Les-being and Identity Politics:
The Intersectionality of Sexual Identity and Desire

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Abstract
Language and sexuality research has recently seen a heated debate over whether the linguistic constitution of sexuality should still be focused on matters of identity or rather on matters of desire. I want to contribute to that debate and argue that this is a non-productive dichotomy. We need to stop the counter-effective spectator sport of academic in-fighting and see desire as one aspect of the articulation of sexual identity. To demonstrate the advantages of the proposed intersectional approach, I will analyse the case of the initiative of the Hungarian Lesbian NGO called Labrisz that approached secondary schools in the country, offering help in the sexual education of the pupils and organising discussions of dissident sexual orientation. I will carry out an ideology critique of the NGO leaflet sent to the directors to argue that, for a pedagogical initiative to successfully inhabit the weaknesses of the heterosexual norm, it should not exclude the discussion of desire but highlight desire as an important dimension of sexual identity, especially as part of a project launched in the name of authenticity.

Key Words: desire, homosexuality, language, les-being, politics of knowledge, sexual education, sexual identity, sexuality.

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1. Critical Reflexivity in Language and Sexuality Research

In this paper I would like to advance the dialogue about the implications of rethinking the conceptualisation of the category of identity vis-à-vis desire for exploring dissident sexuality, in the light of the ongoing debate in the field of language and sexuality research. The participants in these exchanges seem to be divided along geographic lines. British linguists, led by Deborah Cameron and Don Kulick, propose that we should go beyond the dominant, mostly US based approach best represented by William Leap, Anna Livia and Kira Hall.¹ The US research frames particular projects in terms of the concept of identity, while the British approach suggests that the study of language use and sexual practice encompasses other dimensions of sexuality, above all, that of the erotic, discussed under the general heading of the category of desire.

Both approaches emphasise that they see the relationship between language and sexuality as primarily political in nature. In the first place, this
means that it will not suffice for either faction to produce a descriptive account of the distribution of various linguistic forms used by or about lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, queens, transsexuals, or any other sexually non-normative (group of) speakers. They both move beyond that and engage, instead, in critical projects, exploring the many ways in which the identified patterns of language use intersect with social relations of power. As potential targets of similar (academic) discrimination of sexual categorisation, they assume the position of the dispossessed and contest hegemonic practices of power that stigmatise, exclude, or, at best, tolerate non-heterosexual collectives and individuals. What matters to me here are not so much the actual issues, the specific linguistic behaviours identified by the representatives of the two approaches for their case studies, but rather the ideological investments of their conceptual frameworks. In other words, my concern is how best to understand the situatedness of the research projects themselves, especially when, as researchers, we regard ourselves as members of the targeted collective. Having fought all sorts of (academic) battles in order to have our conceptual frameworks acknowledged, it is all too tempting to believe that our reflections do not reiterate the homophobic logic of the dominant discourses we are struggling against. However, in my view, transgressive positions are inevitably forged in the course of discursively mediated contestations, never simply granted.

I argue therefore that we will not necessarily produce transgressive knowledge claims even if we observe the two major requirements of critical social research: first, to situate our research within the lives of the marginalised researched collectives and individuals (in this case, meaning the social position and discourses of the various “outlaw” sexualities); second, to proceed to interrogate and expose the logic of power relations in the chosen field or institution of homophobic practices. I think the obstacle to the ideal of progressive objectives has to do with taking our transgressive position for granted in a two-fold manner - regarding the conceptualisation of intertextuality and of progressive knowledge claims.

Regarding intertextuality, we may believe that what we need to do is identify the particular (textual) sources of discrimination “out there,” as if determinable outside of the exclusionary signifying practices of cultural mediation. One strategy to counter this assumption may require opening up our approach to contingency and seeing the text of our own analysis as an inter-textual product. This involves a need to understand that practices of enhanced reflexivity (such as the specificity of academic knowledge production) are also embedded within the same order of discourse as that of the “data” of our analysis.

The analytical practice is inherently a form of sense-making practice and, as such, a form of interpretation. The corollary of this ontological condition of research practices is that the posited relationship between the
text and the discourses of research practices is always inevitably mediated through the analyst’s *investment* in a given theoretical discourse. Therefore it may not make sense to operationalise the text of the data versus the context of the data-analysis divide. Accordingly, we cannot automatically dismiss an analysis of the dynamics of complicity with - versus transgression of - homophobia in and through the academic discourse.

Once we see the text of the analysis *emerging* at the intersection of the text/context boundary embedded within a particular order of discourse, we need to carry out an *intertextual* analysis to expose the discontinuous, often contradictory logics informing our own discourses of sexuality. It is an often troubled yet necessary intersection, the ontological condition for any change towards a more inclusionary model of language and sexuality research. My observation hinges on the actual understanding of intertextuality. It needs to acknowledge above all the materiality of discourse and define it as an ideological social practice where categories or concepts “never assert their meaningfulness in and of themselves” but function “as a particular way of making sense of [the signified]” and thereby bring about or “define a particular set of social arrangements.” In other words, signifiers come to be meaningful “within the available frames of intelligibility,” which are effects of particular relations of hegemonic power.

The actual intertextual analysis, then, should explore the ideological investments of the sense-making practices in a given cultural and historic moment. I agree with John Frow’s observation that doing such an intertextual analysis of a text - academic or otherwise - “is not, in itself, the identification of a particular intertextual source” (so that we could prove that the text is made up of several *Other* texts) but that of “the more general discursive structure (genre, discursive formation, ideology) to which it belongs.” That is, the mere identification of the textually mediated sources and/or the “origins” of homophobia as ultimate research objectives would count as enacting the ideology of “the real” - paradoxically that of the “real homosexual” or the “really good framework” of sexuality.

