the self-perception of a given society. Jan Assmann’s theory of “memory culture” is based on the interconnection of memory and identity: societies become “visible” in the way they remember – especially in the way a traumatic past is commemorated (or neglected).

This paper analyses the transformation of (western) European memory since the 1980s. This period is marked on the one hand by the break of the European Post-war victim myths, and on the other hand by the increased awareness for the Holocaust as a break in civilisation (Dan Diner). In contrast to the master narrative of the post-war myths which externalised Nazi atrocities from one’s own history, the Holocaust and other Nazi crimes are now internalised as part of “our” history. To acknowledge the guilt – and the responsibility – of one’s own society for the atrocities of a traumatic past is at the core of the new European culture of “negative memory”.

This paper discusses the transformation, especially the concept and the representations of negative memory (memorials, museums etc.). My examples are case studies from Austria and Germany.

Zhurzhenko, Tatiana

V.Karazin Kharkiv National University (Kharkiv, Ukraine)
University of Vienna, Institute for Political Science (Vienna, Austria)

“Re-narrating World War II: Politics of Memory in the Ukrainian-Russian Borderlands”

This paper addresses the politics of memory in the Ukrainian-Russian border regions using the neighboring Kharkiv and Belgorod oblast’s as a case study. This approach allows comparisons of emerging commemorative cultures and memorial regimes in neighboring countries as well as transcending the national framework to include regional and transnational aspects in the analysis.

For historical, cultural, and geopolitical reasons, contemporary Ukrainian and Russian political elites have rather different views on the role of WWII in their national histories and in the formation of the respective national identities. Unlike in Russia, in Ukraine conflicting meanings and alternative interpretations of WWII contribute to a political conflict which splits Ukrainian society. On the regional level the right to interpret the historical and geopolitical outcome of the struggle for the Ukrainian nation is contested by competing political forces. In the Russian regions the Soviet myth of the “Great Patriotic War” remains basically untouched (or is being restored) and is seen as instrumental for national consolidation. Since the fates of the cities of Kharkiv and Belgorod during WWII were closely connected, the emerging differences in the national narratives, as they are reflected on the regional level, are rather illustrative. The way the memory of WWII is preserved, re-narrated and animated on both sides of the border also reflects differences in political regimes in both countries, the level of political centralization, the degree of consolidation of the regional elites, etc.

This paper is based on interviews with political actors in both regions (representatives of public administration, political parties and NGOs) and on analyses of museum expositions and war memorials in Kharkiv and Belgorod oblast’s.
Under the presidency of Victor Yushchenko the Ukrainian government has adopted an interpretation of history similar to that of the Ukrainian diaspora, a story of suffering and heroic resistance. In this narrative, Roman Shukhevych, the leader of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, is presented as one of the greatest Ukrainian heroes of the 20th century. Yet Shukhevych is a controversial figure, not only due to UPA's ethnic cleansing and mass murder of Poles in Volhynia in 1943, an significant issue of contention with Poland. His collaboration as an officer in various armed formations of the Third Reich remains a source of controversy and conflict. To sell Shukhevych as a national hero to the audiences in Western Europe, the institutions of which Yushchenko has declared Ukraine's interest to join, may prove to be a difficult task.

This paper addresses some of the blank spots in Shukhevych's CV, particularly his whereabouts in 1942, when he served as an officer of Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201 in occupied Belarus, an issue which has not yet been conclusively studied. Largely a historiographical paper, it ponders the consequences of designating a figure like Shukhevych a national hero, and its impact on national reconciliation, European integration, and Ukrainian relations with their Polish, Jewish, and Russian neighbors.

Goujon, Alexandra

University of Bourgogne (Dijon, France)

"Memorial Narratives of World War II Partisans and Genocide in Belarus"

The memory of World War II always played an important role in Belarus, characterized as a "Partisan Republic" during the Soviet time. Soviet historiography and memorial narrative emphasized the heroics of the resistance to fascism and allowed only a description of the crimes of the Nazis. New ways of looking at war events appeared during perestroika and after the independence of the country. But after Alexander Lukashenko came to power as a president in 1994, a neo-Soviet version of the past was adopted and spread. The Great Patriotic War (GPW) has become an increasingly publicized event in the official memorial narrative as the culminating moment in Belarusian history. Since the mid-2000s, this narrative tends to be nationalized in order to testify that the Belarusian people's suffering and resistance behavior were among the highest ones during WWII. Political and academic dissenting voices to the Belarusian authoritarian regime try to downplay this official narrative by pointing out that the Belarusians were also victims of the Stalinist repression, and that the attitude of many Belarusians towards the Nazi occupation was more than ambivalent. Behind the memorial discourses, two competitive versions of Belarusian national identity can be distinguished. According to the official version, Belarusian identity is based on East-Slavic identity that incorporates Soviet history in its contemporary development. According to the opposition, it is based on a national memory that discards the Soviet past as a positive one.
Session 5  Models of Collective and Individual Memory

Pastushenko, Tetiana

Institute of the History of Ukraine, NASU (Kyiv, Ukraine)

“Memory of the Nazi Occupation of Ukraine, 1941-1944: Rural Experience”

The sources of this study are 60 biographic interviews with former *osterbeiter* and prisoners of war conducted by the author since 2002. My motivation for stressing the peasants’ experience of life under the Nazis is the significant difference between the city dwellers’ and villagers’ representations of the occupation.

The villagers’ interviews are particularly specific because of the absence of the detailed description of the beginning of the war, and of life under occupation. Mostly this period is outlined only by the few facts explaining the circumstances of the departure to Germany (“there was a Landwirt”, “there were Polizeien, who forced us to go to Germany”; “I took some bread with me because there was a good harvest of barley under Germans” etc.) In most of the village’s stories there is a typical formula of equating “the war” and “the labor in Germany”.

For the population of Kyiv, as well as for the inhabitants of the large cities, war and occupation were the extraordinary events that changed not only everyday life, and basic necessities (food, living conditions, transport, jobs, leisure time), but also “lifestyles” and life plans. That’s why the narratives about life in the occupied city (especially for the Kyiv dwellers) are usually similar in time frame as the narratives about the period of forced labor in the Nazi Reich, or even longer.

The analysis of the story as a whole (not only of the war part of the story) allows us to conclude that the decisive role in the formation of the memory of Nazi occupation is often played by the experience of the Holodomor (1932-1933). For villagers, the Holodomor is the fundamental experience of tragedy, and all further life course events (Nazi occupation included) are usually compared to this event.

One more constraining factor for the construction of narrative about village life under the Nazis is the long-time domination of the Soviet discourse on “the temporary German-fascist occupation.” The contradictory relations of different elements of official memory and personal interviewees’ experiences are likely to cause this “narrative gap”. In contrast, usually the personal experience of interviewees from Kyiv and the official images of war are significantly less dissonant.

It is also worth noting that the life-stories and the representations of everyday life under occupation vary greatly, and every story is the real truth for its narrator. We can’t speak about the sole typical picture of the events represented by the narrators. The histories of ordinary Ukrainians convincingly show us that one’s beliefs and attitudes to certain phenomenon cannot be studied without taking one’s life course, historical context, and preceding events into consideration.

