

**Rudolf Kerschbamer**

# **Game Theory**

Module in the Master Program Applied Economics  
WS 12/13

## **General Remarks**

The course Game Theory consists of a weekly 3-hours lecture (LV-Nr.: 432163) and of a 1-hour proseminar (LV-Nr.: 432164). The 3-hours lecture has 6 ECTS and is given by Rudolf Kerschbamer, the 1-hour proseminar has 4 ECTS and is given by Daniel Neururer.

## **Requirements**

Basic knowledge of microeconomics as well as the willingness to deal with formal models are required. No previous knowledge of game theory is assumed.

## **Target Group**

First year Master students.

## **Course Credits within the Curriculum**

This course is compulsory for the Master Program Applied Economics.

## **Time and Place**

The lecture will take place weekly on Wednesdays from 12:00-14:45 in UR 3, starting **October 3, 2012**. The 1-hour proseminar will take place weekly on Thursdays from 18:00-18:45 in SR 4, starting **October 4, 2011**.

**The preliminary meeting for the whole course is on Wednesday, October 3, 12:00 am in UR 3.**

### Lecture and Exam Dates:

Mi 03.10. 12.00 - 14.00	UR 3	Lectures 0&1
Mi 10.10. 12.00 - 14.45	UR 3	Lecture 2
Mi 17.10. 12.00 - 14.45	UR 3	Lecture 3
Mi 24.10. 12.00 - 14.45	UR 3	Lecture 4
Mi 31.10. 12.00 - 14.15	UR 3	1st Exam
Mi 07.11. 12.00 - 14.45	UR 3	Lecture 5
Mi 14.11. 12.00 - 14.45	UR 3	Lecture 6
Mi 21.11. 12.00 - 14.45	UR 3	Lecture 7
Mi 28.11. 12.00 - 14.45	UR 3	Lecture 8
Mi 05.12. 12.00 - 14.15	UR 3	2nd Exam
Mi 12.12. 12.00 - 14.45	UR 3	Lecture 9
Mi 09.01. 12.00 - 14.45	UR 3	Lecture 10
Mi 16.01. 12.00 - 14.45	UR 3	Lecture 11
Mi 23.01. 12.00 - 14.45	UR 3	Lecture 12
Mi 30.01. 12.00 - 14.15	UR 3	3rd Exam

### Proseminar Dates:

Do 04.10. 18.00 - 18.45	SR 4	PS to L. 1
Do 11.10. 18.00 - 18.45	SR 4	PS to L. 2
Do 18.10. 18.00 - 18.45	SR 4	PS to L. 3
Do 25.10. 18.00 - 18.45	SR 4	PS to L. 4
Mi 31.10. 12.00 - 14.15	UR 3	1st Exam
Do 08.11. 18.00 - 18.45	SR 4	PS to L. 5
Do 15.11. 18.00 - 18.45	SR 4	PS to L. 6
Do 22.11. 18.00 - 18.45	SR 4	PS to L. 7
Do 29.11. 18.00 - 18.45	SR 4	PS to L. 8
Mi 05.12. 12.00 - 14.15	UR 3	2nd Exam
Do 06.12. 18.00 - 18.45	SR 4	PS to ????
Do 13.12. 18.00 - 18.45	SR 4	PS to L. 9
Do 10.01. 18.00 - 18.45	SR 4	PS to L. 10
Do 17.01. 18.00 - 18.45	SR 4	PS to L. 11
Do 24.01. 18.00 - 18.45	SR 4	PS to L. 12
Mi 30.01. 12.00 - 14.15	UR 3	3rd Exam

## Outline of Contents

Below is an outline of the course that roughly but not precisely corresponds to each class session:

### 1. Representation of Games

*Lecture 1 Representation of Games:* normal-form representation, extensive-form representation, information sets, random moves, histories, pure strategies, relationship between extensive-form and normal-form, mixed strategies and expected utility

### 2. Dominance

*Lecture 2 Static Games of Complete Information - Dominance:* (strictly) dominant strategies, (strictly) dominated strategies, iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, iterated deletion and rationality, mixed strategies and dominance

### 3. Static Games of Complete Information: Nash Equilibrium

*Lecture 3 Static Games of Complete Information - Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Finite Games:* definition of Nash equilibrium (NE), finding NE, best-response correspondences and NE, motivating NE, relation between NE and iterated deletion, existence of NE in pure strategies in finite games, multiplicity

*Lecture 4 Static Games of Complete Information - Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Finite (Discrete) Games:* definition of mixed strategy NE, finding mixed strategy NE, mixed best-response correspondences and mixed NE, motivating mixed NE, existence of (possibly mixed) NE in finite games