In terms of ideological investments then, any analytical approach that is merely obsessed with the origin of constituent texts, as if literally in the data, delivers the promise of the authoritative position of the “expert” who is never complicit with the targeted relations of power. However, seen from the very point of view of our arguable claim to belonging in the marginalised collective that we wish to “prove,” by choosing to analyse the diverse ideological investments of *Others* in the differential cultural logic of sexual categorisation of people to their disadvantage, this non-complicity will not deliver the ideal of a progressive, less exclusionary practice of categorisation, because we have failed to carry out an adequate intertextual analysis and consider our own discourses’ *a priori* embeddedness within the existing orders of discourse. We will merely be speaking on behalf of the
Other, legitimising the dominant academic practice of giving voice to the excluded whom we are positioned by this logic (falsely) to know prior to - and without any need of - any actual encounter. I contend therefore that we should rather see critique as an always contingent political activity whose only strategy is to make its own embeddedness in the discursive order visible via self-reflexivity and an explicit accountability to the collectives to which we wish to belong (for example, by way of researching the damages of homophobia). This accountability consists in deconstructing the multiple intersections of the often contradictory discourses of “outlaw” sexuality in our own texts. We should open up its self-contained boundaries, examining the ways in which the practice of analysis itself shapes the meaning of “outlaw” sexuality.

There is another, more general political aspect of taking our (academic or activist) transgressive position for granted. It has to do with the most recent developments of social movements, including LGBT organisations, which are critical of the status quo. Reconsidering the characteristic features of critical social research, Sandra Harding pointed out that identifying with the marginalised does not necessarily mean that the politics of the scientific research agenda are going to be progressive, since there are social movements whose critique of the status quo is informed by a conservative agenda. In other words, it is very important for pro-democratic research projects such as language and sexuality studies to understand that “[s]tandpoint logic shows how to identify and critically analyze a distinctive aspect of power, namely its conceptual practices. Yet, more than pro-democratic groups are marginalized by contemporary political economies.” Therefore it is not “obvious” that (scientific) engagement with the dispossessed for obtaining knowledge of the discursive practices, more specifically of the conceptual framework of power relations, will deliver any knowledge transgressive to the dominant modes of oppression.

I agree with Harding’s point that not all new social movements in the past four decades that have claimed a political agenda to transform the social order have been pro-democratic. In other words, the struggle against exclusion from existing cultural goods and services does not inevitably result in pro-democratic agendas. Movements, such as the American Patriot movement or religious and territorial fundamentalists groups that are marginalised socially and/or culturally, may not only be complicitous with hegemonic forms of power, but may even articulate a politics that is an obstacle to the advance of a progressive, less exclusionary (epistemological) agenda. Yet, their agenda is also informed by the logic of a critical methodology.

Harding, however, does not address the question of the politics of knowing the difference between progressive and regressive conceptual practices. She only observes that “studying up” cannot be politically neutral:
[since] both regressive groups longing for a less democratic past and progressive groups longing for a more democratic future can identify obstacles to achieving their goals in the conceptual practices of modern sciences and their philosophies.7

At this point her own argumentation becomes caught up in the ideological work of naturalising the past versus future orientation divide as the “obvious” ground for differentiation, articulating a complicity with the dominant practice of ahistoricising the meaning of “democratic change.” The exposure of this blindness supports my earlier point about the importance of self-reflexivity. From this second, more immediately political perspective, the strategic struggle against co-optations by dominant conceptual practices requires not only a social movement but also that movement’s self-critical/self-reflexive problematisation, in order to see that the so-called standpoint of any critical approach is itself an emerging position, one that is the effect of a textually mediated intersubjective negotiation of power. Therefore it is never ascribed, nor is it granted on the presumption that we already know what democracy “is” but always remains subject to contingent intertextual deconstructions.

2. Re-Articulation of Identity Versus Desire Based Positions

I propose that the twofold orientation to a contingent intertextuality is what the rival approaches to language and sexuality research could benefit from when revisiting the informing logic of their own discourses of sexuality. As for the twofold orientation of such a critical analysis, we can say that the research field has successfully transgressed the old assumption of linguistic studies rooted in the naturalising proposition that the experience of systematic silencing and humiliation of the researched will simply produce unquestionable transgressive knowledges of the various forms of their oppressions. In other words, language and sexuality research has long gone beyond the obsession with giving accounts of and/or identifying linguistic characteristics of language users based on the naturalising assumption that if gay people use a particular linguistic form that makes the linguistic form itself “gay” and therefore always “authentic.” What matters in this regard for research purposes within the new paradigm is to explore the reasons for choosing particular discourses, to understand the ideological investments of users in one linguistic form rather than another. For capturing the essence of this shift in language and sexuality research we can adapt Deborah Cameron’s criticism of the traditional descriptive projects as a critique of a politics of complicity, against which she argues in favour of a progressive research agenda from a critical feminist perspective. She stresses the need to view the relationship between language and gender - and by extension
between language and sexuality - as primarily a matter of political rather than purely linguistic concern:

Feminism is not about giving housewives [or LGBT collectives] their due, it is about changing the conditions of domestic labour [or homophobia] altogether. Similarly, feminism cannot stop at validating the linguistic strategies typical of women [or LGBT people]; it must also ask why women find some communicative practices more relevant than others to their circumstances: a question of their social positioning, of the social practices [linguistic or otherwise] in which they are allowed to participate.8

However, as far as such an orientation to reflexivity is concerned, language and sexuality research have yet to counter the other equally non-productive assumption according to which a critical (feminist) reflection on dominant oppressive relations of power should always lead to progressive politics (of research). Extending Harding’s earlier cited warning, my point is that in so far as epistemological frameworks (scientific or otherwise) constitute a distinctive aspect of power relations, we cannot assume that a critical theoretical framework is inevitably resistant to them, just as social movements critical of the status quo do not necessarily lead to less exclusionary claims. We still need to address the particular conditions of escape in terms of the politics of knowledge production.

Re-reading the arguments in the language and sexuality debate, we can say that they evolve around the consequences of sexual categorisation in the Other’s academic discourse but never in one’s own. In terms of contingent intertextuality, my reflections on the debate aim to advance a dialogue through giving primacy to questions of self-reflexivity. We need to explore and deconstruct the ideological investments of the discourses of sexuality that the two approaches (believe themselves to) draw on, when critically analysing the damaging linguistic effects produced by exclusionary categories of sexuality. In short, when revisiting the two academic, allegedly “transgressive” discourses of sexuality, I am concerned with the politics of their knowledge production rather than with the relevance of the particular linguistic methodologies chosen for analysis. The ultimate question in the discourse analysis of the two positions will therefore adopt Penelope Eckert’s suggestion to link the place of sexuality in social life to the particular place of language and sexuality research in the order of (academic) discourse.

