Department of Economics - University of Innsbruck
Literatur-Seminar WS 05/06
Learning
Rudolf Kerschbamer
Zeit: Montags von 14:30-16:30 Uhr
Ort: Besprechungsraum des Institutes für FIWI, 4. Stock, SoWi
10.10.05 |
Vorbesprechung |
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Social/Observational Learning:
24.10.05 |
GALE, D. (1996), "What Have We Learned from Social Learning?" European Economic Review 40, 617-628.
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BANERJEE, A and D. FUDENBERG (2004), "Word-of-Mouth Learning," Games and Economic Behavior 46, pp. 1-22
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07.11.05 |
AVERY, C. and P. ZEMSKY (1998) "Multidimensional Uncertainty and Herd Behavior in Financial Markets", American Economic Review 88, 724-748 |
Learning in Games:
1) Adaptive Learning Models
14.11.05 |
FUDENBERG, D. and D. KREPS (1995), "Learning in Extensive-Form Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibria", Games and Economic Behavior 8, 20-55.
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21.11.05 |
FUDENBERG, D. and D. KREPS (1993), "Learning Mixed Equilibria", Games and Economic Behavior 5, 320-367.
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MILGROM, P. and J. ROBERTS (1991), "Adaptive and Sophisticated Learning in Normal Form Games", Games and Economic Behavior 3, 82-101 |
2) Evolutionary Dynamics
28.11.05 |
WEIBULL, J. (1995), "Evolutionary Game Theory", MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., Ch. 2 & 3
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Summary | |
VAN DAMME, E. (1994), "Evolutionary Game Theory", European Economic Review 38, 847-858 |
Papier | ||
BINMORE, K. and L. SAMUELSON (1994), "Drift", European Economic Review 38, 859-867 |
Papier | ||
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WEIBULL, J. (1994), "The 'as if' Approach to Game Theory: Three Positive Results and Four Obstacles", European Economic Review 38, 868-881
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Papier | |
05.12.05 |
KANDORI, M., G. MAILATH, and R. ROB (1993), "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games", Econometrica 61, 29-56.
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Paper | |
YOUNG, P. (1993), "The Evolution of Conventions", Econometrica 61, 57-84. |
Paper | ||
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ELLISON, G. (2000), "Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution", Review of Economic Studies 67, pp.17-45. |
3) Sophisticated Learning Models: Bayesian Priors on Opponent's Strategies
12.12.05 |
KALAI, E. and E. LEHRER (1993), Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium", Econometrica 61, 1019-1045. |
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NACHBAR, J. (1997), "Prediction, Optimization, and Rational Learning in Games", Econometrica 65, 275-309.
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4) Other 'Learning-in-Games' Models
09.01.06 |
McKELVEY, R. and T. PALFREY (1995), "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior 10, 6-38.
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16.01.06 |
CAMERER, C. and T. Ho (1999), "Experience Weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games", Econometrica 67, 827-873 |
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STAHL, D. and P. WILSON (1995), "On Players' Models of Other Players – Theory and Experimental Evidence", Games and Economic Behavior 10, 213-154.
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23.01.06 |
CAMERER, C., T. HO and J. CHONG (2002), "Sophisticated EWA Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games", Journal of Economic Theory 104, 137-188. |
Paper | |
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CAMERER, C., T. HO and J. CHONG (2004), "A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games", Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 861-898. |
Ersatztermin:
30.01.06 |
Ersatztermin |
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Surveys: weitere Literatur:
- Sobel (2000) - Literaturliste
Rudolf Kerschbamer