Rebrova, Iryna

V.N.Karazin Kharkiv National University (Kharkiv, Ukraine)

“Representations of ‘Ukrainian/Nationalist’ in the Soviet Official Politics of Memory of the Forced Labor in Nazi Germany”

For a long time, the problem of forced laborers from Ukraine in Nazi Germany was considered a marginal issue for the general Soviet narrative about “the Great Patriotic War”.


However, an analysis of numerous public and propaganda texts, as well as fiction and “Soviet folklore” published during the war and postwar years indicates the considerable presence of this theme in the official discourse. Official Soviet representations of forced labor were closely linked to the struggle to strengthen Soviet Ukrainian statehood and identity endangered by the war. This struggle was aimed against the “nationalist” or “anti-Soviet” projects (as imagined for the most part by the Soviet discourse itself). The influence of Soviet official discourse is clear in the contemporary public discussions on this subject, be it in the form of continuing reproduction or in the form of negation, refutation, or modification of the key Soviet arguments. The official politics of memory is understood there as constructed through the dialogue of several actors: party leadership, propagandists and authors (whose activity was undoubtedly sanctioned by the state), as well as survivors and eye-witnesses (former forced laborers). The official Soviet discourse on the subject survived the collapse of the USSR, and now it is reproduced/re-created in remarkably different ways in contemporary Russia and Ukraine.

The official Soviet discourse on forced labor as a part of the politics of memory has several specific features:

- “Ukrainian” and “Ukrainian-ness” in this discourse were represented primarily as ethnic phenomena, through the wide range of symbols and figures from the national pantheon created as early as the nineteenth century. This notion was distinctly opposed to the ethnic “German” or to the notion of “European” presented as alien (especially during the war years). This attitude (among others) is reproduced in contemporary Russia;
- The main actor and narrator in this discourse is a person situated externally to the forced labor itself. The forced laborers are presented exclusively as the powerless victims of the circumstances, as objects of the forceful actions (of the Nazi invaders) or of the liberating mission (of the Soviet army). To create this effect the powerful images of Ukrainian national history were used (for example, the image of “Tartar-Turkish slavery”, “fascist barbarian hordes”, where the ostrarbeiter were presented as “yasyr”, captured prisoners, and the victorious Soviet army – as the valorous “chervoni kozachen’ky”, “red Cossacks”). In fact this role of passive objects was played only for the purpose of glorifying the Soviet liberators (the army and the Soviet partisans), as well as for the purpose of damnation of the non-Soviet resistance movement and “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists” (who allegedly were widely engaged in collaborating with the Nazis in the population deportation to Germany, especially by means of working in the lower ranks of the local governance in Ukraine). The ostrarbeiter’s description as absolute victims is one of the most widespread myths in modern Ukrainian historiography, as well as on the level of popular beliefs. This fact is only partly rooted in financial compensations from the German side, and usually it enacts the traditional image of Ukrainian history at large as the history of the innocent victim suffering from the numerous malicious enemies (“vorizhen ky”)..

One of the most widespread images related to the forced labor is the liberation of the forced laborers from “slavery” by the Soviet army. This finds its embodiment in the image of the girl-sufferer waiting for her liberator (most of the works of art usually present ostrarbeiter as young girls or women); the reunion (“vossoedinenie”) of girl and her liberator in the united family symbolically means the reintegration of the injured unity of the “Soviet people” (the Ukrainian people as ethnos being its part). This obviously enacts the traditional patriarchal views of the nature of nation and the gender roles of its members. We can see there the colonial situation in the cultural sense as well (ostrarbeiter, especially Ukrainian women, usually are presented as the bearers of ethnographic features, however, incapable for performing the active, i.e. political, role).
Grinchenko, Gelinada
V.N.Karazin Kharkiv National University (Kharkiv, Ukraine)

“Memory of Forced Labor in Nazi Germany: West-European, Soviet, Contemporary Ukrainian Versions”

The presentation addresses two main questions. The first question concerns the history of the usage of the term *memory* in the contemporary social sciences and humanities, and what meanings the researchers apply to the concepts of *collective memory* and *historic memory*. The second question concerns the formation of memory of forced labor in Nazi Germany in Western European, Soviet and today’s Ukrainian context. Attention here is given to how the image of forced laborers themselves as well as whole the phenomenon of forced labor are constructed and seen in public consciousness and public discourses. The presentation will discuss the politics of memory in light of both international legal rights and internal state regulations concerning compensation payments to the victims of Nazi persecution, recognizing at the same time the ongoing manipulation of war memories in order to legitimize the current political state (such as the regime of soviet democracy), and the fitting of these memories into the existing Russian-Soviet-Imperial, modern and national discourses of war all thriving in today’s Ukraine.

The main questions in the first part of the presentation concerning Western European discourse on the formation, preservation and translation of memory of forced labor and of forced laborers are the following: (1) how is this discourse subject to the ongoing debates in the international community on international legal rights and principles of compensation to the victims of forced labor; (2) how is this discourse predicated on the existence of many national cultures and their own discourses and memories of forced labor, and how is it affected by the processes of nationalization of war memories (contrary to processes of internationalization of memory, as in the case of Holocaust).

The presentation then considers the Soviet discourse and memory of forced labor and will argue that contrary to conventional wisdom, it is not true that the topic of forced labor was not part of the official Soviet discourse on war or was absent in the Soviet scholarly and journalistic writing. Here I concentrate on the analysis of semantic boundaries and certain representative characteristics of the image of the forced laborer which during the Soviet period were implicitly formulated and promoted by various sources. At the same time these sources were preserving and promoting a particular kind of memory of forced labor amongst the Soviet population.

The discussion of Ukrainian interpretations and formulations of historic memory of forced labor and laborers concentrates on (1) how the Ukrainian scholars and policy makers are approaching the topic of forced labor and the politics of victim compensation in their debates, and how they are constructing new historic memories about this phenomenon; and (2) on specificities of new academic and public commemorative initiatives under way with the goal of formulating, popularizing and preserving newly constructed memories about forced labor and laborers.

Subtelny, Orest
York University (Toronto, Ontario, Canada)

“Ukrainian Concentration Camp Guards: World War II Realities and Post-War Trials”

The first part of the paper treats the origins, training, and organization of the so-called “Trawniki Men.” Consisting mostly of Ukrainians, both from Soviet Ukraine and Galicia and Kholm region, this unit provided guards to numerous labor and concentration camps during World War II. The paper discusses the origins of these men, concentrating on three waves of conscripts from, respectively, Soviet prisoners-of-war camps, Galicia, and the Kholm region. It treats
Dyczok, Marta
University of Western Ontario (London, Ontario, Canada)

"Re-examining the World War II Ukrainian Refugee Experience"

Over three million Ukrainians were involuntarily displaced during the Second World War. Some of them returned home at the end of the conflict, others became refugees and resettled in new countries. The Iron Curtain not only separated families for a generation, it separated the narratives of these events in the USSR and abroad. After the Soviet Union collapsed, these two groups and two narratives have been able to engage in direct dialogue. This dialogue touches on issues of the national liberation struggle, rejection of communism, collaboration, the nature of the Soviet regime, and the nature of Ukrainian diaspora through the refugee/repatriation story.

This paper explores how this experience has been represented in history and how this has changed over time. It is the beginning of a new research project that builds on my previous research on Ukrainian World War II refugees (2000) and takes the story into a new direction. The analytical frame proposed by Horn and Kramer (2001) is used, namely that to understand how memory is constructed one needs to first establish the reality of the events and then trace the image of how they are remembered. Following Mazower (2008) it uses an explanation of what happened during the war as a preface to discuss what happens afterwards.