Eckert suggests that in order to expose a particular speaker’s membership of a given social collective through her/his language use, we need to remember that the linguistic effects or specificities of the speech are not merely shaped by the speaker’s membership of a particular sexual
category but equally by the speaker’s investment “in the idea of membership.” In this regard, I want to underscore, academics are simply yet another community of speakers. Consequently, the oppositional positions in the debate on what to prioritise when addressing sexuality through language use can be viewed as conflictual investments of the participants in the idea of subscribing to identity versus desire as the dominant meaning of “outlaw” sexuality. This, in turn, entails producing a categorisation of the LGBT collectives and individuals in terms of identity versus desire, making sense of their belonging in the collectives in terms of either one or the other. I want to argue that what is at stake in the debate, then, is to be able to make a claim to membership in a transgressive sexual collective that will now be produced in terms of their own logic of sexual categorisation. Furthermore, this also means that neither of these positions implicates the proponents in the explanatory value of categorisation itself, even if the desire based approach believes that it is only the identity based approach that is “guilty” of valorising the cultural practice of differentiating people in terms of sexuality based categories. I argue therefore that the obstacle to a transgressive politics of knowledge production is not the fact that categorisation is inherently oppressive but the one-way critical gaze directed at the Other’s conceptual practices “out there,” which obstructs the attempt to forge some framework of non-exclusionary differentiation.

In a self-reflexive gesture, Cameron and Kulick ask explicitly: “What does a focus on desire have to offer that a focus on identity does not?” They see four advantages to the shift. Firstly, they observe that this change would acknowledge that “sexuality is centrally about the erotic.” In their opinion such realignment is all the more needed since research based on the identity paradigm, when analysing language use for finding linguistic indexes of speakers’ membership in a given LGBT collective, implicitly also draws on the category of desire “insofar as the relevant groups are defined by the nature of their desire.” Secondly, the shift would also acknowledge that “our erotic lives are shaped by forces which are not wholly rational and of which we are not fully conscious.” Thirdly, shaped in part by these unconscious forces, desire, unlike deliberate linguistic acts of identification, need to be explored through analysing genres in which we perform and represent desire, such as sex talk or flirting. Finally, the identity paradigm has its main emphasis on “the verbal presentation of the self, [while] the study of language and desire acknowledges that sexuality is relational or transitive: desire is always for someone or something.” Consequently, the identity paradigm “does not exhaust what there is to say about language and sexuality.”

I agree with Cameron and Kulick’s evaluation of the identity based paradigm in that it is predominantly focused on conscious claims to identity and/or the homophobic responses these claims are faced with, and that it runs
the risk of reductionism. However, I want to take issue with them on account of their ideological investments in the traditional exclusionary practices of categorisation in this evaluation. First of all, what is at stake in the change they propose is not a question of quantity and completion as the verb “exhaust” would imply. Nor is such an intention as neutral and disinterested as the chosen methodology of listing the missing apparently self-contained tasks would entail: “we suggested that the study of language and sexuality should encompass not only sexuality but also other dimensions of sexual experience, among which we mentioned ‘fantasy, repression, pleasure, fear, and the unconscious.’”15 It is much more about the competing logic as to which paradigm is better because self-sufficient due to its willingness to explicitly root itself in the “true” organisation of sexuality around the core of desire. Arguably, this is why they turn to Freudian psychoanalysis for their framework of conceptual practices.

I do not want to reiterate the various feminist criticisms of psychoanalysis by lesbian feminists or queer theorists here, but I would like to point out the telling blindness of the authors to those very critical voices, although they do make use of them when, for example, they draw on Judith Butler’s concept of performativity in Gender Trouble.16 Cameron and Kulick argue that we should move away from what Butler calls “epistemological [selfsame] account of identity to one which locates the problematic within practices of signification.”17 According to Cameron and Kulick,

Butler’s call is to move away from the temptation to ground linguistic practices in particular identity categories and to open up our analysis to exploring (rather than denying or lamenting) the ways that linguistic practices are inherently available to anyone to use for a wide variety of purposes, and to a wide variety of social effect.18

The irony here is that to replace an epistemologically understood identity for an equally epistemologically presumed foundational desire, which corresponds “best” with the researcher’s sense of “outlaw” sexuality, does not result in a different politics of sexuality. The issue, in my opinion, is not desire over identity but, much more in line with Butler’s performative contingency, the possibility of a non-exclusionary epistemology of categorisation.

In that case desire and identity will operate as different dimensions of sexuality, intersecting with one another, mediated but not exhausted by discursive signification that is always an effect of power relations. What matters, then, is whether spaces could emerge, in which power relations would no longer be oppressive and exclusionary but instead allow for their dialectic relation, with desire and identity internalising each other without
reducing one to the other. Such a move will also implicate both aspects as matters of relationality.

When Cameron and Kulick argue in favour of a desire based paradigm because desire, unlike identity, is relational, they do not in fact move in the direction of a socially located intertextuality but abstract it from any other dimensions of sexuality, such as identity or practice, and from any other organisation of social activities, such as division of labour or cultural consumption. This move produces the effect that one is always a sexual being, regardless of the particular social and cultural context, and that this is so because of an essentially self-same primordial desire for the Other of the “same sex.” Ironically then, their logic of abstract valorisation of relationality delivers the ideological gain of an “inherently pro-democratic” research model, provided sexuality is argued to be inflected with desire only. This position reminds me of the tradition in feminist conceptualisations of autobiography that equally opts for reversing the logic of devaluing women’s ways of telling stories and argues that those ways are valuable precisely because of their orientation towards the Other.¹⁹

There are two relevant aspects of feminist autobiography research on relationality. Firstly, relationality as a constitutive feature is discussed in the context of the textually mediated sense of the self, that is, identity. Contrary to Cameron and Kulick’s proposition, orientation to the Other is not inherently and exclusively the property of desire. Secondly, as far as the politics of critical research are concerned, a mere celebratory reversal of dominant conceptual practices concerning women’s life does not result in a transgressive position. The celebratory framework inevitably bypasses the possibility of a critical reading of relationality as a strategic conformity to propriety, which is hardly indicative of any transgressive difference to the dominant logic of sacrificing the self for the interests of the Other. Therefore, I argue that to be able to see whether (the theorisation of) orientation to the Other, either in terms of the linguistically mediated act of the self or that of desire, maintains the hetero-patriarchal status quo, or whether it is part of a transgressive project, we need a dialectical model of connectedness. Such a model may analyse the intertextual contingencies of the particular modes of relating and look out for the conditions of building a non-exclusionary frame of relationality.