*Lecture 5 Static Games of Complete Information - Nash Equilibrium in Infinite (Continuous) Games:* finding NE in games with continuous strategy spaces, best-response correspondences and NE with continuous strategy spaces, strategic substitutes vs. strategic complements, applications in economics and finance, existence of NE in games with continuous strategy spaces

### 4. Dynamic Games of Complete Information: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

*Lecture 6 Dynamic Games of Complete Information - Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in Finite Games:* incredible threats and incredible promises, subgames, definition of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), finding SPNEs in games of perfect information (Backward Induction Procedure), finding SPNE in games of imperfect information (Generalized Backward Induction Procedure), NE versus SPNE, existence of SPNE in finite games

*Lecture 7 Dynamic Games of Complete Information - Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Perfect Information:* finding SPNE in continuous games of perfect information, SPNE outcome vs. SPNE, games of positive externalities vs. games of negative externalities, NEs of simultaneous-move vs. SPNE of sequential move games, costs and benefits of precommitment: first-mover advantage vs. second-mover advantage, strategic effect and direct effect of first-stage behaviour, applications

***Lecture 8 Dynamic Games of Complete Information - Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Imperfect Information:*** finding SPNE in continuous games of imperfect information, strategic precommitments to affect future interactions, formal analysis of incentives for precommitment, strategic effects and direct effects, Tirole's animal terminology to characterize commitment strategies, a graphical analysis of precommitment effects

***Lecture 9 Dynamic Games of Complete Information - Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in Games with (Potentially) Infinite Sequences of Moves:*** finding SGPE in games with (potentially) infinite sequences of moves, motivation for repeated games, finitely and infinitely repeated games, finitely repeated games with unique and with multiple NE in stage-game, one-stage-deviation principle, infinitely repeated games and discounting, applications of infinitely repeated games (cooperation in social dilemmas, collusion), characterizing SPNE outcome paths in payoff space (folk theorems), infinite horizon, infinite action bilateral bargaining

## **5. Static Games of Incomplete Information: Bayesian Equilibrium**

***Lecture 10 Static Games of Incomplete Information - Bayesian Equilibrium in Finite (Discrete) Games:*** incomplete information, Harsanyi transformation, definition of Bayesian equilibrium (BE), finding BE in finite games, correlated types, applications, existence of BE in finite games  
BE

***Lecture 11 Static Games of Incomplete Information - Bayesian Equilibrium in Infinite (Continuous Action and/or Continuous Type Spaces) Games:*** definition of BE in games with continuous action and/or continuous type spaces, finding BE in games with continuous action and/or continuous type spaces, Cournot with asymmetric information on cost, purification of mixed strategies, first price auction

## **6. Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium**

***Lecture 12 Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information - Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Finite Games:*** motivation for definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), elements of PBE, definition of PBE, finding PBE, applications

***Lecture 13 Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information - Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Signalling Games:*** definition of signalling game, translation of definition of PBE (for general games) to a definition of PBE for signalling games, finding PBE in signalling games, applications of signalling in economics and finance

***Lecture 14 Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information - Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium:*** implausible beliefs off-the-equilibrium-path, forward induction, domination-based refinements on beliefs, intuitive criterion, other refinements, applications

**Lectures 13 and 14 will not be covered in class and they are not relevant for the exams. The slides will be available, though.**

## References:

Although the slides are pretty much self-contained, it does make sense to take a look at a textbook. Useful references are:

Gibbons, R., *A Primer in Game Theory*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed., Harvester/Wheatsheaf, New York 1992

Myerson, R., *Game Theory - Analysis of Conflict*, 1st ed., Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1991

Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole, *Game Theory*, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991

Mas-Colell, A., M. Whinston and J. Green, *Microeconomic Theory*, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford 1995

Binmore K., *Fun and Games*, D.C. Heath & Co., Lexington 1992

Osborne, M. J., *An Introduction to Game Theory*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004

Kreps, D. M., *Game Theory and Economic Modelling*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1990

## Course Requirements

*Regular attendance in class:* Regular attendance and participation in class is expected. If you cannot attend for any reason, please inform us per e-mail. Please don't provide any reasons, just inform us that you cannot attend.

*Problem sets:* To help you to gain ease in applying the tools of non-cooperative game theory, there will be weekly problem sets. Please work on the problems in small groups (comprising no more than four students each)

*Participation in three written exams:* The three exams include material from both parts of the course. You find the exam dates and places on one of the earlier pages

**Please note the above dates now, and keep them free from any other obligations. We can offer alternative exam dates only in exceptional circumstances.**

## Grading Scheme for this Course:

Will be announced in one of the first meetings.

## Registration

Registration by computer. **Attendance in the first meeting (October 4) is nevertheless required!**