Starting with a look at how these events were depicted in Soviet and Western historiography, the paper explores how the story of Ukrainian refugees has been revised since the collapse of communism. Key questions include, how does the memory of these events resurface in contemporary Ukraine? What forces are driving this, both in Ukraine and abroad? How are the issues reframed and how do they become a political factor in new ways?

Two main sources are used for this paper. The first is the narratives of the refugees and returnees (repatriates) themselves, from interviews conducted and letters received from both groups, as well as memoirs and other published records. The second draws on my more recent research on mass media in contemporary Ukraine, and consists of media stories and reports of the issues in the years since the collapse of communism.

Tovaryanska, Oksana
National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy” (Kyiv, Ukraine)

“Peculiarities of Collective Memory Formation of the Former Soldiers of Division “Galicia” (on Oral History Materials)"

Events after the Second World War, especially the politics of the Nurnberg tribunals, proved that history is usually written by winners. Official Soviet historians and writers proposed the one
and only true vision of the war with no other possible interpretations. After the collapse of the USSR, new national states inherited the war narrative, war myths and victory rhetoric. Therefore, our past in mass consciousness is full of stereotypes established during the Soviet period.

Understanding our relationship to the Second World War, even after 18 years of an independent Ukraine, is still very controversial. This conflict is mostly based on different relations in terms of agreeing or disagreeing with the Ukrainian nationalist movement. The problem of the evaluation and interpretation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and in some way of the Division “Galicia”, regularly appears and troubles Ukrainian society. The main issue here is the cooperation of Western Ukrainians with Nazi Germany. These formations were created in Western Ukraine mostly from Western Ukrainians – Galicians. As a result of Soviet propaganda, the Russian contribution to the Nazi war effort has been forgotten, whereas the Ukrainian contribution has been remembered. During the entire Soviet period, the former soldiers of Division “Galicia” were labeled ‘traitors-collaborators’.

Dzhegosh Motyka wrote that whether or not we deal with collaboration, the main focus of the discussion should be not just on the presence of Ukrainians in any German military formations but also to the individual motivations for doing joining these formations. Therefore, I examine reasons people joined the division “Galicia”. The main sources used here are personal interviews with the former soldiers that I conducted since 2006 working on my own project “Division ‘Galicia’ through the Eyes of its Former Soldiers”. I also utilize published memories and materials from Ukrainian archives. My task is to show their own view of that time, how and why they are describing one of the key events of their past, to illustrate their ‘space of experiences’ and ‘horizon of expectations’.

In my paper, I look at the conditions and circumstances that influenced the oral histories of the former soldiers, to examine the formation of their collective memory and collective identity, to show how they explain their past, what is the main reason of their ‘life story’, their representation of the war, and their memory of it.

Khromeychuk, Olesya
University College London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies (London, England)

“The Re-construction of World War II Memory and its Contemporary Political Framing: The Case of Ukrainian Surrendered Enemy Personnel”

In light of the present debate over the reconciliation of World War II veterans, those Ukrainian formations which in the post-war years were categorised as “Surrendered Enemy Personnel” have found themselves in the middle of a range of politically framed discussions. This paper looks at how the memory and, subsequently, identity of one such group (namely, the First Division of the Waffen SS “Galicia”; later know as 1st Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army) is being re-constructed and presented to a wider audience by scholars, politicians and veterans themselves. It also discusses the importance of the process of memory reconstruction and how it affects the official narrative.

The narratives and political framings of the “Galicia” Division tend to divide into two dichotomous approaches. On the one hand, ex-members are often portrayed as traitors (for they fought in the ranks of the German Army during the Second World War); as opportunists who did not care for their motherland, or even as war criminals. On the other hand, ex-“Galicians” are seen as those who arguably chose ‘the lesser of two evils’ and joined the Nazi army in order to defend their motherland against the Soviet invasion and attempted to build a nucleus for the Ukrainian army, which would serve the future independent Ukrainian state.

Rather than follow the well-trodden path of attempting to justify or condemn the Division’s actions, this paper emphasizes the specificity of the historical and political conditions which surrounded the Division’s dissolution and which enabled its members to escape repatriation to the USSR. The paper also addresses two inter-linked questions: how are the contemporary narratives
of the Division being presented to the public? And what is the role of national institutions in creating an official narrative of the “Galicia”? This paper uses data collected during interviews (2007-2009 in the UK and Ukraine) as well as archival material (UK National Archives and from the Government of Canada Files).

Wynnyckyj, Iroida

Ukrainian Canadian Research and Documentation Center (Toronto, Ontario, Canada)


In this paper, I argue that since the geographical territory inhabited by ethnic Ukrainians was the battlefield for much of the Second World War’s eastern front, Ukrainian women were victimized by both the Soviets and Nazis. They also were victims of the petty internal ethnic struggles that accompanied the ever-changing borders.

During the Second World War, Ukrainian women faced an enormous challenge. The memories and personal experiences of Ukrainian women who lived through the Nazi and Soviet occupations of Ukraine were recorded as part of an oral history project at the Ukrainian Canadian Research and Documentation Center (UCRDC). This paper deals with various individual cases -- their life histories and memories. An attempt was made to include cases from different regions of Ukraine.

The materials informing this paper are divided into three parts:
1. the oral history collection, at the archives of the Ukrainian Canadian Research and Documentation Center, under the title of: World War II--Ukrainian Women;
2. the interview process;
3. an analysis of a sample of 70 selected interviews.

The UCRDC has a World War II--Ukrainian Women archival depository. It holds over 100 oral history accounts. They are the result of two different projects and collections: the UCRDC project; and the Institute for Historical Research at Ivan Franko National University of L’viv project.

The interview process consisted of a structured questionnaire and interviewers were instructed to follow it. The interviews lasted from one to three hours. They were conducted in Ukrainian. During the interview, basic personal data were obtained and then followed by a chronological account of the respondent’s life. Particular emphasis was placed on the war years.

The oral histories relate to issues of particular significance to women in several ways: women as political hostages for the actions of their husbands; women as mothers (maternity); women as orphans; women as victims of rape; women as forced laborers (Ostarbeiters); and women as part of the underground.

Wylegala, Anna

KARTA Center (Warsaw, Poland)

“Alternative Patterns of Memory: World War II in the Eyes of the Oldest Generation of Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi and Kyiv Oblasts’ Inhabitants of Polish Origins”

During the Soviet period, alternative memories and interpretations of World War II in Ukraine were forbidden or forcibly suppressed. Among those most suppressed were memories of groups that in wartime or before experienced Stalinist persecutions and therefore were by definition excluded from official discourse. One can mention here examples of Ukrainian Insurgent Army
Before 1939 the Polish population formed a significant minority in Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi and Kamyanets-Podilskyi oblasts. In 1925 the Polish National Autonomous Region was created in Zhytomyr oblast with its capital in Marchlevsk (today’s Dovbysh), where Poles were allowed to cultivate their language and culture. However, in 1935 the National Region was dissolved, and the next year Stalinist persecutions started. Approximately 200,000 Poles were repressed – arrested, executed, or deported to Kazakhstan. Like other victims of the Stalinist persecutions, their fate was never mentioned in official propaganda.