A critical engagement with the desire based model, then, entails an intertextual deconstruction, aimed at destabilising the desire versus identity divide through two steps. First, I expose a contradiction between the claims that - to the extent it is discursively mediated - desire is a social construct and that desire is essentially oriented towards the Other of the “same” sex. Second, I expose that the vested interest in conceptualising desire as an isolated, therefore never contingent, ontological category lies in further privileging the lesbian or other “outlaw” collectives of privilege, for instance
amongst academic researchers, through the idea that lesbians are women who desire other women. That is, the exclusively sexually defined imaginary “outlaw” sexual being is made possible by attributing to her/him the autonomy from exploitative social relations such as class or race. What is more, such a reductionist ontology may also come to serve the very interest of the dominant logic of straight sexuality, ascribing sex-based desire as the cause of sexuality. However, once we see sexuality as a matrix inflected by other dimensions of hierarchical arrangements of social practices, we can forge a discourse of sexuality oriented to a transformative politics. As Rosemary Hennessy puts it in her self-reflexive criticism of the major feminist models of desire by Theresa de Lauretis, Elizabeth Grosz, and Judith Butler:

A politics built on abstracted desires may be the privilege of those for whom survival is not a pressing daily concern, but it also lures those whose struggle to survive is laced with sexual oppression into a collectivity that splits their sexuality from their survival needs. For some of us, unlearning the privilege of rallying around our sexual desires may indeed be a loss, but a loss of this privilege does not require that we forfeit critical attention to sexuality.20

3. Redefining Identity: Identity-in-Progress

The corollary of an intertextual approach to identity is that the individual subject is neither transparent, in an unproblematic referential relation to her/his non-discursive material sexual practices, nor is she/he “dead” in the sense of a purely textual construction, excluded from any agency. Rather, the individual becomes a subject/agent in Judith Butler’s sense of the word.21 Consequently, it becomes a meaningful political project to explore the dialectics of complicity and transgression in any given configuration of identity based practices without reifying identity as an inherently exclusionary concept. It is no longer assumed to be a unified and unifying construct, nor an utterly contingent pattern of signification, but is inserted into the constraining conditions of its formation. This process involves relatively stable, textually mediated organisations of practices that achieve a contingent permanence. What matters, then, is the exploration of the moment when this process of identity formation comes to be informed by a non-exclusionary logic of power relations. I argue that the need for knowledge of “outlaw” sexuality collectives is best served if we see that the two discourses of identity versus desire do not necessarily entail that we should take sides. The debate around whether language and sexuality studies should be evolving in terms of identity or desire is a non-productive
dichotomy. One cannot delineate sexuality along either dimension but should perceive it at the intersection of both. Moreover, I consider this the strategy that best satisfies the reformulation of our scientific framework in the current context of the LGBT agendas’ shifts towards identity-based social movements.

We can reformulate the debate in language and sexuality research as a struggle not about what categories to use, if any, but how to categorise. In the quest for a non-exclusionary model of categorisation, Allison Weir’s theorisation of the self proves promising for replacing the dominant individualised concept of the self with a progressively relational one.22 In my PhD research I summed up the two distinctive conceptual changes proposed by her model as follows:

One is the recognition of the connectedness of the self to the other/s, that is, the intersubjective nature of the self. The other is the recognition of heterogeneity, non-identity within the self. This way identity is not necessarily a product of the repression of difference achieved via the negation of non-identity. It is not reduced to the repression, exclusion of the other (meaning either the other self or otherness as such). The model fosters difference both by accommodating the non-identity of the other/s in relation to the self as well as by accepting non-identity within the self.23

Weir’s self is not a self-contained subject present-to-itself any longer but a subject-in-process of negotiating with Others, while the dominant concept of the autonomous self is seen as a disengaged and seemingly self-contained individual. However, Weir conceptualises relationality in terms of Julia Kristeva’s concept of the affective relationship of the child to her/his primary caretaker, typically the mother. Drawing on Kristeva,24 Weir defines relationality as the “promise of the gift of meaning,”25 which positions the Other as the enabling source for recognising nonidentity in the self. The ontological condition for difference to be partially included within the self is said to be the child’s recognition of the mother’s internal differentiation, which takes place through the mother’s failure to satisfy all her/his demands because she has another meaning in her life beyond the child. The child needs to learn that there is another realm of meaning that can satisfy desires. Through its affectionate relationship with the mother, the child is able to identify with the mother’s desire for that meaning. In short, the child learns to identify with the mother’s linguistic means of participation in a shared meaning. Note that the child’s participation in shared meanings is achieved via a de-historicised glorification of an “affective relationship,” an affective
investment in discourse with others, based in an abstract concept of desire, which is not a matter of power struggle but of intellectual “discovery.” Desire here stands for an idealised “common bond,” an inherently pleasurable process of relating to a loved one. Consequently, Weir does not need to attend to the differentiation of actual practices of relating to the Other, but is able to abstract theory away from the politics and practices of categorisation to glorify what might be termed “affectionate mothering.” That is why she is not troubled by the need to qualify relationality further as “inclusionary.”

According to a social theorisation of inclusionary relationality, the task of the analyst is precisely to explore whether the social and political conditions of relating to others and self may allow for an “identity” not conflated with domination of the Self over the Other. This can be achieved by a critical intertextual analysis of the gaps or discontinuities between ideals of sexual identities promoted in a given polity and the (discursively mediated) practices of sexuality not legitimised by the identity categories involved, hence determining to what extent it is possible to disidentify with them.

