Dr. Matteo Baggio, PhD (FWF)

Portrait von Federica Malfatti

Department of Christian Philosophy
Karl-Rahner-Platz 1 (2. Stock, Raum 202)
A-6020 Innsbruck

Tel.: +43 512 507-85001
E-Mail: matteo.baggio@unito.it

Areas of Research:

  • Epistemology
  • Social Epistemology
  • Philosophy of Logic
  • Philosophy of Mathematics

Matteo Baggio is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Innsbruck, where he holds an FWF ESPRIT grant as Principal Investigator of the project Movements of Thought (MoTI(n)F). His research lies at the intersection of epistemology, social epistemology, and the philosophy of logic and mathematics. He is particularly interested in how we acquire knowledge of logical and mathematical truths and, more recently, how AI systems affect understanding and knowledge.

Baggio studied philosophy at the University of Genoa (BA 2016, MA 2019) and holds an earlier BA in Economics from the University of Bologna. He completed his PhD in Cognitive Neuroscience and the Philosophy of Mind at IUSS Pavia in 2023, under the supervision of Prof. Andrea Sereni. His dissertation, Intuitions in Logic, defends a new version of moderate rationalism in the epistemology of logic. During his PhD, Baggio was a visiting scholar at the Complutense University of Madrid, under the supervision of Prof. Elia Zardini, and at the University of Bergen, under the supervision of Prof. Ole T. Hjortland.  

From 2024 to 2026, Baggio was a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Turin, where he worked on the PRIN-PNRR-funded project Controlling and Utilizing Uncertainty in the Health Sciences, under the supervision of Dr. Lorenzo Rossi. During this period, he was also a visiting fellow at the University of Innsbruck, under the supervision of Dr. Federica I. Malfatti.

Inference is the mental act of drawing a conclusion from premises. It underlies almost everything we call reasoning. Formal logic tells us a great deal about which arguments are valid, but it says little about what it is to make an inference. That question is still contested, and it has become pressing. Philosophers disagree about the nature and content of inference. Experts' inferences shape what the public believes, in an age of misinformation. And AI systems now produce outputs that look like reasoning.

MoTI(n)F addresses this with three questions:  

  1. What is inference? The project studies the nature and content of the inferential act. 
  2. Why does inference matter? It examines the social and epistemic role of experts' inferential practices, and how they ground epistemic authority. 
  3. Can non-human systems infer? It asks whether AI systems can genuinely infer, and what that would mean for knowledge and trust.


By bringing these questions together, the project aims to give a unified account of inference as both a mental act and a social practice.

What Logical Evidence Could Not Be. Philosophia (2023)51: 2559–2587.

Unfamiliarity in Logic? How to Unravel McSweeney's Dilemma for Logical Realism. Acta Analytica (2024) 39 (3): 439-465.

Logical epistemology, social evidence, and the a priori. Synthese (2025) 209 (205):1-28.

Knowledge from falsehoods reconsidered. Episteme (2025): 1-26.

Counter-closure principles in the age of complex software systems: a generalized challenge from AI. Social Epistemology (2025) 1-16.

Logical theories are harder to abduct. Erkenntnis (2026) 1-24.

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