During the war many of those people were enlisted in the Red Army and fought on the front. Others went through all the war atrocities that the civilian population experienced. Many of them or their relatives died defending a state that was responsible for the repressions. After the war Poles, as others Soviet citizens, were subjected to the very strong Soviet ideologically-based interpretation of World War II.

In such a context, several questions appear: how does the oldest generation of the repressed Polish residents of these regions remember World War II? Do they identify themselves with the Soviet Union as a party of the war, in other words – are the Soviets “our boys” for them? What is their image of the Soviet Army soldiers, and what is their image of the Germans?

Another group of questions concerns memory and an understanding of the repressions. It was common practice for the Soviet state to justify repressions towards certain groups by the state’s needs in extreme circumstances. Are victims able to justify the repressions too? What is stronger, a feeling of hatred towards the state which harmed them and their families, or a feeling of pride toward the same state, which defeated Germans to win the war? To put it another way – what proved to be more successful in shaping memories and consciousness of those people, personal biographical experience or ideological pressure?

The empirical basis of the paper is interviews conducted in Ukraine in May-June 2008 by the author and her colleagues from the Warsaw based KARTA Center. The research combines a methodology of qualitative sociology (in-depth semi-directive biographical interviews) with oral history methods. We conducted more than 60 interviews with the oldest generation of Poles living in oblasts of Zhytomyr, Kyiv and Khmelnytskyi in order to formulate the thesis of those proposals. The language of the interviews was mostly Ukrainian.

Brown, Kate

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“Atomic Forgetting and the Tragedy of Chornobyl”

This paper explores the coverage of the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Despite Cold War rhetoric about the American aggressor, there was a remarkable silence on the horrors of nuclear war, the dangers of radiation and the long-term consequences of a post-nuclear landscape in Japan. Perhaps these silences are not surprising when one considers the secret nuclear accidents that occurred in Soviet nuclear cities soon after start up of the first industrial nuclear reactor in 1948. The consequences of these silences were especially dire in Ukraine in 1986. The general ignorance among national and local leaders and citizens about radioactive contamination exacerbated the Ukrainian tragedy.
Any visitor to Kyiv, especially on a Saturday afternoon, is struck by the number of wedding parties at the city’s historical places, sometimes queuing to have their pictures taken at the sites, inscribing themselves into the city’s historical landscape. This paper focuses on this aspect of the public commemoration of the Second World War – couples having their wedding pictures taken at sites in Kyiv relating to the war, most notably Park Vichnoyi Slavy (Park of Eternal Glory). Park Vichnoyi Slavy is dedicated to the fallen in the Great Patriotic War (as the Second World War is often called), and contains a monument, an obelisk dedicated to the Unknown Soldier, as well as 34 tombstones of named heroes. The main entrance is an alley leading up the obelisk, drawing visitors in with its perfect symmetry. The monument is located on the high western bank of the Dnipro River with a stunning view of the river and eastern parts of the city. Flowers are constantly placed by the monument, most notably around Victory Day in May, and many of the wedding parties choosing this location for photographs and perhaps drinks also pay their respect to the fallen by placing flowers by the eternal flame. This is an event that is often clearly staged, photographed, and sometimes filmed from several angles.

Few families in Ukraine today do not have a relative who died in the war. The horrendous death toll, the enormous suffering and sacrifice contribute to making the war almost sacred, then and now. The Soviet view of the war can be described as a grand narrative, emphasizing the unity and heroism of the defenders of the motherland. According to this view, the higher goal of the war effort legitimized the sacrifice. The cause was an unquestionable good.

While the presence of nationalist and partisan groups in the Ukraine contributes to a greater variety in narratives compared to contemporary Russia, the monuments under investigation in this paper reflect the Soviet narrative of the war and do not question it. Is this true also for the more private uses investigated here?

This paper investigates why couples choose to commemorate the war in a ritual of life. How do they interpret the chosen sites? How does family history relate to national identity and future hopes? The paper is based mainly on interviews with couples that had their pictures taken at such places and participant observation.

In the past several years I have supervised a small project of a German Protestant foundation called Niemöller-Stiftung that concerns the village Peremoha in Kyivs'ka oblast (on the way from Kyiv to Chernihiv). The village was burned down by the Nazis in 1943, and many children and women were taken away for forced labor in Germany. The women of the village always remembered the day when the village was burned down. This date was more important to them than the 9th of May. In the past 15 years the foundation has invited most of those who had been forced laborers in Germany during the war and who are still alive to come to Germany. Most of them have visited the places where they had been forced laborers. Their perspective is different from a Red Army soldier’s perspective; it is also very different from the perspective of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).
Analyzing the sources of totalitarianism, Hanna Arendt asserted that the Soviet totalitarian project was most vividly manifested during two periods: 1929-1941 and 1945-1953. Between these two periods, specifically during the Second World War, the logic of Soviet totalitarianism underwent substantial modifications. This researcher claims that the war was a period when the ambitions of Soviet authorities weakened temporarily. Artists immediately reacted to the change of the aesthetic atmosphere characterized by “gleam” (Abram Terts) and “war period happiness” (Maria Chegodaeva).

According to Hans Hunter’s conception of the phases of socialist realist canon, during the war the canon “unfolds” and consequently modifies. The mechanisms of the modification of socialist realism during the war period were caused by the realities of “threatened” culture. For example, the crucial futurist idea of socialist realism is visualized, i.e. the movement to communism is transformed, into the march to victory. Like the 1930’s, Soviet literature again found itself in narrow functional limits: it had to bring victory closer. Accordingly, the main literary ideological discourse of achieving victory was formulated and the concept of hero as victor was defined.

The poetics of socialist realist modification is revealed in the appearance of two constants: life formula and its mimetic potential, and the concept of literary character. Hence there are two key objects of my research: war documentary prose - its metamorphoses of “truth of life” as a reality formula in socialist realist discourse; and war theme and war – the explication of the national and the universal in O.Dovzhenko’s heritage.

Socialist realism manifested the “truth of life” as a formula of reality while in practice the socialist realist world view is opposite to reality. Socialist realism of the 1930s is based on the gap between reality and its literary embodiment. The socialist realist formula “truth of life” was fully embodied in war documentary or art prose with a realistic and documentary emphasis. Examples include “My Letters” and “A Test by Fire (Commentaries of War Correspondent)” by I.Le; “Along Homeland” and “Don’t Give Up” by A. Shyyan; and “A Soldier’s Notes” by I.Bahmut. The gap between word and fact in documentary writing was reduced. Words were liberated from ideological pressure and became works of art.

It has long been stated that O.Dovzhenko’s war works are to be considered as a specific ideological and aesthetic unity which results from the non-totalitarian discourse: Dovzhenko is against war and is in favor of man. The main mechanism of non-totalitarian discourse is a populist notion of “man.” In O.Dovzhenko’s creative work this notion is conditioned by two factors: the writer’s spiritual connection with the people, and the depiction of folk characters. The latter is based on the dichotomy of “ordinary/heroic”. The heroic underscores the essence of the ordinary, and often appears as actions and deeds that surpass the ordinary man’s abilities. In particular, it is victory over death (“Stop death, Stand,” “Novel of Flaming Years,” “On Thorny Wire”). Attention to man in his national and universal dimensions, especially noticeable in Dovzhenko’s prose and essays, explains his humanistic conception as opposed to the totalitarian depersonalization and military imprisonment of man.