4. Feminism and Sexual Identity: Queering the Lesbian

In this section I translate the general concerns about identity to the meaning of “lesbian” through mapping queer onto lesbianism. The main thrust of my argumentation is concerned with the re-articulation of Judith Butler and Tamsin Wilton’s positions, challenging the prevailing normative discourses of sexual(ity based) identity.

While discussing what it means to be critically queer, that is, conceptualising the conditions of escaping reiterative discourses of normalcy and of producing non-normalising knowledges of sexuality, Judith Butler makes two important observations. One is concerned with the politics of categorisation. In this context Butler rethinks the separability of sexuality and gender for analytical purposes and argues that debate between researchers of feminist and queer theory over the relationship of sexuality and gender is in part negotiated between discourses based in identification and desire. In her opinion, the difficulty of imagining the relationship of the two domains of practices consists in a “keeping open an investigation of their complex interimplication.” In my reading of Butler, a queer critical practice entails a practice of conceptualisation that is informed by the logic of relative differentiation, one that does not force the analyst to be complicit with the dominant discourses of essentialising either identity or desire. In short, gender and sexuality as analytical categories of identity are to be conceptualised as intertextually linked dimensions of the category of the (lesbian) woman. In Butler’s view, this open approach will also entail the possibility of theorising sexual difference within homosexuality. In other words, Butler acknowledges the relevance of different sexual experiences for the construction of a queer theoretical model of sexual identity.
The other relevant observation Butler makes is concerned with the locus of the language of such a queering project. She contends that, in the absence of new non-normalising discourses of sexuality, researchers need to turn to non-academic practices of conceptualisation in LGBT movements. She emphasises that her example of gender-as-drag, should not be viewed as “exemplary of [all forms of] performativity” but only as one particular example of performing gender parody, and one that is apparently an example of a transgressive practice of sexuality. Consequently, the absence of transgressive conceptual categories functions as a sort of enabling ontological condition of communication, “This not owning one’s words is there from the start, since speaking is always in some ways the speaking of a stranger through and as oneself.” I hold that this stranger speaking through oneself can be reformulated as the model of a relational identity, where the “stranger” gets articulated in the self as non-identity.

However, Butler’s queering ends up in a contradictory position. It is a contradictory position in that Butler argues in favour of the non-academic field of “outlaw” sexuality, not only as another field of multiple discourses of sexuality but as a better place for forging a transgressive vocabulary for describing the difficult interplay of destabilising gender identifications within homosexuality. It comes to be assumed to be “the” locus, because it is outside of the dominant institutional locations of social control. Ironically, the ideological subtext of the model, informed by the Foucauldian idea of the “positive” because dispersed and therefore apparently non-locatable power, comes to be exposed on its own terms. The non-reflexive valorisation of the marginal cannot achieve more than a desperate gesture of hope, since the ontology of Butler’s redefined queer is purely discursive in nature. With all dimensions of social existence reduced to discursivity, Butler cannot develop any analytical concepts to link “queer” systematically with its ideological investments. Consequently, the margin is either ascribed to be a space saturated with inherently non-exclusionary relations of power, or else Butler needs to address the problem of the directionality of power. Butler’s anxiety about securing openness seems to push her instead into conflating directionality with determinism and maintaining her investment in power as constitutive but non-locatable. That logic will simply produce the declaration that non-academic LGBT identifications is an ideal field to turn to, since it is a dense site of multiple signification outside of the heteronormative matrix. This misses the question of what enabling conditions might first render this engagement possible at all and what might open up a future mode of community that is not informed by the sacrificial logic of identification with the Same. Implicitly, Butler simply evokes her previous position on the “referential function of the name [of a category] as performative.” On this basis, all we may argue is that the transgressive politics of the term “queer” as a performativ signifier consist in its constitutive instability, which is the
discursive effect of a dense intersection of differential social relations of
discourse. In other words, queer turns out to be losing its political potential in so
far as in Butler’s ontology any term is assumed to gain or lose its stability “to
the extent that it remains differentiated and that differentiation serves
political goals.”\(^{30}\) The naïve trust in non-academic LGBT discourses of
sexuality as “much more instructive” for theory, because “historically
embedded in gay communities,”\(^{31}\) results in conflating the difference between
progressive and conservative critical research in Harding’s sense of the term.
If the non-academic field of LGBT movements is potentially more instructive
for a progressive model of sexuality, I suggest that this has got to do with
lesser degrees of institutional(ised) social control over terminologies and less
standardisation of language use from within the marginalised locus of
“outlaw” sexuality. Though also a site of struggle, it is one where ways of
linguistically signalling sexuality have not been temporarily institutionalised
through the ideal of a “standard,” as has been the case in heterosexuality.

My choice of the Labrisz project for analysis seems to follow
Butler’s expectations. As a non-academic text, it may be more of a source for
queering the meaning of “lesbian” than academic discourses. However, as my
analysis aims to demonstrate, the dominant discursive practice informing the
NGO text is that of a self-inflected silencing of desire, a strategy of pre-
empting excessive homophobic responses. As such, the NGO text is the
effect of hegemonic relations of power, except for one moment of
transgression achieved by the non-exclusionary intersection of identity and
desire in the meaning production of “outlaw” sexuality (see Item 9 below).

The position I found helpful for conceptualising sexual identity as
potentially open to change, without abstracting it from power as a directional
concept, is that of Tamsin Wilton.\(^{32}\) She discusses various models of sexual
identity that reinforce different claims to “truth” about the sexual self. In
order to avoid complicity in the project of oppressive social control, Wilton
chooses the particular location of the “lesbian.” Although I am not going to
address the particular forms of “outlaw” sexualities in the analysis of the
NGO text, it is important to underscore that LGBT sexualities should not be
ascribed a false homogeneity, not even vis-à-vis the discourses of normalcy.
In an extended analysis of the project itself, not possible here, I should
question the leaflet’s adherence to the narrative of a “homosexuality” \textit{per se}.

