Mittwoch, 21.10.2020
Gastvortrag ONLINE
Pragmatic Encroachment with Reasons
18:00 - 20:00 Uhr
Online, Online
Anmeldung ist nicht erforderlich
Eintritt / Kosten: Keine
Vortragende/r
Eva Schmidt
Eva Schmidt ist Juniorprofessorin für Theoretische Philosophie - mit einem Fokus auf Erkenntnis- und Handlungstheorie - an der TU Dortmund. Sie ist ein Principal Investigator des Projekts „Explainable Intelligent System“ (EIS), das von der VolkswagenStiftung unterstützt wird. Sie hat mehrere Aufsätze zu epistemischen und praktischen Gründen veröffentlicht, u.a. in Ethics und Philosophical Studies.
Weitere Informationen
Pragmatic encroachment is a widely discussed phenomenon, in which (arguably) pragmatic concerns affect the epistemic status of a belief (Stanley 2005, Fantl and McGrath 2002). I propose the Attenuators View (AV), according to which pragmatic encroachment on epistemic justification functions via pragmatic encroachment on epistemic reasons, which works by pragmatic considerations that attenuate epistemic reasons. (AV) is compatible with additional pragmatic encroachment from reasons to suspend.
I show that this proposal is better than Schroeder’s (2012a, 2012b, 2015, 2017) way of spelling out pragmatic encroachment in terms of reasons against believing – what I call the ‘Reasons View’ (RV). For (AV) does a better job distinguishing practical and epistemic reasons bearing on belief. First, it doesn’t appeal to the costs of believing falsely as reasons against believing; second, because of this, it doesn’t run the risk of tearing down the wall between practical and epistemic reasons bearing on belief. (AV) therefore also isn‘t threatened by related worries raised by Worsnip (forthcoming) for proponents of pragmatic encroachment.
Veranstalter
Institut für Christliche Philosophie
Doktoratskolleg Religionsphilosophie
ICPR - Innbruck Center for Philosophy of Religion