The modification of socialist realist canon under the circumstances of “threatened” culture, on the one hand, signals its flexibility and ability to mobilize, and on the other hand, embodies the immortality of the living word liberated from the pressure of totalitarian power.
The study of the memory of World War II would be incomplete without considering the émigré experience, in particular how it was reflected in literature. Although this memory may overlap with that of people from mainland Ukraine, it has a different, and not ideologically controlled, perspective.

Ukrainian Soviet literary discourse was represented by carriers of an official Soviet concept of the war as the “Great Patriotic War” (Honchar, Stelmach), whereas the émigré discourse absorbed the whole gamut of voices of those who had been in the Red army (Barka), the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Samchuk, Bora), the German army (Klen), and medical units (Kyivan), as well as a great number of refugees (Osmachka, Kosach).

Besides personal experience, there were a number of other factors contributing to the formation of Ukrainian émigrés’ memories of World War II, including (1) their stay in the West with its established concept of World War II as a commemorative event; (2) the influence of émigrés from Western Ukraine who actively opposed the Soviet expansion and fought for an independent state; (3) the view of the war as a human disaster and a result of the clash of two totalitarian systems. This allows us to examine literary works representing different views of the war (Cho ho ne hoít ohon by Ulas Samchuk, Khreshchatyi Yar by Dokia Humenna, and Liudyna bizhyt nad prirvoiu by Ivan Bahrianyi). These and other texts may serve as primary sources about the memory of World War II, though some contain their own myths and stereotypes.

Khreshchatyi Yar (1946-49), a novel-chronicle by Humenna, is one of the best accounts of the beginning of the war. It documents the attitudes of the population of Kyiv and its vicinities towards the war’s developments, Stalin’s and Hitler’s regimes, and prospects for Ukraine’s independence. The work is full of stories, gossip, anecdotes, myths and legends, and effectively conveys the atmosphere during this important period in Ukrainian history. The author shows the tragedy of this time for Ukraine, divided between a “corrupted and assimilating” East and an “all-destroying” West. But she believes in her people, a people whose origins she dates back to the Trypilian culture.

In his novel Cho ho ne hoít ohon, Samchuk extends the geography of warfare from the capital to the Volhynian forests, where a real military power — the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) — was being formed, and which could resist both totalitarian systems. Having experienced Stalin’s brand of socialist construction and disillusioned with the new “civilized liberators,” the Ukrainian population of the region fought heroically for its freedom. Taking a philosophical attitude towards war and ethnic relations, the writer approaches events through a nationalistic worldview, emphasizing national self-defense, solidarity and sacrifice.

In his novel Liudyna bizhyt nad prirvoiu (1948-49), Ivan Bahrianyi continues his favorite theme of man in extreme conditions. He places his characters in the extreme circumstances of the war in order to show his faith in humanism and humankind. He does not distinguish between the two fighting sides, as both appear for him an embodiment of evil. He gives the novel an existential dimension by depicting the war as absurd and interfering with man’s greater destiny. Bahrianyi’s hero does not escape to the West (as does Humenna’s) and does not perish in the battle (as does Samchuk’s) but remains on his own land to present the author’s faith in man. This also reveals Bahrianyi’s own ideological inclination.

Despite all contrasts, the three novels under consideration have similarities concerning the memory of World War II, all of which were absent in the official Soviet discourse:

1) opposition to the Soviet state and Stalinist rule, and a desire to put an end to it;
2) expectation of changes after the invasion by the German army;
3) disillusionment with “new liberators”;
4) the tragedy of Ukraine trapped between two military powers.
In this paper, I analyze the texts of (at least) nine songs by eight of Ukraine’s rock and hip-hop musicians as well as their activities that relate—either directly or obliquely—to events in Ukraine during World War II. The paper highlights this relationship in the context of historical memory and current perceptions of the war in Ukraine. In the post-Soviet era, Ukrainians have shown that they are divided over interpretations of World War II. While in basic agreement over Nazi rule during the war, Ukrainians are still conflicted over the Soviet role during the war and especially over the role and actions of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Particular attention is paid to songs that feature or make reference to the UPA.

The paper also looks at the actions and songs of Ukraine’s rock and hip-hop musicians as a means of shaping perceptions of the war and creating alternative memories of the war. In addition, the paper addresses the question of why contemporary rock and hip-hop musicians are engaged in writing lyrics and performing songs inspired by events of World War II. It explains this in the context of contemporary politics and the building of national identity, as well as in the legacy of Ukraine’s folk music traditions associated with periods of warfare.

I postulate that the songs can be divided into three basic types: patriotic songs, parodies, and perversions (deliberate distortions). I highlight instances where songwriters and musicians use parody or perversion to oppose, undermine, or subvert official representations of the past, Soviet and post-Soviet narratives, interpretations, memories, myths, and stereotypes associated with the war.

The paper focuses on the actions of musicians and songs on World War II between the years 1989 to 2008. During this period the songs being examined were either performed in public, appeared on a commercial or bootleg album, tape or CD, or became available as texts and audio files on the Internet.
The territory that was marked as peculiarly sacred was the state border. Frontier guards were treated as not just members of the military, but more like a kind of guardian angels. Their antipodes were the creatures of hell, border violators. In military films they were turned into traitors and diversionists.

During the war, the motive of sacrifice, inherent to the mythological mindset and born even before the war, grew stronger.

One of the key figures of Soviet mythology was Stalin. He appeared on the screen as an all-powerful demiurge, the Great Father, as the transcendence in flesh. The archetype of the Great Father is related to the mythology of the Great Mother, which has an ambivalent nature, and the Great Family, where all relations are built vertically only. The films about the war vividly demonstrate this.

The topic of war itself undergoes a complicated, sometimes unpredictable evolution, from pompous films like “The Great Break” and “Fall of Berlin” to the films of “trench truth”, and the desire to understand the fate of an individual in the harsh chaos of war. During times of the stagnation, the urge to make the war myth ontological became more and more insistent. It became a substitute for the myth of the revolution and the civil war, both of which had deteriorated over time.

Today, because all the people that were part of the USSR experienced the deep existential experience of war, the myth of war continues to influence both their conscious and unconscious. It does this by appealing to their true heroism and self-sacrifice, as well as to the type of dangerous illusions that C.B. Jung referred to as “world-ruining fire.”

Dyak, Sofia

Center for Urban History of East Central Europe (Lviv, Ukraine)

“*The Second World War in the Lviv Cityscape: Creating the Cornerstone for the City’s Postwar Identity*”

In my presentation I explore the inscription and erasure of the tales related to the Second World War in the Lviv cityscape. World War Two was a turning point in the city’s history, while the experience of the war was strongly imprinted both in the city’s outlook and in the memory of those people who came to inhabit it after the war or were expelled. Tracing the appearance of new sites commemorating the Second World War, changes in the topics which they brought to public commemoration, and the commemorative language which they used, I discuss the overall development of the publicly-allowed commemorative framework as it was part of making Soviet Lviv. At the same time, I point out tensions which it provoked in relation to Lviv’s post-war society and the city’s experience of war. The official tale of the war was integrated as a pillar for a new identity for the city. Therefore, looking at the dynamics of commemoration and making the war mythologies for it helps to assess how its legacies influenced and shaped the post-Communist re-making of the city’s image.