Wilton’s model of sexual identity argues for a dynamic \textit{les-being},
i.e. it emphasises \textit{lesbian doing} while still making a “politically strategic
claim” to the identity category of lesbian.\(^{33}\) This is a position that can cut
across the dividing boundary between queer versus lesbian feminist concepts
of identity. Like Butler, Wilton also understands the politics of naming,
observing that “[w]hat is certain is that \textit{the politics of naming} is at the heart
of lesbian studies.” But she continues in a very different direction and
supports the previous claim by \textit{inserting} the apparently linguistic question of
how to categorise the “lesbian” back into its social context. “It is not so much ‘the lesbian’ [the signifier] which we study, as the multiple, shifting processes which the lesbian body inhabits and enacts at the permeable meniscus between the social and the self.”

This logic pushes us beyond the assumption that “outlaw” sexuality, seen from within, is a neutral process. It makes us denaturalise the celebratory engagement with LGBT spaces, by reflecting on the actual relations of power promoting or hindering intellectual benefit from the various frameworks of sexuality operating within marginal spaces. This radical integration of the self, the body, and the social will open up the boundary of the “lesbian” to the dynamic discontinuities effected by the reflection on the differences of the passage of time and the crossings of space. Without considering the “lesbian” as a dense site of power struggle, I could not embark on a critical project and argue against the assumption of a reassuring permanent visibility of “outlaw” identity abstracted from desire.

5. Discourse Analysis of the Leaflet: Strategies of Defence

To support my proposition for a model of sexuality that presupposes the intersection of identity and desire I undertake a case study of the sex-educational project Melegség és megismerés (“Gayness and Knowledge”), launched in 2002 by Labrisz, the Lesbian Civil Organization in Budapest. Labrisz was and is the only officially registered Hungarian lesbian activist group, since it was first registered in November 1999 with 11 members. In 2002 the Lesbian organisation sent a letter to the directors of all Hungarian secondary schools (approximately 1300 institutions), promoting a sex-education programme as part of the official curriculum. The letter included a leaflet which, in nine points, sums up the most common stereotypes the organisation perceives to be dominant in contemporary Hungary, with each derogatory prejudice followed by a counterargument. In the letter the NGO expresses its hope that, as an actual enactment of tolerance, the schools will take the opportunity and invite its members to foster a safe space for classroom inquiry about “outlaw” sexual identities through discussions with self-identified and therefore authentic members of such communities. The text I am going to analyse is the actual leaflet the NGO attached to their letter of introduction. The linguistic analysis of the conflicting points produced through the rhetoric of argumentation aims to explore the predominantly defensive strategy of the NGO’s self-perception and the unexpected ruptures of its liberatory logic brought about by the discursive articulation of homosexual desire. More to the point, this explicit formulation functions as an integrated part of a more general framework of identity politics.

The following discourse analysis of the emerging meanings of lesbian/ness and gay/ness will explore firstly, the extent to which the NGO text successfully exploits the weaknesses of the heterosexual norm by deconstructing various stereotypes and, secondly, the extent to which it offers
any genuine alternative discourse of “outlaw” sexuality, which strategically “queers” the subject position of the lesbian, keeping it potentially open to change and preventing it from an identitarian fixation.

As I have said before, the nine stereotypes, cited in translation, are meant to serve as strategic sites for developing a competing perspective that should support the NGO’s “visibility” project, when introducing themselves as LGBT members in the classroom. My analysis exposes the rhetoric of argumentation in the claims, counterclaims and the implied meanings of the emerging LGBT identities.

1. In a homosexual relationship one party plays the role of man and the other that of the woman.
   That is not true. In a homosexual relationship the partners should share the characteristic features of both genders one way or another. That is, neither is “playing” the other gender.35

   What is contested by the NGO’s logic in Item 1 is the denial of a differential way of being non-normative, the degradation into pretence, the hetero/homo divide itself. However, there is no contestation of an equally bipolar mobilisation of gender. Instead of seeing gender as a dividing principle of categorisation, it is reduced into “two genders.” As a result, the implied claim to a non-linearity between sexuality and gender in the statement “the partners should share the characteristic features” runs into a self-jeopardising contradiction. The claim to sexual multiplicity cannot be supported by the male/female polarity of gender roles retained in the phrasing “of both genders.”

2. They have no permanent relationships.
   Not true. Many lesbians and gays live in permanent relationships. The fact that many do not dare to be open about it in public is a heavy burden that makes co-habitation difficult - nevertheless, many are able to live in a stable relationship.

   A perspective of ambiguous hybridity informs Item 2. A discourse of self-blame - “do not dare” (because cowardly) - merges with an implied criticism of the hostility enacted by the dominant social behaviours and values, summed up by the collocation “heavy burden” that indicates oppressive forces imposed from outside. Nonetheless, this is a successful displacement of the original logic of the stereotype that rests on the implied meaning of some unruly, volatile homosexuality, which supposedly pushes LGBT people on to yet another affair. The success consists not so much in
the stability of the gay relationships, which could easily run the risk of normalisation, as in the achievement of any relationship in spite of an extremely hostile and as such stressful environment.

3. Gay men are paedophiles and child molesters.
   Not true. There are a lot less homosexual men molesting children than heterosexual ones.

   Missing in Item 3 is the contestation of the criminalisation of “outlaw” sexualities in the first place. The alleged higher number of perpetrators on one side, so to speak, will not contest the legitimate/criminal divide itself. What’s more, it could easily be countered by the same quantifying logic, arguing that the lower number is “due to” the lower ratio of gay men in the general population and as such paedophilia is “naturally confined” to a “minority” only.

4. Homosexuality is caused by childhood trauma.
   Not true. Nobody knows what makes someone “become” homosexual. There are various theories, which contend various propositions about heredity or social influence. Most homosexuals experienced no hardships in their childhood.

