

The Multiple Hierarchical Legislatures in Representative Democracy:

Districting for Policy Implementation

Katsuya Kobayashi and Attila Tasnadiz

We build a multiple hierarchical model of representative democracies in which, for instance, voters elect county representatives, county representatives elect district representatives, district representatives elect state representatives and state representatives elect Prime Minister, and show the policy determined by the final representative can become more extreme as the number of hierarchical levels increases. This result is brought by increasing the opportunities of gerrymandering in a number of hierarchical levels. Thus a sufficiently large number of voters gives the district maker advantages to implement her favorite policy. We also show that the range of implementable policies increases in the depth of the hierarchical system. Consequently carrying out a districting by a candidate in a hierarchical legislative system can be viewed as a sort of policy implementation device.

Keywords: Electoral Systems, Median Voter, Gerrymandering, Council Democracies.

JEL Classification Number: D72.