I focus on spatial expressions of World War II commemoration, both through what was inscribed and what was erased. First of all, these are monuments, but also sites, marked in different ways, and the city as a whole served as a stage for the commemorative rituals. It is important for my research to see the individual “biographies” of memorials, using the term from James Young’s work on Holocaust memorials. In particular, the sites commemorating war experiences are called to keep or impose a certain vision of the past and therefore invite the researcher to ask in what manner meaning is assigned to them, what are the differences among them, and how they influence society’s understanding of its past. Space was one of the key vessels to carry the official vision of the identity and collective memory for new inhabitants of Lviv. Memory of the war could thus also be seen as an instrument that, on the one hand, enhanced and strengthened new polities, but on the other hand, excluded others, leaving them “invisible.”
In the historical memory of the contemporary Crimean Tatars, the 1944 Deportation is, without exaggeration, a defining event. Even now, more than 60 years later, the rallies in memory of the deportation victims attract thousands of people both in Crimea and in all the Crimean Tatar diaspora communities. Assessing the significance of the deportation from the viewpoint of national awareness among Crimean Tatars, even today the deportation and the time spent in exile shape national awareness and consolidate and cement this ethnos.

The deportation stands out in the historical memory of Crimean Tatars as the most prominent event—above all, because this memory is linked to the history of every family. Virtually every family had members who died in the first years of exile. Furthermore, this event defined, for years to come, their lives in a foreign land, which is still traumatic to the representatives of the older generation of the Crimean Tatars. These people linked their most cherished hopes to their motherland. (They often say, “But for the exile, life would have taken a different path.”) The Crimean Tatars were banned from returning to Crimea for decades, and this intensified the very concept of deportation. In exile they started making sacred their historical motherland—Crimea.

If viewed in the comparative aspect, the 1944 deportation is much more important for the Crimean Tatars than the victory of the USSR in the Second World War. Their perceptions of political leaders differed, too. The historical memory of other nations shows a certain whitening of Stalin’s image, but the Crimean Tatars have shown no historical forgiveness or mercy to him. (Several years ago, with the support of their compatriots in Crimea, the Crimean Tatar community in Moscow mobilized the human rights community across the world and essentially derailed plans to install a monument to Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt in Livadia.)

The topic of deportation has also acquired special intensity because today, two decades after the launch of mass repatriation, the status of the Crimean Tatar people remains undefined in Ukraine, and the Crimean Tatar problem remains unresolved on the legislative level. The absence of a real legislative act regulating the solution of this problem and offering a symbolic apology for what was perpetrated by the authorities makes the deportation even more traumatic. At the same time, certain representatives of the younger generation, who were born and/or grew up in Crimea, sometime speak in favor of investing a more positive meaning in the concept of deportation by linking it to the idea of return (Avdet).

Meanwhile, ideas for commemorating the victims of the 1944 genocide are emerging in the Crimean Tatar community. For example, the present author voiced the following suggestion in a number of Crimean Tatar mass media outlets in the spring of 2008: “For Jews the Holocaust, (Shoah or the Catastrophe) is a colossal symbol of the unity of the Jewish nation. I am convinced that for the Crimean Tatars the 1944 deportation is the same Catastrophe and the same symbol of unity and solidarity. Look at the importance that the historical memorial Yad Vashem and the very concept ‘Holocaust’ has had for consolidating the Jewish people. I believe that the Crimean Tatars need to consider erecting their own Yad Vashem—a national memorial whose purpose should be formulated as follows: commemorating every compatriot who died as a result of the deportation. Fortunately, in many Crimean villages and cities there are monuments to the victims of the deportation, and our symposium even started from a visit to the Revival monument. This is all very good. However, I believe we need to think about a memorial complex that would include a museum, archive, library, and a research center and would immediately address the task of restoring
to the collective memory of the Crimean Tatar people the names of all our compatriots who died in exile. This has to be done without delay. Yad Vashem was founded in 1953, a short while after the events it was designed to commemorate, while in the case of the Crimean Tatars, over six decades have gone by since the time of the deportation. This means that people are departing this life, and with them we are losing the knowledge of that time that only they possessed.”

This presentation looks at the deportation of the Crimean Tatars in the context of developing national self-identity in the 20th century. What is impact of deportation for those who were exiled, their children, and the contemporary generation of the Crimean Tatars? What is the symbolic potential of the concept of deportation? What is the relationship between deportation and genocide for the present-day Crimean Tatar community?

Carynnyk, Marco
Independent Scholar, (Toronto, Ontario, Canada)

“Jews, Poles, and Other Swine: Ruda Róźaniecka, 30 June 1941”

Scholars have written much in recent years about the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, or OUN. One important member of the OUN has not received the attention he deserves. My paper deals with relations among Ukrainians, Jews, and Poles in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia in 1939–1941. At the heart of the paper are the events of June–July 1941. Drawing on archival documents, interviews with eyewitnesses, and the published secondary literature, I try to clarify the crucial role that OUN activists played in those events and particularly in the organization of the pogroms that broke out when the Red Army retreated from the Wehrmacht and the remains of victims of killings by the NKVD were discovered in L’viv, Zolochiv, Ternopil’, and other localities. The paper throws new light on the attitude of the OUN towards Poles and Jews and on the anti-Semitic discourse that it engaged in throughout the 1930s, on its cooperation with German forces in persecuting Jews, and on the origins of the pogroms that broke out in Galicia and Volhynia in the summer of 1941.

Illiushyn, Ihor
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“The Ukrainian-Polish Conflict in Public Consciousness and Collective Memory: Stereotypes and Historical Facts”

It is no secret that the problem of the Ukrainian-Polish conflict during World War II remains the most debated topic in both Ukrainian and Polish historiographies and the most painful spot in the relations between the neighboring peoples. In spite of the fact that more than seven decades has elapsed since the start of World War II, many Ukrainians and Poles still cannot forgive the offenses and abuses experienced by their compatriots during those events.

For example, Polish scientific institutions and public organizations are convinced that just in Volyn’ during the years 1942-1944 “nearly 40-50 000 men, women and children were killed by Ukrainian nationalists simply because they were Poles and didn’t want to leave this territory.” This state of affairs had been confirmed by the course of discussions in 2003 concerning the tragedy in Volyn’ and by events organized on both sides of Ukrainian-Polish border to commemorate the victims.

A new wave of mutual accusations arose in 2008 as a result of the 65th anniversary of the Volyn’ tragedy. Members of the All-Poland Committee dedicated to commemorating the anniversary of those events, guided by its chief, deputy head (Vice Marshal) of the Sejm, Yaroslav...
Kalinovsky, started to demand inclusion of the question of “Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-Ukrainian Insurgent Army (OUN-UPA) atrocities,” along with the recognition and juridical qualification of their actions against the Polish population in Volyn’ and Eastern Halychyna (Galicia), as an act of genocide.

Prominent Ukrainians (officials, deputies, politicians) mostly try to compare the extent of responsibility on both sides as part of an international tragedy in war time. Some of them even assert that the UPA’s role in those events “should be recognized as rightful” and that it waged “the just struggle for liberation of the people in its ethnical territory against all the occupants, Poles among others”.

In certain political circles in Ukraine there is the view that since Poles supported the “Orange Revolution” and Ukraine’s efforts to integrate into Europe, they will also forget about past events such as Volyn’. Yet in the Polish mass media and in a wide segment of Polish society (and, by the way, in the West as well), there is a widespread opinion that “Ukraine didn’t dare to make an appropriate moral evaluation of Ukrainian nationalistic combatants’ actions in the past, so the Poles are still waiting for the excuses from Ukrainian officials.”