   Note here that there is no hypothetical question formulated to the same effect as at the end of Item 5 below, something like: Why should we need to know it at all? Do we (want to) know the “causes” of heterosexuality in our childhood? Without that critical voice, the argument risks slipping into an obsession with the original cause. And any quest for a shared origin will inevitably mobilise the same exclusionary logic of collective membership that motivates the heteronormative myth of belonging. Besides, because of the psychological pathologisation of “outlaw” sexualities evoked by the word “trauma,” this slippage comes to be informed by the moralising logic of accountability or discipline. Nevertheless, the quotation marks around “will become” indicate a potential site for departure from the logic of anchoring sexual identity once and for all. It may echo the difference between “I am a lesbian” and “I advocate lesbianism” as formulated by Wilton, 36 where the dynamism of the transitive verb can successfully contest the effect of the copula of “be,” which would imply the transparent assumption of a self-contained location for good.
5. The children of homosexual people will be homosexual too.
   Not true. Many studies prove that children raised by same sex couples are not more likely to become homosexual than children in other sex couples. But there arises the question too: Why should it be a problem if that were the case?

   As observed above, Item 5 is a successful contestation of the origin(al sin) model, even if the polarity and complementarity of the two genders is left in place by the distinction “same sex” versus “other sex couples.” This success is the effect of the question at the end of the contesting paragraph, reversing the stereotype against its own logic.

6. Homosexuals feel attracted to everyone of the same sex.
   Not true. Homosexuals do not feel attracted to everyone of the same sex indiscriminately. They have as high expectations of their partners as heterosexuals.

   The homogenising problem with the NGO’s general strategy of “we are people just like them” emerges most tellingly at this point: its direction is always only one-way. Seen from the problem of unidirectional comparison, the issue of the missing question after Item 4 (and in general from the end of all entries besides Item 5), can be reformulated in terms of this reinforcing normalisation of heterosexuality that always functions as the point of departure for any comparison with the various sexualities in question.

7. If we spread positive information about homosexuals, then there will be an increase in their number.
   Not true. Knowing about gay people does not make you homosexual. On the other hand, there are more people daring to live as homosexuals since information about them reduces prejudice and repudiation.

   Item 7 is the most visible moment of the missing displacement of the dominant logic. It could easily have been formulated as a question such as “Why should we be concerned about the growth of their number anyway?” Since the self-defined objective of the NGO is to create a space in the classroom where students can try to define for themselves the meaning of “outlaw” sexualities, the systematic use of these questions of displacement would have been a more effective strategy than staying within the dominant culture’s logic of “we are as nice as you/them” - even if the questions might provoke some explicit homophobic responses in the classroom. Perhaps, the
NGO participants’ reports after the encounters to the effect that the students did not articulate a strongly homophobic disposition, indeed, hardly any at all in comparison with the emerging voices in the media and the political field, could have to do partly with this strategic avoidance of a more confrontational formulation of the contestations. Interestingly, the NGO members were much more ready to explain the high level of tolerance of the students in terms of the disciplinary power of the classroom setting itself.

8. One becomes homosexual because his/her relationship with members of the other sex is not good.
Not true. Homosexuality has nothing to do with how much one attracts members of the other sex. It means that one feels attracted to others in his/her own sex.

With Item 8 we have arrived at the point where I must address the other most telling feature of the NGO’s avoidance strategy, the embarrassing avoidance of any explicit implication of sexual practices - except in the context of the criminal conduct of male paedophile practices in Item 3! This self-inflicted silencing of “outlaw” sexual practice through wordings such as the desexualised choice of “relationship” and the barely charged term of “attraction” instead of “desire” or “pleasure”, so as to avoid the unspoken but assumed accusations of “doing” homosexuality in the classroom when talking about it, only serves the interests of that kind of zero tolerance. Such evasion remains caught within the homophobic logic that conflates physical injury and discursive injury, in order to silence any form/degree of “outlaw” erotic explicitness in case of being charged with disseminating pornography.

The strategic avoidance of this aspect of LGBT identity is made explicit both in the covering letter addressed to the schools, saying that their representatives will refuse to talk about actual sexual practices, as well as in the course of the training for the participating NGO members, which emphasises the importance of refusing to discuss one’s own practices for fear of unmanageable situations arising in the classroom. Such self-inflicted silencing can easily link the dispersed points of trauma in Item 4 and the argument of frequency in Item 5, turning the former into the cause of the latter: accusing non-heterosexual parents of a criminal act of exposing their children to some sort of pornographic sexual behaviour. This trajectory may easily construct a shared ground between Items 4 and 5 and the already criminalised act of “child molestation” in Item 3! Instead of affectionate caring and erotica, we have merely the medical discourse of heterosexuality, evoking some mechanistic, clockwork activity, if any at all, in fact justifying the unspoken outrage over the inherent pornography attributed to “outlaw” sexualities, which are always already assumed to be implicated in “perverse” and dehumanising brutal acts.
9. Gays and lesbians intend to provoke with their behaviour.
Anything that in the case of a heterosexual couple is not considered to be showing off, such as wearing a wedding ring, walking hand in hand, keeping the photo of the other on their desk, is considered by many to be provocative in the case of same sex lovers. Yet these gestures are part of a relationship - everyone has the right to show their emotions.

My point above about the missed chance of displacing homophobia through voicing “outlaw” erotic sexual practices, moments of affectionate desire, etc. is in fact supported by the success of the line of argumentation in Item 9. Note, straight away, the difference of the opening in this session. There is no need for the usual denial - “Not true.” - for framing the counterargument. Why? Arguably, because the direction of the displacement here is not caught within the logic of the contested stereotype. Instead, we have an appeal to the logic of some legal discourse: sexuality is rearticulated in terms of the universal right to one’s feelings and, by way of implication, to their open enactment. Even if the gestures of affection the homosexual lovers perform (such as wearing rings, walking hand in hand, let alone displaying a picture of the loved one at one’s place of work) have nothing to do with erotica proper, their mitigated emergence in relation to the “lover” may work as textual sites for recognition. Once the NGO discourse seems to trust its own capacity to handle the emerging space for passion, no matter how mitigated, a shift in perspective can emerge. I’m afraid the NGO’s investment in the importance of authenticity cannot come about without this different framing of the matter. Even more to the point, this moment of emancipation comes from within the position of the NGO trusting its own desire.

