This talk examines the extent to which epistemic beliefs – in particular, truth relativism and truth realism – are linked to susceptibility to disinformation. Drawing on the findings of a recent study and related research, I examine whether truth relativism is associated with greater susceptibility to pseudo-truth-related nonsense and conspiracy theories, as well as a higher likelihood of sharing scientifically unfounded claims. The observed data suggest that such correlations exist independently of political ideology and point more to broader epistemic orientations than to party political affiliation alone. The results suggest that certain views on truth may be associated with a lower sensitivity to shared standards of evidence and justification. Addressing current challenges to truth and trust in democratic societies may therefore require not only consideration of institutional and technological factors, but also of the epistemic beliefs that shape the way in which citizens evaluate and disseminate information.
Julia Aspernäs is a psychologist and researcher specialising in vulnerability to disinformation and political psychology at Linköping University in Sweden.
A video recording of the lecture can be found at here.