This paper is devoted to some basic and the most widespread stereotypes in the public consciousness and collective memory of the Ukrainians and Poles concerning these events.

Tiahlyi, Mykhailo

Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies (Kyiv, Ukraine)

“‘Collateral’ Genocide: Poraimos as an Element in the Historical Memory of Ukrainian Society and an Instrument for Constructing Roma Identity”

This presentation is dedicated to the peculiarities of the collective identity of Roma (Gypsies) and an analysis of the role that the genocide of Roma by Nazis during the Second World War is playing in the historical memory of both Roma and Ukrainian society in general. Due to certain historical conditions, this ethnic group is not monolithic. According to estimations of some researchers, the number of subgroups forming this community exceeds fifty just in the CIS alone.

After the decline of Communism and rise of the cultural life of ethnic groups, a set of social problems arose and became aggravated from interactions between the Gypsy and non-Gypsy populations of the former Soviet Union, in particular in Ukraine. In order to protect their rights more effectively and to counteract discrimination from the authorities, the Roma started to seek a model of identity that could present the group as a unified community with many ethno-cultural variations, rather than as an artificial construct with separate geographic and cultural groups. This, in particular, is the goal of some Roma ethnic and cultural organizations. One of the tasks they strive to achieve, in addition to resolving their urgent social problems, is to build a pan-European model of identity.

One of the effective instruments for building this new identity is establishing the model for a unified historical memory common for all groups. Due to the peculiarities of the ethno-cultural behavior of Roma (until recent times – absence of written records and experience transfer, priority of individual historical memory over collective memory), this task is far from easy. The quest for the common elements of history for groups separated culturally and geographically is still pending.

The historical events of the Second World War and the phenomenon of the Nazis’ persecution of Roma in occupied Europe (some historians use the term “Poraimos”) are significant to all groups and are increasingly being used to consolidate the different groups. Adherents of such an approach claim that the principles of the “Gypsy policy” of the Nazis and the treatment of Gypsies in occupied Europe was absolutely identical to the Nazi policy regarding Jews, and that the Nazis applied the policy of full extermination to Roma along with Jews. This claim is accepted ambiguously, and is criticized by researchers and ethnic activists for copying the “Jewish” post-War
identity construction model, in which, in their opinion, the historical memory of the Holocaust plays a prominent role, and victimization becomes an instrument for more effective achievement of the tasks of the present. Another point for criticism in the eyes of many researchers is the attempt to equate principles of anti-Jewish and anti-Roma policy of the Nazis, which, in their opinion, goes against objective historical facts. This issue has sparked very spirited historiographic debates. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the history of the Nazi anti-Roma policy is hardly covered at all, and current scientific literature on the topic is very limited and leaves a lot of space for conjectures and speculations. In the journalistic and educational discourses in Ukraine, the issue of the Roma tragedy during the war years is still on the periphery of public attention, and is absent as a separate topic in textbooks or in commemorative acts initiated by the state.

This presentation is an attempt to analyze major directions of this discussion, to trace how historical events are interpreted by modern leaders of the national movement of Roma (ritualization of the memory of Poraimos, utilization of commemorative places), and how they are used for building Roma identity in modern Ukraine in the context of memorial policies implemented in the state.

Amar, Tarik Cyril
Center for Urban History of East Central Europe (Lviv, Ukraine)

“A Noisy Silence: Soviet Discourse on the Holocaust in Lviv 1941-1987”

The legacy of the Holocaust has been of great importance for Soviet and post-Soviet societies, including the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe. And its importance has only grown in recent years. The collapse of Soviet hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe has opened new spaces for remembrance, reflection, and open discussion, and increased the opportunities for researchers to explore the contemporary meaning of the Holocaust for these societies. In Ukraine in particular, the history, memory and politics of memory of the Holocaust are currently receiving fresh impulses. One area of special interest is the relationship between Ukrainian nationalists during World War Two and the Holocaust, as well as questions of the comparability of victimization. At the same time, the post-Soviet present cannot be understood without an equally fresh exploration of the legacy of the Soviet period itself. Clearly, another variation on the return-of-history theme would be misleading, implying that societies and discourses that have been in suspense under a Soviet/Cold War “freeze” could now take up again where they left off before it.

My paper examines Soviet discourse on the Holocaust in and around the city of Lviv in western Ukraine. The traditional Soviet attitude towards the Holocaust has been to conceal or de-emphasize the Germans’ special drive against the Jews. Findings in and about Lviv suggest a need, however, to go beyond the dichotomy of denial or eclipse, on one side, and recognition, on the other.

My paper seeks to demonstrate that the official Soviet approach to the Holocaust was distorted but complex, and cannot be adequately described as simple suppression. This, however, should not be taken to imply that its legacies are less detrimental. In fact, the opposite may be the case. It was precisely a fuller recognition of the events of mass murder which could be used stridently in a way that converged with a Soviet anti-Semitism. This combined traditional, i.e. pre-Soviet and non-Soviet, prejudice and Soviet anti-Zionism.

We should remember Jan Karski’s fundamental insight: that anti-Semitism could be a bridge of mutual understanding, where rulers and ruled otherwise disagreed strongly. Karski wrote about the very special case of German-occupied Poland, where the exact nature of anti-Semitism and authoritarian rule differed very substantially across Central and Eastern Europe between 1939 and 1991. Yet his insight holds potential for qualified generalization in territories such as Western Ukraine with its urban center of Lviv, where three factors coincided: the existence of traditions of pre-Soviet anti-Semitism; anti-Soviet resistance; and the latter’s defeat, followed by two generations of Soviet postwar rule.
Hrynevych, Ludmyla

Institute of History of Ukraine, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Kyiv, Ukraine)

“Political and Ideological Conception of the ‘Justification of the Holodomor Through the Victory of the Great Patriotic War’ in the Political Battles and Historiography of Ukraine and Russia”

This paper focuses on the birth and formation of the new political and ideological concept of ‘justifying’ the Holodomor with the victory in World War Two. The presenter analyzes the works of those who have come up with this “concept,” and traces its current expression by particular political officials, in the mass media, and in the realm of education in both Ukraine and Russia. It’s the presenter’s opinion that this concept prevents a proper understanding of the Holodomor and World War Two, is based on a rejection of guilt and responsibility for the past, devalues human life, and legitimizes political violence.

McBride, Jared

University of California Los Angeles (Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.)

“Through a Lens Darkly: The Massacre at Malyn, July 1943”

On the morning of 13 July 1943, a German “anti-partisan” detachment cordoned off Malyn, a small village consisting of a Czech and smaller Ukrainian colony, located in the Ostrozhets raion of Rivne oblast’ in Volhynia. Following a protocol played out in villages all over Western Ukraine that spring and summer, soldiers rounded up the population from their homes, claiming that there would be a registration in the town square. The soldiers then drove the entire Czech population to the Ukrainian section of Malyn, where they and the Ukrainian residents were divided by gender. The women and children were taken to the Orthodox Church, while another group was taken to a number of barns and sheds. The men were taken to Malyn’s school and town hall. Malyn’s residents were then locked inside these structures while the soldiers laid down straw, poured gasoline, and lit the buildings ablaze. As those locked inside panicked and were engulfed by the flames, the soldiers “threw grenades in the windows” and “opened fire on [the burning buildings] with machine guns and tommy-guns.” The cries could be heard a kilometer away from Malyn as Malyn’s residents burned to death.