6. Conclusion
If the ultimate aim of the NGO project is to make students recognise and know that “they [LGBT people] are just like any other people,” then the perspective of this counter-discourse is untenable because, as my analysis has shown, it will end up caught within the normative discourses of homophobia, re-inscribing the normality/deviance divide and rendering homosexual erotic desire and pleasure as perversion and, as such, “rightly” criminalised acts of unruly forms of sexuality. The latter is especially problematic in my view because of its exclusionary identitarian move. It consists in reducing and confining “outlaw” sexualities, in effect, to sex as an ontological category, moreover one that is inherently “sick.” As a result, it legitimises the ideological investments of the various normative institutions in controlling the subversive power of non-normative sexualities by silencing gay erotica,
anchoring this technology of discipline in and through an appeal to the right to privacy, while hiding the flip side of any rights rhetoric, namely the duties and responsibilities expected to be delivered in return to the state.

To sum up my position then, it is precisely the expected unruliness of “outlaw” sexual desire and pleasure that emerges in Item 9 as a potential source of queering the (self-)policed boundaries of LGBT identities. Furthermore, it occurs vis-à-vis the self-identified strategy of avoiding anything that runs the risk of explicitly relating to sexual erotica, to matters of practice, pleasure, or desire. What could we learn from the emergence of this transgressive intertextuality in the NGO leaflet as far as language use and sexuality is concerned, especially when academic discourses of sexuality have become the focus for conflict in their own right? In an article critically exposing so-called conversation analysis, another established mode of linguistic analysis, Celia Kitzinger revisits the various conversation data bases to see how the world is constructed and maintained as “naturally” heterosexual in everyday talk-in-interaction.37 Crucially, Kitzinger argues that “outlaw” sexualities, unlike straight collectives of speakers, occupy non-symmetrical relations to discursive resources of assumptions for constructing their sexuality as “ordinary.” When using reference terms to kinship relations, such as identification of the other with reference to their spouse, or telling stories of notable events of their lives, implicating heterosexual institutions such as family, marriage, courtship, or health care, etc., straight collectives will position themselves as “ordinary,” because these linguistic devices automatically evoke the corresponding hetero-normative institutional organisations of life. These organisations act as the interpretative frame, which is taken for granted by the listening members of their normative speech community for what gets explicitly said in the interaction. In my view, the asymmetrical relation to power is especially informative for a progressive critical research agenda when the linguistic interaction is not thematised explicitly around anything “sexual,” whether that be identity or desire. The marginalisation, the exclusionary differentiation between straight and “outlaw” sexualities is played out through this set of (non-discursive) institutions of legitimacy, not as readily available as the necessary interpretative framework for “outlaw” sexualities. Consequently, if they do make assumptions about familial, intimate, or any other relations, they are likely to be heard as “making an issue of” the speaker’s sexuality - even if that is not what they believe they are doing.

Finally, let me underscore that it is this hegemonic distribution of access to “ordinary” assumptions, which serves as the foundation for the dominant set of conceptual frameworks. Paradoxically, Labrisz’ general strategy of defence, the self-inflicted silence it decided to opt for, will not be able to redefine the general landscape of straight privilege and implicit, seen-
but-unnoticed membership in the heterosexual category, precisely because it
tries to mobilise a non-available reciprocity of shared assumptions.

Notes

1. The works that I find most representative of the two positions, are, on
the British side, D Cameron and D Kulick, Language and Sexuality,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge & New York, 2003; and D
Cameron, On Language and Sexual Politics, Routledge, London &
New York, 2006; and, on the US side of the dividing line, W Leap
(ed.), Beyond the Lavender Lexicon: Authenticity, Imagination and
Appropriation in Gay and Lesbian Languages, Gordon and Beach,
Buffalo, New York, 1995; W Leap, Word’s Out: Gay Men’s English,
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1996; and A
Livia and K Hall (eds.), Queerly Phrased: Language, Gender and

2. On the meaning of critical self-reflexive research I have found
important arguments in S Harding, ‘Rethinking Standpoint
Epistemology: What is “Strong Objectivity?”’, in L Alkoff and E Potter
(eds.), Feminist Epistemologies, Routledge, London & New York,
1993, pp. 49-82; N Fraser, ‘What’s Critical about Critical Theory?’
, in J Meehan (ed.), Feminists Read Habermas: Gendering the Subject of
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Politics of Empowerment, Routledge, New York, 1991; D Haraway,
‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the
Privilege of Partial Perspective’, Feminist Studies, vol. 14, no. 3, 1988,
pp. 575-599.

3. R Hennessy, Materialist Feminism and the Politics of Discourse,

4. Ibid., p. 46.

Intertextuality, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1990, pp. 45-
56, p. 46.

Epistemological Resources for Social Justice Movements’, in LM
Alcoff, M Hames-Garcia, SP Mohanty and PML Moya (eds.), Identity
Politics Reconsidered, Palgrave Macmillan, New York & Houndmills,
2006, pp. 246-263, p 249, emphasis added.

7. Ibid., p. 260.

8. D Cameron, ‘Rethinking Language and Gender Studies: Some Issues
for the 1990s’, in S Mills (ed.), Language and Gender:


11. Ibid., p. 106.

12. Ibid., p. 106.

13. Ibid., p. 107, emphasis in the original.


15. Ibid., p. 106.


17. Ibid., p. 144, emphasis in the original; cited in Cameron and Kulick, op. cit., p. 104.

18. Ibid., p. 104.


27. Ibid., p. 230.
29. Ibid., p. 216.
30. Ibid., p. 218.
31. Ibid., p. 239.
33. Ibid., p. 42.
34. Ibid., p. 49, emphasis added.
35. The quotes are my translations taken from Már nem tabu - tanári kézikönyv a melegekről, leszbikusokról, biszexualisokról, transzneműekről, Labrisz Egyesület, OKKER, Budapest, 2002. The emphases are my own, so as to highlight wording which is particularly relevant for the analysis.

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Labrisz Egyesület, Már nem tabu - tanári kézikönyv a melegékkról, leszbikusokról, biszexuaálisokról, transzneműekről, Labrisz Egyesület, OKKER, Budapest, 2002.