Working in the state archives of the Russian Federation in 2001, I came across a dozen testimonies located in the Extraordinary State Commission (ChGK) files that told the story of what happened in Malyn. Oddly I had never heard of this village or its fate. Unlike other “martyred villages” from the Second World War, such as Lidice or Oradour-Sur-Glune, Malyn has only appeared periodically in English-language works, often as just another passing example of Nazi brutality in the East. Initially I simply wanted to discern whether this was in fact an anti-partisan reprisal and not an act of ethnic cleansing by Ukrainian nationalists. Though I was able to discover through my research that the German division that destroyed Malyn was in fact comprised of both a Polish police division from Olyka and a number of Ukrainian schutzmanner, meaning this was an example of a multi-ethnic division under German command destroying a multi-ethnic village, it was actually all of the fallacious information that I discovered during my inquiry that became the focus of my research.

In my initial inquiry, I encountered a dizzying array of explanations as to what happened on 13 July 1943 in memoirs and secondary literature. Not only were the explanations for the reprisal varied, but the facts about the reprisal themselves were far from lucid. The date and time of the reprisal was not clear, not to mention the ethnicity of the perpetrators seemed to morph from account to account, as well the victims’ ethnicity. In some accounts Poles were responsible, elsewhere it was Ukrainians, others Vlasovites -- even Uzbeks were blamed. To probe the historical
record even further, I turned towards scholarly accounts from Eastern European historians. To my dismay, this effort caused even more problems. The discord between Soviet, Ukrainian, Polish, and Czech accounts of what occurred was so great that there did not seem to be a possible way to bridge them. Armed with archival references, oral histories, and a litany of explanations, each historian made very specific “truth claims” about Malyn, but none meshed. As I began to check and cross-reference their footnotes and claims in half a dozen languages and archives in four different countries, a much more distinctive pattern emerged.

In this paper, I dissect four distinct discourses or narratives on the massacre of Malyn -- Soviet, Ukrainian, Polish, and Czech, and I sort out the complex process of “creative forgetting” and “creative remembering,” to adapt the phrase of one Polish historian, which has so often plagued the memory of the Second World War in Eastern Europe. My task is twofold -- I interrogate the source base used in each of these narratives, while also explaining and charting the trajectory of the narratives themselves. It is my contention that if we peer through the ethnic prism at Malyn, we will learn more about how the war has been remembered in Eastern Europe, rather than the massacre itself.

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“Memory of the Holocaust: Sources of Formation and Forms of Functioning in Ukraine”

Historical memory is constructed artificially and deliberately, and can be revised and corrected. Revised historical memories are often the consequence of a society’s (lack of) desire to know the historical truth, or a desire to erase certain events altogether.

Memories of the Second World War and its specific aspects (in particular, the Holocaust) are constructed by survivors, by scholars who study various aspects of genocides, and by the state. The state has unlimited abilities to shape the attitudes and judgments of its citizens towards historical events. Taking this into account, is the state deliberately forming historical memory of the Holocaust in Ukrainian society? The answer is yes. But the Ukrainian state lacks consistency in doing so. One of the reasons for this is a tendency to read Ukraine’s past within the framework of an ethnic history.

In general, the state's policy regarding the Holocaust can be defined as follows: it allows others to construct and preserve the memory of the genocide victims. For instance, Ukraine supports the construction of memorial complexes in locations of mass executions of Jews, but foreigners whose relatives perished in the Holocaust nearly always pay for these memorials. The memory policy is often implemented based on the priorities of the titular nation only. The state does not obstruct scientific studies of the Holocaust, yet it does not fund such projects, transferring the burden to interested historians, Jewish ethnic communities, and others.

Those outside the state who are devoted to preserving the memory of the Holocaust exhibit certain attitudes:

1. Memory of the Catastrophe in the Jewish community reached the level of an archetype long ago.
2. Out of various ways to identify the presence of Jews within Ukraine, the dominant one is marking places of mass executions of Holocaust victims.
3. We assume that the Jews of Ukraine, just like other groups who were victims of genocide, are inclined to claim that the crime against them was a unique one. This is a way of privatizing pain, and appropriating the tragic past.
4. Pain draws attention to other historical events that can be identified as genocide, or are already accepted as such. By lifting the taboo on the crime of the Holodomor, and the official declaration by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine that it was an act of genocide, we can see reflections and comparisons of the Holocaust with the tragedy of 1932-1933.
5. Ukrainian Jews remain sensitive to reflections of the Holocaust in various spheres of social life, especially in educational literature. This is because educational literature is one place where historical memory of the Holocaust is formed most consistently in Ukraine.

6. NGOs concerned with the Holocaust attempt to use its social and historical lessons to form inter-ethnic tolerance in the young generation, and to prevent the growth of anti-Semitism in Ukraine.

In sum, this paper focuses on the formation of historical memory of the Holocaust in Ukraine as part of the collective memory of World War Two. The ways in which Holocaust victims are memorialized in Ukraine reflects the state’s ambiguous attitude towards this aspect of the war. This means that the state and other groups and individuals who form and implement the memory policy still have much to accomplish.

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“Constructing Collective Memory of the Holocaust and National Identity”

Since achieving independence, Ukraine has started a process of rethinking its history, reconstructing historical and collective memory, and constructing a national identity. Such processes are typical for any society undergoing crucial changes, and usually reconstruction of collective memory and national identity depend upon and support each other.

Reconstruction of collective and historical memory can be carried out either by “repairing” old narratives or by creating a new narrative about a specific event or historical period and distribution of this narrative in the society. Such a new narrative about World War II that fundamentally differs from the Soviet narrative has been created and distributed in the textbooks on the history of Ukraine and world history, in mass media, commemorative practices, etc. It was impossible not to include the Holocaust, which has not been reflected in the official memory before in this new narrative about World War II. Not only scholarly and moral reasons but also Ukraine’s desire to join the European community demanded it. Analysis of historical textbooks shows the evolution of narratives about the Holocaust included in the plot of the Second World War, and the presence of different “voices” (in Bakhtinian sense) in the narratives about it. They form levels of the official memory about the Holocaust.

What characterizes collective memory of young people to whom these narratives are addressed first of all? And how do these narratives influence their national identity? Empirical study shows that youths’ collective memory of the Holocaust is not rich in content, and in many cases is grounded in myths and stereotypes. When it is more meaningful it is based on the pattern of the equal rights of people of different races and nationalities. In the youths’ collective memory of the Holocaust there are even more various “voices” than in official memory, and the versions of their collective memory are often contested and even opposite.

Usually young people do not consider the Holocaust to be an event belonging to Ukrainian history and try to distance themselves from it. Very few analyze the past to draw some conclusions from it or to connect it with the future in order to prevent similar events. The majority of youth do not want to learn more about the Holocaust, considering this information traumatic and troublesome and pushing it to the periphery of their memory. As a result, collective memory of the Holocaust does not noticeably influence the national identity of the majority of young people in Ukraine. At the same time there is a small group in which the memory of the Holocaust appeared to be connected with different types of national identity, such as civil identity, ethnic identity, opposition of “Us” and “Others” or “Alien”. Empirical data also show regional specificity for the collective memory of the Holocaust and the dynamic of its change over several years.